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INTRODUCTION
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution is an
enigma of increasing concern to the Supreme Court and to scholars.'
While its language is specific, technical, and limited,' the amendment has
been construed to embody or recognize a broad constitutional immunity
for states from being sued in federal courts. The Court first articulated
this view of the Eleventh Amendment in 1890 in Hans v. Louisiana,3 a
decision it has since adhered to and even expanded." Yet this principle of
immunity is in tension with two other fundamental constitutional princi-
ples: that the law will generally provide a remedy for rights violated by
the government ("governmental accountability") 5 and that the judicial
power of the United States over claims arising under federal law is as
1. See, e.g., C. JACOBS, THE 11TH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972); J. ORTH,
THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES (1987); Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 139
(1977); Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived
the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEo.
L.J. 363 (1985); Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part
One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1977) [hereinafter Field, Part I]; Field, The Eleventh Amendment and
Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 1203 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Part II]; Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Elev-
enth Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a
Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983); Nowak, The
Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the His-
tory of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); Shapiro, Wrong
Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV. 61 (1984); Tribe,
Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues
in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976).
2. See infra text accompanying note 28.
3. 134 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1890).
4. See, e.g., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (state cannot be sued
without its consent by foreign state); Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (suits in
admiralty against states barred).
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see generally Amar, supra note 1.
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broad, within its sphere, as is the legislative power of the United States
("full judicial power").'
To accommodate the conflict between these competing principles, fed-
eral courts have used a set of arcane doctrines to limit application of this
broad immunity. Thus, if a state officer is sued for a prospective injunc-
tion to restrain unconstitutional action, the doctrine of Ex parte Young'
permits adjudication of a direct challenge to state action on the fiction that
the state itself is not the defendant. In other instances, states are subject to
federal adjudication because of congressional abrogation of the immunity,8
or a state's supposed consent to the exercise of federal jurisdiction.9
These fictions ameliorate but do not eliminate the tension between ac-
countability and judicial power, on the one hand, and immunity on the
other. The constitutional status of the states' immunity continues to bar
important forms of relief on federal claims10 and to impose unusual barri-
ers to the exercise of Congress' power to overcome state immunity."1 It
thus remains important to ask: Does the Eleventh Amendment supply, or
imply, a constitutional immunity for states as to claims arising under fed-
eral law? This article argues that it does not and that the consequences of
the Court's acknowledging the error in its constitutional theory of state
sovereign immunity would be less drastic than might be thought.
The Eleventh Amendment, and the doctrine of state constitutional im-
munity from suit in federal courts which it represents, has long been per-
ceived as a doctrinal abyss, replete with inconsistencies borne of pragmatic
adjustments to the principle for which it supposedly stands. Many schol-
ars have concluded that Hans was wrongly decided insofar as it held that
federal courts are barred from exercising jurisdiction over a suit arising
under federal law and brought by a citizen against his own state." Al-
6. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19 (1824); Cohens v. Virginia,
19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 391-92 (1821); Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the
Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U.L. REv. 205 (1985); Amar, supra note 1, at 1481-84;
Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1074 n.170.
7. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
8. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (Congress has power under Fourteenth
Amendment to abrogate state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for monetary relief by pri-
vate individuals in federal court).
9. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled in part, Welch v. State
Dep't of Highways, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
10. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (no monetary award against state trustees of
public school fund even where breach of federal requirements alleged); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S.
64 (1985) (no declaratory judgment available to determine whether state's prior administration of
federal welfare program complied with controlling federal law).
11. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (Congress failed to make
sufficiently clear that state could be sued for monetary relief under Rehabilitation Act); cf. Pub. L.
No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-7 (West Supp.
1987)) (legislative response to Atascadero).
12. J. ORTH, supra note 1, at 157; Amar, supra note 1, at 1473-75; Fletcher, supra note 1, at
1078-87; Gibbons, supra note 1, at 2004; see also Tribe, supra note 1 (federal question jurisdiction
would extend to statutory claims where Congress abrogates immunity); cf. Field, Part II, supra note
1, at 1265-68 (Hans correct as interpretation of contracts clause under common law immunity).
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though divided on its precise outlines,"3 most modern scholarship would
limit the amendment's scope and its implications as to whether Article III
itself embodies a rule of state immunity. Several members of the Court
have recently embraced the view that the amendment does not bar federal
question jurisdiction, at least over claims by citizens against their own
states;"' the Court, however, remains divided on the fundamental meaning
of the amendment and on the implications of a revised understanding for
the states and federal courts. Indeed, in its most recent decision, Welch v.
State Department of Highways," the Court split four-four on whether the
Hans view was correct or should be overruled. The dispositive opinion by
Justice Scalia rested on statutory grounds but indicated that the Eleventh
Amendment issue was a difficult one, virtually inviting further efforts to
overrule Hans.18
Despite the wealth of scholarship on the history and meaning of the
amendment, relatively little attention has been paid to the effect of the
amendment on the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.17 The Court
13. This article and several other recent works see the amendment as a limited repeal of a party-
based head of jurisdiction, implying no constitutional immunity over claims arising under the federal
question or admiralty heads of jurisdiction. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 1. Others see the amend-
ment as embodying a rule of judicial restraint in implying causes of action against states but not as
constraining jurisdiction over claims created by Congress. See, e.g., Tribe, supra note 1. For a criti-
cism of this latter view, see infra Part III (A).
14. Compare Employees v. Department of Pub. Health, 411 U.S. 279, 313-15 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (Justice Brennan alone arguing that Eleventh Amendment, which by its terms prohib-
its only suits by out-of-state citizens against a state, has no application to federal question cases
brought by citizens against their own state) with Welch v. State Dep't of Highways, 107 S. Ct. 2941,
2964 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (three justices join Brennan's argument that Eleventh Amend-
ment does not apply to federal question cases, suits in admiralty, or to suits by citizen against own
state). Until 1984, Brennan alone viewed the Eleventh Amendment as not restricting citizen suits
against states for violations of federal law. After Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89 (1984), however, Justice Stevens explicitly disavowed reliance on stare decisis. In light of
the majority's alleged violation of stare decisis and the weight of evidence that Hans was "egregiously
incorrect," he joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, at 304 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall, who also joined the Brennan dissents
in Atascadero and Welch, had argued earlier that Hans was correct insofar as it concluded that
Article III embraced a constitutional immunity for the states from federal judicial power. Employees,
411 U.S. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2957-58 (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (questioning Hans' correctness).
15. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
16. Justice Powell, for the plurality, concluded that the state was not subject to suit in federal
court on a Jones Act claim to recover damages for injury suffered by a state employee, reiterating the
classic view that the Eleventh Amendment "embodies a broad constitutional principle of sovereign
immunity" that bars citizens (as well as noncitizens) from suing a state in admiralty or federal ques-
tion cases. Id. at 2952. Assuming arguendo that Congress might expressly abrogate such immunity,
he found no such express abrogation in the Jones Act's general application to "employers." Id. at
2947. Justice Brennan, for the four dissenters, argued that the Hans view of the amendment should
be overruled. Id. at 2970. Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that the general provisions of the
Jones Act providing a monetary remedy in federal court did not permit actions against states. Id. at
2957-58. His reasoning, however, did not depend on a constitutional principle of immunity. Rather,
he wrote, regardless of whether Hans was correct, its view of the amendment was widely held when
the Jones Act was passed and thus Congress could not be presumed to have intended the act to apply
to states.
17. The anomaly has been briefly noted in, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 295-96 n.51 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U.
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routinely asserts that the amendment bars the exercise of judicial power in
cases against states. Yet, just as routinely, it reviews state court decisions
involving claims against the states for monetary relief. 8 The conventional
reference point for this practice, Cohens v. Virginia,'9 simply does not
account for its breadth.
The contradictions of this element of the jurisprudence are striking,
particularly after Green v. Mansour.20 The Court there held that a fed-
eral district court could not award declaratory relief against a state official
if the judgment might have preclusive effect in subsequent state court pro-
ceedings for monetary relief." ' Yet on direct review of state court judg-
ments, the Court frequently renders opinions requiring state courts to
award monetary relief on affirmative claims against states. As discussed in
Parts II and III below, direct review of such state court judgments is best
accounted for by an understanding that the Eleventh Amendment does not
limit the "judicial power" over questions "arising under" federal law.
Rather, the amendment was intended to repeal part of a diversity-based
jurisdiction that had been construed to permit federal adjudication of state
law claims. This understanding of the amendment will not only refocus
analysis in federal statutory cases like Green but may also imply some
constitutional protection for states from federal adjudication of pendent
state law claims.
Although many scholars have argued that the Eleventh Amendment,
properly read, does not apply to federal claims brought in federal courts,
fewer have considered the effect such a revised understanding would have
for state liabilities and the business of the district courts.22 If the Eleventh
Amendment does not represent a constitutionalized rule of state sovereign
immunity, what principles will inform the remedial discretion of the fed-
eral courts in awarding relief against states for violation of federal law?
Parts IV and V address this question.
Sovereign immunity, I argue, is a federal common law principle that,
even if Hans is discarded, will continue to limit the remedial discretion of
federal courts and constrain the likelihood of substantial reallocations of
judicial power from state to federal courts. Understood as a form of fed-
eral common law, state sovereign immunity can more accurately reflect
CoLo. L REv. 1, 64-66 (1972); see Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1935, 1946 (retaining ability to re-
present to foreign nations that Supreme Court review of state court judgments in federal question
cases would control states was critical to Federalists who supported Eleventh Amendment).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 59-64.
19. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
20. 474 U.S. 64 (1985).
21. Id. at 73-74. For detailed discussion, see infra Part III(C)(2).
22. Compare J. ORTH, supra note 1 (historical analysis) and Gibbons, supra note 1 (same) with
Amar, supra note 1 (Constitution requires full remedies for constitutional wrongs, including compen-
satory relief) and Fletcher, supra note 1 (Tenth Amendment imposes substantive limits on liabilities
that federal government may impose on states). For further discussion, see infra notes 408-09.
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legitimate judicial concerns in identifying appropriate remedies for gov-
ernmental wrongdoing.
Even now the Eleventh Amendment caselaw bars only some forms of
relief on federal claims. Injunctions against future misconduct are permit-
ted; damage awards generally are not. Present Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence operates in large measure as a specialized form of remedial hier-
archy, albeit one that bears no resemblance to the text of the amendment
which applies to suits "in law or equity." This remedial hierarchy, ap-
plied to cases originating in federal district courts, intersects with another
important functional aspect of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence-the
availability of federal review of state court judgments on those claims
barred from federal district courts. As to disfavored forms of relief, then,
the Eleventh Amendment functions less as an absolute jurisdictional bar
than as a form of abstention, mandating that state courts have the first
opportunity to consider certain claims for relief arising under federal law.
These functional aspects of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence are not
reflected in its doctrinal underpinnings and are inconsistent with the
Court's repeated characterization of the immunity. Their existence, how-
ever, illuminates three important reasons for abandoning the present doc-
trinal framework. First, institutional values of stare decisis are ill-served
by formal adherence to a doctrine riddled with exceptions designed to
counterbalance its evils. Continued homage to the supposed constitutional
principle of Hans is a form of "verbal disguise,"23 denying the reality of
change and undermining the principal sources of judicial legitimacy: rea-
soned and honest disclosure of the basis for decision. Second, restoring the
Eleventh Amendment to its rightful place in the Constitution will not cre-
ate a massive shift in power between federal and state judiciaries inconsis-
tent with principles of federalism or separation of powers. The remedial
preference and forum allocation rules of Eleventh Amendment law are
grounded in a defensible federal common law of remedies for governmen-
tal wrongdoing, and thus need not be wholly abandoned even if the pre-
sent doctrinal framework is. Finally, understanding state sovereign immu-
nity as a creature of federal common law clarifies two problems of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence: whether federal courts have power to
award monetary relief against states based on the Constitution itself; and
whether Congress may, pursuant to its Article I powers, render states
subject to suit in federal court. Reconceiving both the Eleventh Amend-
ment and state sovereign immunity will provide more satisfactory answers
to those questions, and a better doctrinal account of the present function-
ing of that jurisprudence.
23. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 293 (1930).
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I. THE PRESENT FRAMEWORK
The problem of Supreme Court review of state court judgments against
states cannot be appreciated without understanding the limitations on dis-
trict court jurisdiction the Court has found in the Eleventh Amendment.
Likewise, the argument that this body of jurisprudence is functionally dif-
ferent from its doctrinal basis and can more properly be understood as a
form of federal common law requires some knowledge of present doctrine
and its history.
The Eleventh Amendment was the first amendment added to the Con-
stitution for the purpose of overturning a Supreme Court decision. In
Chisholm v. Georgia," the Supreme Court rejected objections to its origi-
nal jurisdiction over an action in assumpsit against the State of Georgia.
Four members of the Court read the grant of jurisdiction in Article III
over "Controversies . . .between a State and Citizens of another State"
to extend the judicial power to the case, rejecting the view that the clause
applied only where states were plaintiffs.2 5 Only Justice Iredell dissented,
arguing that the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not extend to such cases and
expressing doubt as to Congress' power to so extend jurisdiction.26
Promptly after the decision, proposed amendments were offered and,
within a year, Congress passed what is now the Eleventh Amendment.
27
As ratified by the states over the next four years, its text is familiar: "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State."2
Early constructions of the amendment generally gave it a literal and
narrow reading. The Marshall Court found that it did not apply to con-
troversies between a citizen and his own state,29 or to suits against state
officers to recover money in the state treasury claimed to be due under
federal law. 0 The Court in an 1872 opinion emphasized a technical and
24. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). According to recent scholarship, plaintiff was a South Carolina
citizen, acting as executor for the estate of another South Carolina citizen, seeking payment for goods
purchased by the state during the revolution. Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Inter-
pretation, 2 GA. L. REv. 207 (1968).
25. Id. at 450-51 (opinion of Blair, J.); id. at 464-66 (opinion of Wilson, J.); id. at 467-68
(opinion of Cushing, J.): id. at 476-78 (opinion of Jay, C.J.).
26. Id. at 433-37, 449 (Iredell, J., dissenting). Some view the Eleventh Amendment as an enact-
ment of the Iredell dissent, see Field, Part 1, supra note 1, at 541-42, despite the dissent's primarily
statutory basis.
27. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1059. For a more detailed description, see id. at 1054-1063; Gib-
bons, supra note 1, at 1926-38.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
29. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
30. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See also United States v.
Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction over action against
executors of state treasurer's estate even though state asserted interest in proceeds). But see Governor
of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123-24 (1828) (Madrazo I) (foreign citizen's admiralty
claim against governor treated as one against state; thus, if not barred by amendment, subject to
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limited view of the amendment, indicating that if a state could not be
named as a party defendant because of the amendment, that was a suffi-
cient reason to permit an action to proceed against a state officer. 1 By the
1880's, however, as debt repudiation mounted in southern states, the
Court increasingly came to find that suits nominally against state officers,
and brought by out-of-state citizens or foreign citizens, were in fact
"against the state" and thus barred by the amendment.32
In 1890, under the pressing political likelihood that the executive
branch would not enforce judgments against the southern states, 3 the
Eleventh Amendment was profoundly reinterpreted to exemplify a broad
constitutional prohibition against the exercise of Article III judicial power
over states. In Hans v. Louisiana," the Court unanimously concluded
that the existing federal question jurisdiction of the federal circuit courts
did not embrace an unconsented to suit on a contract by a state citizen
against his own state, notwithstanding the allegation that the claim arose
under the federal Constitution.35 On the assumption that the amendment
barred federal question jurisdiction over claims by diverse citizens against
a state, the Hans court found it inconceivable that the amendment was
intended to permit citizen suits on federal questions.3" While acknowledg-
dismissal because not brought originally in Supreme Court); Ex parte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
627, 632 (1833) (Madrazzo I!) (case not within admiralty jurisdiction, and no person may commence
personal suit against state in Supreme Court). For detailed discussion, see Gibbons, supra note 1, at
1961-68 (Madrazo I reasoning knowingly flawed in suggesting that admiralty actions against states
could only proceed in Supreme Court; Madrazzo II reasoning applied Eleventh Amendment to bar
claims against state where jurisdiction based solely on party status); see also infra note 118 (discuss-
ing Bank of Washington v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 530 (1857)).
31. Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220-21 (1872) (enjoining state governor from grant-
ing patents to land claimed by railroad company under pre-Civil War contract). Cf Board of Liqui-
dation v. McComb, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 531, 541 (1875) (granting partial relief on federal grounds
against state board for violating plaintiff's bond contract). Soon after Osborn, the Court had dis-
claimed the most extreme version of the nominal party rule, that the amendment applies only when
the state is named as a party. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
32. See, e.g., Christian v. Atlantic & North Carolina R.R., 133 U.S. 233 (1890); In re Ayers, 123
U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886); Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
But cf. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884) (suit against collector to recover property seized
for alleged nonpayment of taxes not one against state).
33. J. ORTH, supra note 1, at 77-80. But see Collins, The Conspiracy Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 212 (1988) (arguing that Orth understates degree of continuity in
decisions on state sovereign immunity and thus overstates importance of changed political circum-
stances in accounting for doctrinal expansion of Eleventh Amendment in Hans).
34. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
35. Id. at 19-21. Proceeding under the newly conferred federal question jurisdiction, Hans sought
judgment of $87,000, arguing that since he alleged that state laws unconstitutionally impaired his
contract with the state and that the party configuration was not within the literal terms of the Elev-
enth Amendment, the Court had jurisdiction. Id. at 4-9. The state objected to the Court's jurisdiction
on the ground that plaintiff could not sue the state without its consent. Id. at 3.
36. 134 U.S. at 15. See Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882) (impliedly concluding that Elev-
enth Amendment and common law sovereign immunity doctrines barred adjudication of federal ques-
tion claim by out-of-stater against state). The Hans Court insisted that Article III was never intended
to embrace any private suit against a state, and that Chisholm was wrongly decided. 134 U.S. at
11-12, 15. But see New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883) (Article III originally
permitted out-of-state citizen to sue another state; thus state-state head of jurisdiction not available for
assertion of personal grievances against state's citizens); see generally, J. ORm, supra note 1, at
1988]
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ing the Marshall Court's earlier conclusion in Cohens v. Virginia" that
the Eleventh Amendment posed no constitutional bar to a suit by an indi-
vidual against his own state, Hans concluded that the amendment's lim-
ited language instead signalled an understanding that the Article III judi-
cial power did not extend to any unconsented suit against a state.
Notwithstanding that Cohens was written many years closer to the enact-
ment of the Eleventh Amendment, the Hans Court found that Marshall
had incorrectly concluded that the prohibition of suits applied only to
cases encompassed by the express terms of the amendment. 8
Apart from this apparent constitutional basis for the decision, the Hans
Court specifically identified a statutory ground as "an additional reason
why" the jurisdiction claimed for the circuit court did not exist: Congress
had not given the circuit courts jurisdiction over such suits. 9 Despite the
alternative grounds for decision, Hans was soon read as having embedded
in the Constitution a principle of state sovereign immunity from suit by
private individuals. Two years later, in United States v. Texas,4 the
Court restated its conclusion in Hans: "[E]ven where . . . suits [against a
State are brought by its own citizens and] arise under the Constitution,
laws and treaties of the United States, . . . the judicial power of the
United States does not extend to suits of individuals against States.""' In
Ex parte New York,42 the Supreme Court concluded that federal judicial
power over admiralty matters did not extend to suits against states, even
though the amendment by its terms applied only to suits "in law or eq-
uity." '3 The modern development of the Eleventh Amendment as a consti-
69-70, 74-75 (noting discrepancy). Hans' reliance on the Eleventh Amendment to interpret what
Article III originally embraced reflects a confusion as to the source of state immunity that persists
today. Compare Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2945, 2949 (amendment affirms sovereign immunity as limit on
Article III) with id. at 2952 (amendment embodies broad constitutional principle of immunity). See
infra text accompanying notes 179-200, 220-23 (neither amendment nor Article III supplies immu-
nity on federal claims).
37. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
38. 134 U.S. at 19-20 (also arguing that Cohens' discussion was dictum given Cohens' conclusion
that writ of error there was not suit against state). Hans referred to a "presumption that no anoma-
lous and unheard of proceedings or suits were intended to be raised up by the Constitu-
tion-anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted." Id. at 18. The "cognizance of
suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Consti-
tution when establishing the judicial power," id. at 15; the Court wrote that "[tihe suability of a State
without its consent was a thing unknown to the law," and thus not justiciable. Id. at 16.
39. 134 U.S. at 18. The language of the statute conferring jurisdiction was that the "Circuit
Courts of the United States shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several
States of all suits of a civil nature at common law. . . arising under" federal law. Id. at 9. The state
courts, went the argument, did not have concurrent power here because they could not entertain a suit
against the state without its consent; the circuit courts, "having only concurrent jurisdiction," could
not acquire any such power either. If the judicial power of Article III did not in its entirety extend to
suits against states, however, this statutory point would have been completely unnecessary. See Eng-
dahl, supra note 17, at 61-62.
40. 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
41. Id. at 644.
42. 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
43. Id. at 497-98. This decision overruled the views expressed in United States v. Bright, 24 F.
Cas. 1232 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809) (No. 14,647) (jury charge by Justice Washington, sitting as Circuit
1988] State Sovereign Immunity
tutional principle of state sovereign immunity was largely completed in
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,4" where the Court likewise held
that, notwithstanding the amendment's failure to mention foreign states as
among those parties who could not sue a state in a federal court, the "pos-
tulates which limit and control" the understanding expressed in Article
III and the Eleventh Amendment required that result.'
5
While the amendment was read expansively to apply to cases against
states that were beyond its literal reach, efforts to avoid its application
increasingly centered on the ability to name an officer and a form of relief
that would not be regarded as within its scope. Under the doctrine of Ex
parte Young,46 a state officer executing an unconstitutional statute was
regarded as acting ultra vires; accordingly, relief against the officer
named as defendant was not against the state and thus was not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.""
The most important modem decision demarcating when a case is "re-
ally" against the state, and hence within the Eleventh Amendment's pro-
hibition, notwithstanding the expedient of naming an officer, is Edelman
v. Jordan . 8 The Court there articulated a prospective-retrospective relief
distinction: If the plaintiff sought prospective relief, such as an injunction
concerning future behavior, the Eleventh Amendment permitted the relief;
if, however, the plaintiff sought a monetary award for past wrongdoing,
Justice). Although some treat Bright as the recognized precedent on this point in the nineteenth cen-
tury, see, e.g., J. ORTm, supra note 1, at 37, John Marshall repeatedly avoided clear resolution of
whether the Eleventh Amendment applied to suits sounding in admiralty. See, e.g., Governor of Geor-
gia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 121 (1828) (even if Eleventh Amendment did not apply to
admiralty proceeding in lower federal court, action to recover slaves and money in possession of state
nonetheless improper because within exclusive original jurisdiction of Supreme Court); Fletcher,
supra note 1, at 1078-79.
44. 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
45. Id. at 322-23 (referring to postulate that states are immune from suit without consent except
where there has been "'surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention," quoting The
Federalist No. 81 (A. Hamilton)). These postulates, the Court discerned, precluded suits by private
individuals or by foreign states against a state, but permitted suits by one state against another, and by
the United States against a state. Id. at 328-29. Since the language of Article III is seemingly parallel
with respect to claims by states and foreign states, the distinction drawn between them is difficult to
justify. See Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 525-26 (Court's distinctions drawn on "ad hoc" basis).
Likewise difficult to justify doctrinally is the conclusion in United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621
(1892), that the United States could sue a state within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
in light of the Court's conclusion elsewhere that the fact that a state is a party is insufficient, standing
alone, to bring the case within the Court's original jurisdiction and that only those cases to which the
judicial power extends because of a party-alignment including a state are within the original jurisdic-
tion; a suit by a state against its own citizen on a federal question would fall only within the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction. See Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158, 163-64
(1922) (citing California v. Southern Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229 (1895)); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398-99 (1821). But see C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. CooPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4043, at 175 (1988) (criticizing these decisions).
46. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
47. Id. at 157-60.
48. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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the relief was barred since, the Court assumed, it could come only from
the state treasury.49
Recently, the Court has explicitly justified this remedial distinction as
the necessary result of a balance between the supremacy of federal law
and the demands of a constitutional rule of state immunity. 0 Any relief
on state law grounds that is effectively against a state cannot be justified
in the face of this immunity.51 And while the need to stop ongoing viola-
tions of federal law overcomes the state's constitutional immunity, com-
pensatory and deterrent interests in vindicating federal rights through
damage awards are insufficient to override the command of the Eleventh
Amendment.5 2 As a result of these doctrinal developments, the amendment
does not bar injunctive relief to redress ongoing violations of federal law.
Yet, monetary relief in the nature of damages for accrued liabilities under
federal law cannot be awarded by federal district courts, though such re-
lief may be available in actions filed in state courts, with review available
in the Supreme Court.
Even disfavored forms of relief, however-compensatory awards for
past wrongs, for example-can be granted if the state consents to suit in
federal court 53 or, in some circumstances, if Congress abrogates the state's
immunity. In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,54 the Court held that under the Four-
teenth Amendment, Congress could authorize abrogation of any Eleventh
Amendment limits on the judicial power of the United States and permit
states to be sued for damages in federal district court.
55
49. Id. at 664-65. But cf Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974) (damages award
against state governor personally not barred by Eleventh Amendment).
50. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984).
51. Id. at 105-06 ("fiction" of Ex parte Young should not be extended to permit injunctive relief
to issue against state officers on state law grounds, since there is no federal interest in supremacy of
federal law that would justify intrusion on state sovereign immunity). See also County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 251-53 (1985) (extending Pennhurst to bar exercise of jurisdic-
tion over ancillary claim for indemnity based on state law).
52. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 72-73 (1985). See also Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265
(1986) (no relief against state trustee for failing, in violation of federal law, to repay losses incurred
by the imprudent investment of plaintiff counties' trust corpus).
53. Nineteenth century cases established that a state could waive its immunity or consent to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. See, e.g., Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883). The significance of
the consent or waiver doctrine in Eleventh Amendment law has been mitigated by the rigor with
which the Court has insisted that such consent be shown. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (state's general waiver of immunity insufficient to constitute consent to suit
in federal court on federal claims); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573,
577-80 (1946) (state consent to be sued "in any court of competent jurisdiction" construed as limited
to state courts). But cf. Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1957) (implying
consent from "sue and be sued" clause in congressionally approved compact).
54. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). See also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179-80 (1980)
(applying Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer reasoning to Congress' power under Fifteenth Amendment).
55. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978) (upholding Congress' power to set
aside Eleventh Amendment immunity and to require states to pay attorney fees to prevailing plaintiff
on constitutional claim); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122 (1980) (same where plaintiff prevails on
statutory claim pendent to substantial constitutional claim). Whether Congress has power to establish
such liabilities pursuant to its Article I powers, unamplified by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
has not yet resolved. The Court has indicated, however, that if Congress does have such a power, it
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This brief sketch of the Court's development of the amendment permits
identification of some oft-noted paradoxes that emerge both within the
doctrine and from its functional effects. Why is action by a state official
'"state action" for purposes of substantive Fourteen Amendment law but
not for the assertedly jurisdictional bar of the Eleventh?" Why has the
Eleventh Amendment been, in effect, read out of federal claims for injunc-
tive relief against state action, while damage actions are treated so differ-
ently? Why has the definition of when a suit is one "against a state" come
to turn on both the remedy sought and the source of law from which the
plaintiff's right derives? And why is a supposedly constitutional limitation
on Article III courts subject to waiver by consent, or to abrogation by
Congress ?1 These inconsistencies have led many to conclude that the
Hans Court was in error in its apparent view that the judicial power of
the federal courts did not extend to federal claims against states. That
conclusion is supported by consideration of another anomaly: that the Su-
preme Court, exercising the judicial power of the United States, can re-
quire state courts to provide affirmative relief against the state that federal
district courts are constitutionally barred from awarding.
II. COHENS V. VIRGINIA, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S APPELLATE JURISDICTION: AN ANOMALY
The Eleventh Amendment applies to the entire "judicial power of the
United States." That "judicial power" is "vested" by Article III in the
Supreme Court, and is distributed between the Court's appellate and orig-
inal jurisdiction. Thus, an untutored reading of the Eleventh Amendment
suggests that the "judicial power" being constrained is the entire judicial
power of the United States. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that:
"[T]he entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not em-
brace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a
State without consent given .. ."I" The Eleventh Amendment, however,
must exercise that power in clear and unmistakable language. Welch v. State Dep't of Highways, 107
S. Ct. 2941, 2948 (1987).
56. The fiction of Ex parte Young-that injunctive relief against an officer was not against the
state-was justified as necessary to secure the supremacy of federal law, particularly the constraints
on states imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 209 U.S. at 159-60. Yet if the Fourteenth Amend-
ment authorizes Congress to abrogate immunity, it is difficult to see why it would not equally author-
ize federal courts to do so. But see Nowak, supra note 1 (Fourteenth Amendment authorized Con-
gress, but not courts, to overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity). If it did not so authorize federal
courts, then was the Court justified in adopting the fiction of Ex Parte Young? And if Congress could
abrogate state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, why was judicial creation of the Ex parte
Young fiction necessary?
57. This list is by no means exhaustive. One might also ask: Why, if the United States can sue a
state without its consent, may a foreign state, or an individual suing on a federal claim, not do so? See
supra note 45. Why has the Court ignored the important eighteenth century distinction between
"suits in law or equity" and admiralty cases? As I will later suggest, many of these anomalies result
from the incorrect "constitutionalization" of principles of sovereign immunity. Instead, the sovereign
immunity doctrine emerges more coherently if seen largely as one of federal common law.
58. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (emphasis added); accord Pennhurst State
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while given an expansive construction as it applies to original actions in
the lower federal courts, has been construed to have little or no applica-
tion to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Conflicts between the Supreme Court practice of reviewing state court
judgments and the "Eleventh Amendment" constraints on federal district
court jurisdiction are striking. The Supreme Court has routinely reviewed
on the merits adverse judgments entered by state courts on claims for af-
firmative monetary relief made by individuals against states.59 Yet Elev-
enth Amendment doctrines would preclude many of these cases from be-
ing filed ab initio in the district courts. The Eleventh Amendment, the
Court has held, precludes actions against states for monetary relief paya-
ble by the state for past wrongful acts. 0 Many of the state cases reviewed
by the Court have involved precisely such claims for monetary relief from
the state treasury, particularly in tax disputes."1 If the suit is filed against
the state in its own name for an injunction, the suit is barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment even though injunctions against state officers to restrain
unconstitutional official conduct will issue.62 Yet suits against states eo
nomine, if brought in state court, are routinely reviewed within the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 3 A general consent to suit provided
for by state law is not a sufficiently clear waiver of Eleventh Amendment
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury,
323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311, 313 (1920); see also Gibbons, supra
note 1, at 1946 (if amendment intended to constitutionalize state sovereign immunity, it would apply
to both appellate and original federal jurisdiction).
59. See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Indiana Employment Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.
136 (1980); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275 (1972); Laurens Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax
Comm'n, 365 U.S. 517 (1961); cf. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290 (1967) (suit against state to
try title to land). Even at the height of southern debt repudiation, the Court reviewed state court
decisions on the merits. See, e.g., Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 240 (1896) (affirming state
court decision that had dismissed action for lack of jurisdiction on grounds that withdrawal of state
court jurisdiction does not violate federal nonimpairments of contracts clause); Railroad Co. v. Ten-
nessee, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 337 (1879) (repeal of state consent to suit no violation of contracts clause).
Although it is likely that in many cases the states raised no Eleventh Amendment objection, the prac-
tice described in this section cannot be accounted for as resulting simply from a case-by-case waiver of
immunity. But cf. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515-16 n.19 (1982) (Court need not sua
sponte dismiss on Eleventh Amendment grounds not raised by parties). The Court's later decisions
rationalizing this practice are not consistent with the view that states could limit the appellate jurisdic-
tion over cases initially brought in state court by raising an Eleventh Amendment objection. See infra
text accompanying notes 136-60.
60. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Trea-
sury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
61. See, e.g., Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7 (1983) (reversing adverse
state court judgment in tax refund suit); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136
(1980) (same); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reiley, 373 U.S. 64 (1963) (same).
62. Compare Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (upholding lower federal court's power to
issue injunction against state officer) with Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (dismissing action
for injunctive relief against state as named defendant).
63. See, e.g., Williams v. Vermont, 472 U.S. 14 (1985) (refund suit); Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617 (1978) (commerce clause challenge to environmental law); United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (contracts clause challenge to law modifying state bond obligations);
Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973) (quiet title to land).
State Sovereign Immunity
immunity to permit suit in federal district court; yet such consent may
result in the Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction over a case
initiated in state court."'
With respect to federal claims that would be barred from federal dis-
trict court, then, the Eleventh Amendment functions less as an absolute
bar to the exercise of the judicial power than as a specialized initial forum
allocation principle. Certain kinds of federal claims against states may be
brought in the first instance only in a state court. Review of any disposi-
tive federal issues presented therein, however, is available through the Su-
preme Court's appellate jurisdiction. To understand how this came to be,
we must return to near the beginning of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence.
A. Cohens v. Virginia
Cohens v. Virginia65 is popularly cited for the proposition that the
Eleventh Amendment does not preclude Supreme Court review of state
court judgments, whether in favor of or against the state as a formal
party.6" In this respect, the opinion is read for far more than it in fact
decided. The reasoning of Cohens v. Virginia on the Eleventh Amend-
ment is surprisingly limited and has, moreover, in large measure been
undermined by subsequent decisions. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has generally not regarded the amendment as a barrier to its review of the
judgments of state courts, even in cases involving affirmative claims
against the state that under "Eleventh Amendment law" could not be ini-
tiated in federal courts.
0 7
The Court's quiet transformation of Cohens to sustain its appellate ju-
risdiction over all dispositive federal questions arising in state court litiga-
tion suggests that something is profoundly wrong with its interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment as implying a constitutional bar to federal dis-
trict courts' jurisdiction over federal claims against states. No such bar is
required by Article III or by the Eleventh Amendment, properly
understood.
64. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 445 (1900); see Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590 (1904); see
also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
65. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821). The case is captioned "Cohens v. Virginia" in the official
U.S. Reports. The text, however, makes clear that the defendants were two men with the last name
"Cohen." See, e.g., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 265 (describing "presentment" against P.J. and M.J. Co-
hen). The correct caption should, therefore, have been "Cohen v. Virginia."
66. "[i1t was long ago settled that a writ of error to review the final judgment of a state court,
even when a State is a formal party and is successful in the inferior court, is not a suit within the
meaning of the [Eleventh] Amendment." General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 233 (1908)
(Harlan, J. concurring) (citing Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 408-09). See, e.g., Field, Part I, supra
note i, at 549 n.117; Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against
States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 189, 303-04 & n.534
(1981).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 111-35; see, e.g., Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 294 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1956; Wolcher, supra note 66, at 303-04 nn.533-34.
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Cohens v. Virginia is significant not only for its analysis of the Su-
preme Court's appellate review of state court judgments but also because
it was the Court's first major exposition of the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment."" Cohens is frequently cited by critics of Hans and its prog-
eny for the proposition that Chief Justice Marshall believed that the Elev-
enth Amendment did not restrict federal jurisdiction over federal question
claims against the states.6 The opinion, however, is not straightforward,
reflecting a tension between the nationalist view of the constitutional
structure that dominates Marshall's jurisprudence, a lawyer's understand-
ing of the common law traditions of governmental immunity from suit and
of remedies for governmental wrongdoing, and a politician's awareness of
the more particular history and text of the amendment itself. As I suggest
below, the decision in Cohens can be seen as a harbinger of the later,
more fully developed agonies of interpretation seemingly occasioned by
this amendment. And John Marshall's appreciation for the difficulties
posed by the question of what judicial remedies are available against the
state may still, two centuries later, assist in providing a more acceptable
account of this question.
1. Facts. The facts of Cohens were simple, and agreed to: The Cohen
brothers of Virginia sold tickets in Virginia for the Washington, D.C.
lottery and were prosecuted for violating Virginia's anti-gambling law.7
The state trial court rejected their defense that their conduct was specifi-
cally authorized by a federal law permitting the District to authorize lot-
teries 1.7  They were fined $100, and their appeals to higher state courts
were "refused . . .inasmuch as cases of this sort are not subject to revi-
sion by any other Court of the Commonwealth. '7  Application was made
for and writ of error granted to the United States Supreme Court.
2. Counsels' Arguments. Argument concerning the presence of a state
as a party focused on two questions: first, whether, in view of the Consti-
tution's grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases to
which a state was a party, the Court could nonetheless exercise its appel-
late jurisdiction based on the presence of a federal question; and second,
68. See also United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809). Cohens was also controversial
in the general contemporary debate over the scope of federal power, judicial and legislative, vis-a-vis
the states. See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 541-64 (1928).
69. See, e.g., J. ORTH, supra note 1, at 39-40; Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1946, 1953; see also D.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT, 1789-1889, at 99-100 & nn.56, 61 (1985)
(noting ambiguity of opinion, but suggesting that Marshall rejected state sovereign immunity on fed-
eral question claims). But see C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 87 (Cohens reflects Marshall's unwilling-
ness to decide whether citizen could sue his state on federal questions).
70. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 265-67, 303 (defendants described in indictment as being recent resi-
dents of the "borough of Norfolk," and by counsel as citizens of Virginia); D. CURRIE, supra note 69,
at 96.
71. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 289-90. Pursuant to an act of Congress, the then City Council of the
District of Columbia had enacted a lottery law.
72. Id. at 290.
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whether the Eleventh Amendment or its implications barred the Court
from reviewing the judgment at the behest of the private defendants.
Acknowledging that the precise terms of the Eleventh Amendment did
not apply to a case between a state and its own citizens, counsel for Vir-
ginia argued that Article III had never extended the judicial power to any
such cases but only to cases involving out-of-staters, a power limited by
the Eleventh Amendment. 73 Thus, federal judicial power could operate in
a case in which a state and an individual were the parties only when the
state invoked the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction as a plaintiff. The
grant of federal question jurisdiction, in Virginia's view, did not embrace
any authority to adjudicate claims against a state. The Eleventh Amend-
ment confirmed an understanding that a state could never be sued by its
own citizens in a federal court, "for it cannot be presumed, that a right to
prosecute a suit against a State would be taken from a foreigner or citizen
of another State, and left to citizens of the same State."74
Virginia, in support of its challenge to the Court's jurisdiction, also
made the more technical argument that a writ of error was a "suit"
against the state, within the meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. The
term "suit" itself embraced a writ of error, as evinced by the general un-
derstanding that a "release of all suits" included release of writs of er-
ror."5 Moreover, the language of the Eleventh Amendment prohibiting the
"'prosecution" as well as commencement of suits supported the view that
the judicial power of the United States could not extend to cases which,
while not "commenced" against a state, came to be "prosecuted" by writ
of error against the state in federal court."
Counsel for the Cohens rejected Virginia's contention that the states
remained, after the Constitution, independent sovereigns immune from
claims in national tribunals. 7 D.B. Ogden argued that the judicial power
extended to "all cases" arising under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, and that Virginia had failed to show any exception as to
either the entire grant of judicial power over this subject or the exercise of
that power in its appellate form.78 The Eleventh Amendment, he argued,
imposed no restriction, express or implied, on the federal question juris-
diction; rather, it barred only "the other class of cases, where it is the
character of the parties, and not the nature of the controversy, which
alone gives jurisdiction.
'7
73. Id. at 303-09 (arguing, inter alia, that use of express words required to make states parties).
74. Id. at 315. The perception that the amendment, in order to support a constitutional doctrine




77. Id. at 347-48.
78. Id. at 348-50.
79. Id. at 348. This is the same argument that several recent pieces of Eleventh Amendment
scholarship have urged, and that I adopt as well. J. ORTH, supra note 1, at 134, 149; Fletcher, supra
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Turning to the claim that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over states
could be exercised only as an original matter, Ogden argued that when a
state brought proceedings in its own court against a citizen, it gave up any
privilege of having cases to which it was a party heard only as an original
matter in the Supreme Court."0 The need to produce uniformity of deci-
sions on federal questions, and to prevent affirmative use of state courts to
achieve unconstitutional ends, led Ogden to his final argument-that the
matter before the Court was, in any event, not a "suit against" the state:
[Assuming arguendo] that a State cannot be sued in any case; the
State is not sued here: she has sued a citizen, in her own tribunals,
who implores the protection of this high Court . . . .The jurisdic-
tion does not act on the State; it merely prevents the State from act-
ing on a citizen, and depriving him of his constitutional and legal
right."
Pinkney, who argued next for the Cohens, likewise urged that a writ of
error was not a "suit" because no one was to be restored to anything; a
reversal of the judgment would simply leave things as they were before
the judgment. 2
Pinkney also emphasized that under the structure and spirit of the Con-
stitution, which the Eleventh Amendment did not change, "judicial control
of the Union over State encroachments and usurpations, was indispensable
to the sovereignty of the constitution-to its integrity-to its very exis-
tence." ' The necessity for federal appellate review is particularly strong,
he argued, when the state is prosecuting in its own courts because of the
"motives to judicial leanings and partialities" that might be present
note 1, at 1045-63; Gibbons, supra note 1, at 2004. If this was Justice Marshall's view, however, he
did not explicitly embrace it. See infra text accompanying notes 103-109. His failure to do so, when it
was made explicitly in argument, is either an uncharacteristic bit of timidity from the author of
Marbury v. Madison or a sign of genuine uncertainty as to the relationship between the Eleventh
Amendment and Article III. See also infra note 109 (discussing Marshall's opinion in Osborn).
80. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 349-50. Ogden's suggestion that the power-distributing clauses of Arti-
cle III were intended to protect states from being subject to original suit in any federal court other
than the Supreme Court is in tension with later decisions. See, e.g., Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 93-98 (1972) (original jurisdiction need not be exercised in view of concurrent district court juris-
diction); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1884) (acknowledging Congress' power to give inferior
federal courts concurrent jurisdiction in cases where Supreme Court has original jurisdiction and
upholding federal question removal of case initiated by state in state court). Interestingly, Ogden's
conception of the division of the judicial power into original and appellate categories as representing a
privilege of the state that could be waived by its conduct presages the concept of the "waivable"
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
81. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 350.
82. Id. at 366. Pinkney also argued that, notwithstanding the recognized immunity of the United
States when it won a case brought in the lower courts, the appeal was not barred by immunity. Id.
Further, he claimed that the state of Virginia was not compelled to do anything, since the writ did not
act on the state, but only on the state court, id. at 366, 372-73, a somewhat disingenuous argument
echoed in the Court's opinion. Id. at 410 (writ acts on record); see infra note 141.
83. Id. at 370, 371.
[Vol. 98: 1
State Sovereign Immunity
there.8" The appellate form of review was at once less intrusive and more
necessary than original jurisdiction: Though "trifling, compared with the
original [jurisdiction of the Court] as it formerly stood," the appellate ju-
risdiction over federal questions, he urged, "stands upon high considera-
tions of self-defen[s]e, . . . [and] of constitutional necessity. . . . The su-
ability of States might have been dispensed with, and the constitution still
be safe." 5 The power of appellate control of state court judgments against
individuals and in favor of the state, however, was indispensable.
3. The Court's Opinion. In his opinion for the Court, Marshall
framed the first inquiry as "whether the jurisdiction of this Court is ex-
cluded by the character of the parties, one of them being a State, and the
other a citizen of that State."'8 6 His discussion of this question proceeds in
three segments which consider, sequentially: (1) whether under Article
III, as originally written, the judicial power of the United States over
cases arising under federal law extended to cases in which a state was a
party; (2) if so, whether that judicial power could be exercised in the
appellate form; and (3) whether, if under the original Constitution the
Supreme Court could exercise appellate jurisdiction over the writ of error
in this case, the Eleventh Amendment required a different result.
As will be seen below, Marshall was unusually and perhaps atypically
careful not to resolve the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment
and federal question jurisdiction over cases within the literal reach of the
amendment's text. The Eleventh Amendment discussion is of limited
scope, as is the discussion of remedies available against a state for breach
of federal law, and reflects what appears to have been a deliberate deci-
sion to avoid clearly holding states subject to federal judicial power over
84. Id. at 372.
85. Id. at 371. Pinkney emphasized that the appellate jurisdiction would act only on state courts,
not states, id. at 372, avoiding whether in a different case original federal question jurisdiction could
be exercised over a state. Id. at 369, 372.
86. Id. at 378. With his customary rhetorical skill, Marshall emphasized the importance of the
principal jurisdictional issues "[because] [tihey exclude the inquiry whether the constitution and laws
of the United States have been violated by the judgment [under review] . . . and maintain that,
admitting such violation, it is not in the power of the government to apply a corrective[,] . . . that the
nation does not possess a department capable of restraining peaceably, and by authority of law, any
attempts which may be made . . . against the legitimate powers of the whole .. " Id. at 376-77.
Marshall regarded only two of the several questions argued as important: whether the character of the
party as a state precluded the exercise of jurisdiction and whether as a general matter the Court could
review state court decisions. He found the jurisdictional arguments premised on the allegedly non-
federal character of the law of the District of Columbia less important. Id. at 376-77. But see Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801 ,1835, 49 U. CHI.
L. REV. 646, 688 n.261 (1982) (issue not as free from doubt as opinion implies, particularly since one
law in question enacted by City Council of District of Columbia). To contemporary critics, the impli-
cation that a local law for the District of Columbia could preempt state law was anathema, even
though on the merits the convictions were affirmed. 19 U.S. at 448. See Roane (writing under name
Algernon Sidney), Virginia Opposition to Chief Justice Marshall, Richmond Enquirer, May 25,
1821, reprinted in 2 JOHN P. BRANCH HisT. PAPERS OF RANDOLPH-MACON COLLEGE 78, 81
(1906); see also Smith, Spencer Roane, in 2 JOHN P. BRANCH HIsT. PAPERS OF RANDOLPH-MACON
COLLEGE 4, 28-30 (1905).
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affirmative claims made against them. The analysis of Cohens, then,
standing alone, does not justify the subsequent course of practice in which
the Supreme Court has reviewed state court judgments in actions involv-
ing such affirmative claims.
In the first part of Marshall's analysis, the opinion propounds the now-
familiar distinction between the two classes of cases to which the judicial
power extends: those based on the "character of the cause" regardless of
the parties, and those based on "the character of the parties" regardless of
the cause."7 Thus, Marshall argued that under the Constitution, as it
originally stood, federal question jurisdiction was separate and indepen-
dent from those heads of jurisdiction based on the parties to the contro-
versy. The federal question jurisdiction applied to "all cases of every
description,""8 and thereby extended the judicial power to cases to which
a state might be a party, regardless of the party alignments specified else-
where in Article III. The burden was on those who argued for an implied
exception from this broad coverage."9 Granting the state's general proposi-
tion "that a sovereign independent State is not suable except by its own
consent," Marshall concluded that such consent could be given in the
Constitution by which the states surrendered large elements of sovereignty
to the national government and extended the federal judicial power to all
cases arising under federal law.90 Thus, "a case arising under the consti-
tution or laws of the United States, is cognizable in the Courts of the
Union, whoever may be the parties to the case." 1 The correctness of this
view, moreover, was supported by both the purpose of the Constitution,
unlike the earlier confederation, to enforce the demands of federal law
through a separate judicial department, and the appropriateness of a con-
struction of the judicial power as coextensive with the legislative.
92
Concluding "that the judicial power, as originally given, extends to all
87. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 378.
88. Id. at 382.
89. Id. at 379-80.
90. Id. at 380. Marshall specifically rejected Virginia's argument that the judicial power did not
extend to cases between a state and its own citizens: While this was true where jurisdiction depended
on the character of the parties, the purpose of federal question jurisdiction was "to give jurisdiction
where the character of the parties would not give it." Id. at 391.
91. Id. at 383. This language, often relied on by others for the proposition that Marshall em-
braced the argument that the Eleventh Amendment applied only to those cases in which federal juris-
diction was based solely on the character of the parties, is found in his discussion of the Constitution
as originally enacted. See infra note 108.
92. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 387-88. Marshall explained that the federal judiciary was better suited
than state courts to act "impartially" in upholding the supremacy of federal law because "[in many
States the judges are dependent for office and for salary on the will of the legislature." Id. at 386. He
observed that, "given the importance which the Constitution attaches to the independence of federal
judges," it cannot "have intended to leave these constitutional questions to tribunals where this inde-
pendence may not exist . . . where a State shall prosecute an individual who claims the protection of
an act of Congress. . . .How extensive may be the mischief if the first decisions in such cases should
be final!" Id. at 386-87. The case at hand provided an interesting illustration of such "mischief."
Under Virginia law, the only tribunal available to hear the Cohens' claim that their conduct was
protected by an act of Congress was the trial court in the borough of Norfolk. Id. at 265, 290.
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cases arising under the constitution or a law of the United States, whoever
may be the parties," '93 Marshall next considered whether that judicial
power could be exercised in the appellate form in cases to which a state
was a party.94 Notwithstanding dictum from Marbury suggesting that the
grant of original jurisdiction to cases in which states were parties pre-
cluded the Court's appellate jurisdiction over such cases, Marshall con-
cluded that the Constitution required a choice between two competing
rules: that the Court review federal questions in an appellate mode, or
that it exercise original jurisdiction over cases in which the state was a
party. Since a federal question could arise defensively in the course of
proceedings initiated by a state in its own courts, the comprehensive lan-
guage of the "arising under jurisdiction" compelled the conclusion that,
even where the state was a party, the Court could exercise appellate,
rather than original jurisdiction, to review federal questions.
9 5
Whether an affirmative demand against a state could be a "case," how-
ever, was a matter of some uncertainty for Marshall. In many instances of
allegedly unconstitutional state conduct, he concluded, the proper remedy
would be suit against another individual in which the consequences of the
state's misconduct could be challenged. 8 Even where the only possible
affirmative remedy was against the state, Marshall was hesitant to affirm
that federal courts would provide it. "Were a State to lay a duty on ex-
ports, to collect the money and place it in her treasury, could the citizen
who paid it . . . maintain a suit in this Court against such State, to re-
cover back the money? Perhaps not"-because the law would imply an
assumpsit, breach of which "may be no" violation of the Constitution.
97
What about the "case of a State which pays off its own debts with paper
money[?]" The courts, he concluded again, "have no jurisdiction over the
contract; they cannot enforce it, nor judge of its violation," even if the act
discharging the debt is a nullity and the debt still due." That such claims
93. Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 393-405. Marshall also concluded that the original jurisdiction over cases in which a
state is a party was intended only for those cases in which judicial power under Article III exists
because a state is a party. Thus, the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction could not have been exer-
cised in this case, which was between a state and its own citizens. Id. at 397-99. But see Governor of
Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 124 (admiralty case should have been brought as original
action in Supreme Court).
96. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 403 (if state confiscates debt or property in violation of
treaty, remedy is to sue original debtor or to sue occupant of confiscated land). Although this discus-
sion appears in the middle of the analysis of whether the Court could properly exercise appellate
jurisdiction, it has no evident relation to that issue but rather concerns the general reach of the judicial
power over cases arising under the Constitution. What seems important is that this hypothetical dis-
cussion of remedies for state violation of federal law precedes any consideration of the Eleventh
Amendment and thus pertains to the original Article III. In his earlier discussion, Marshall had said
that there was "force" to the view that citizens could not make "demands" on their own state in
federal court, implying that these were "ordinary controversies" under state law. Id. at 391.
97. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 402-03.
98. Id. at 403.
19881
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 1
might not be "cognizable," however, flowed from something other than
the states' exemption from the judicial power over "Cases, in Law and
Equity," arising under federal law. 9 Were the state to initiate enforce-
ment proceedings in which a federal defense concerning attempted dis-
charge of the debt were raised, moreover, the Court would have jurisdic-
tion; otherwise "the constitution would be violated, and the injured party
be unable to bring his case before that tribunal to which the people of the
United States have assigned all such cases."1 00 Thus he concluded that "as
the constitution originally stood, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court, in
all cases arising under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States, was not arrested by the circumstance that a State was a party."' 01
99. Id. at 403-05 (there cannot be "case in law or equity" arising under Constitution to which
judicial power does not extend). That the constraint was not a jurisdictional bar based on sovereign
immunity-a principle that a state, as a sovereign, could not be sued-is also suggested by Marshall's
opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15 (1831). Marshall concluded that there
was no original jurisdiction over the action to enjoin Georgia from enforcing various laws alleged to be
in violation of rights of the Native Americans, not because sovereign immunity prohibited the suit, but
because Indian tribes did not fall within the Article III term "foreign nations." Id. at 19. He went on
to indicate that, even if there were jurisdiction, the case was still non-justiciable-but once again, not
because of sovereign immunity, but because the particular claims presented and the relief sought were
"political" in nature. Id. at 20. See also Currie, supra note 86, at 721 n.449. This is consistent with
Marshall's argument in Cohens that the states had surrendered their sovereign immunity in all cases
arising under federal law. See supra text accompanying note 90; see also Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) at 58, 68-69 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (tribes are "foreign nations" and some injunctive relief
to restrain violations of federal law should be available).
100. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 403-04.
- 101. Id. at 405. Marshall's views on the nature of the Article III judicial power, before the Elev-
enth Amendment, over affirmative claims against the states remain puzzling. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810), Marshall alluded to the difference between "the constitution, as
passed," and the Constitution as amended. The former, he claimed, "gave the courts of the United
States jurisdiction in suits brought against individual states. A state, then, which violated its own
contract was suable in the courts of the United States for that violation." In such a suit, he continued,
a defense based on enactment of a state law "absolving itself from the contract" would have been
rejected, since the states were restrained by the Constitution. In a delicate but fairly obvious reference
to the Eleventh Amendment, Marshall stated that "[t]his feature [the suability of states on contracts] is
no longer found in the constitution; but it aids in the construction of those clauses with which it was
originally associated." Marshall evidently was arguing that while states could no longer be sued on
their contracts, the contracts clause still limited their conduct. In this context, he seemed to assume
that the only basis for original federal jurisdiction over a contract claim against a state is under the
party-based head of jurisdiction. See also Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 402 ("[Fjederal Courts never
had jurisdiction over contracts between a State and its citizens.").
In view of the non-impairments clause, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, and Marshall's broad
description of federal question jurisdiction in Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 821 (whenever federal
question is ingredient in original cause, jurisdiction may be exercised), one is left to wonder about his
understanding of either the contracts clause or federal jurisdiction. It is possible that his view was
influenced, or confused, by the then-statutory structure of jurisdiction and the absence of any lower
federal court with general "arising under" jurisdiction. Alternatively, he may have believed that until
the state took action to enforce its breach against the citizen, the citizen's claim for assumpsit arose
solely under state law and raised no federal question on which jurisdiction, other than through the
state-citizen diversity clause, could be grounded. The discussion in Cohens lends some support to this
latter view. See also D. CURRIE, supra note 69, at 99 n.56 (Marshall's view was that affirmative
claim to recover improper taxes would sound in assumpsit). But ef. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at
379 (case consists of rights of both parties). It is possible that Marshall never fully resolved his views
on the scope of the original state-citizen clause. Compare Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 139,
with 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION 555-56 (J. Elliot 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES] (Marshall, in Virginia
ratifying convention, stating that state-citizen clause of Article III did not authorize suits against states
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Finally, Marshall reached the question of whether the Eleventh
Amendment required a different result. Instead of adopting Ogden's argu-
ment that the amendment did not affect federal question jurisdiction,
Marshall principally argued that the Eleventh Amendment was "intended
for those cases, and for those only, in which some demand against a State
is made by an individual in the Courts of the Union. "1°2 Motivated by a
fear that pre-existing debts would be enforced by out-of-state creditors,
the amendment was, in Marshall's view, narrowly drafted to extend only
to those suits commenced by "persons who might probably be its
creditors."103
Under this view, a writ of error to review a judgment obtained against
a state court defendant was not a "suit" against the state. Marshall noted
that a writ of error could operate either defensively or affirmatively: If the
plaintiff could recover or be restored to the possession of anything by the
writ of error, the writ could be "released by the name of an action" and
would be a "suit."1 4 Here, however, the writ of error had no such af-
firmative operation but was "entirely defensive":
Nothing is demanded from the State. No claim against it of any
description is asserted or prosecuted. The party is not to be restored
to the possession of any thing. Essentially, it is an appeal on a single
point; and the defendant who appeals from a judgment rendered
against him, is never said to commence or prosecute a suit against
the plaintiff who has obtained the judgment.10 5
After further emphasizing the defensive nature of the invocation of federal
jurisdiction, Marshall summed up the opinion of the Court as follows:
[T]he defendant who removes a judgment rendered against him by a
State Court into this Court, for the purpose of re-examining the
question, whether that judgment be in violation of the constitution or
and noting difficulty in making state defendant). If one accepts the conclusion that Marshall viewed
the non-impairments clause as creating no affirmative federal right until state action inconsistent with
the underlying obligation was fully complete, however, this uncertainty should have no effect on the
more important question of the judicial power over claims arising under federal law.
102. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 407. Marshall elaborated this argument:
A general interest might well be felt in leaving to a State the full power of consulting its
convenience in the adjustment of its debts, or of other claims upon it; but no interest could be
felt in so changing the relations between the whole and its parts, as to strip the government of
the means of protecting, by the instrumentality of its Courts, the constitution and laws from
active violation.
Id. The opinion is again ambiguous, for whether "active violation" embraces all actionable violations
of federal law by a state or only those in which a state makes a demand on a citizen is unclear.
103. Id. at 406.
104. Id. at 409.
105. Id. at 410. See also id. at 411-12 (writs of error routinely issued to review judgments in
favor of the United States, even though it was "universally received ... that no suit can be com-
menced or prosecuted against the United States ... [and] that the judiciary act [did] not authorize
such suits").
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laws of the United States, does not commence or prosecute a suit
against the State, whatever may be its opinion where the effect of the
writ may be to restore the party to the possession of a thing which he
demands.,0 8
The principal holding, then, turned on the fact that the federal petitioner
had not sought the return of anything from the state.
Only after fully arguing this conclusion does Marshall pronounce,
without further explanation, an alternative holding:
But should we in this be mistaken, the error does not affect [this]
case. . . If this writ of error be a suit in the sense of the 11th
amendment, it is not a suit commenced or prosecuted 'by a citizen of
another State, or by a citizen or subject of any foreign State. . .' It is
not then within the amendment, but is governed entirely by the con-
stitution as originally framed, [in which] the judicial power was ex-
tended to all cases arising under the constitution or laws of the
United States, without respect to parties.""7
While it is clear from this statement that, except where the party align-
ments specified in the Eleventh Amendment were present, the amendment
had no effect on the judicial power, Marshall left open how, if at all, the
amendment would have applied in this case had the Cohens been out-of-
staters.
Marshall's analysis of the relationship between federal question juris-
diction and the Eleventh Amendment, then, is somewhat opaque."' 8 If
106. Id. at 412 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Judge Gibbons has concluded that Cohens supports the view that the Eleventh Amendment
was not intended to bar the exercise of federal jurisdiction in any case presenting a substantial federal
question. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1952-53. For support, he relies on the alternative holding, see
supra text accompanying note 107, and the statement earlier in the opinion that "a case arising under
. . . [the] laws of the United States. . .is cognizable in the courts of the Union, whoever may be the
parties to that case." 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 383. The quoted passage, however, appears in a section of
Cohens explicitly devoted to an analysis of the scope of the federal question jurisdiction under the
unamended Constitution. This is emphasized by Marshall's discussion, in the very next paragraphs of
the opinion, of the enumeration of cases to which Article III jurisdiction extends: "The mere circum-
stance, that a State is a party, gives jurisdiction to the Court. . . . The constitution gave to every
person having a claim upon a State, a right to submit his case to the Court of the nation." Id. A
careful reading of the full opinion suggests that Judge Gibbons placed undue emphasis on a statement
taken out of context to reach his conclusion. For readings similar to Gibbons', see J. ORTH, supra
note 1, at 39; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1084 & n.207.
Judge Gibbons' reliance on Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), to support the claim
that the Marshall Court believed that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar federal question jurisdic-
tion is similarly problematic. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1953-54. Worcester v. Georgia was a criminal
prosecution of a federal agent for living on an Indian reservation without a state license. Since the
agent was a citizen of Vermont, the alternative holding in Cohens was unavailable to sustain the
jurisdiction. The case presented the party alignment specifically addressed by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Yet the case fits squarely within the contours of the extensive Cohens analysis of a "suit."
Thus, it cannot properly be seen as evidence of a contemporaneous understanding that the Eleventh
Amendment did not apply to cases in which the foundation for federal jurisdiction was the presence of
a claim arising under federal law. The case only supports that view if one ignores the primary holding
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federal question jurisdiction were not restricted by the Eleventh Amend-
ment, it would seemingly have been unnecessary to argue that the writ of
error was not a "suit." Marshall could simply have embraced Ogden's
argument that the Eleventh Amendment applied only where federal juris-
diction was based solely on the character of the parties.1"9 On the other
hand, Marshall plainly did not read the Eleventh Amendment as based on
broad notions of sovereign immunity, concluding that, outside its literal
language, the amendment did not restrict the originally granted jurisdic-
tion of the Court. Whether the federal courts could take cognizance of
certain affirmative claims against states was more troubling,1 but the
power of the Court to assure the defensive operation of the Constitution
against abuses of state power was plain.
B. Supreme Court Review of State Court Judgments in Actions against
States: From Cohens to the Present
While some scholars conclude from Cohens that Marshall believed the
Eleventh Amendment had no application to the exercise of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, a more complete analysis suggests that Marshall was not
entirely clear on this point or was unable fully to persuade his colleagues
of it. The Court's subsequent exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, how-
ever, strongly suggests that this understanding has been accepted: For the
purpose of reviewing state court judgments in actions against states, fed-
eral question jurisdiction is essentially unencumbered by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Marshall's reliance on the distinction between negative and affirmative
relief against a state did not go uncondemned. Marshall's arch-rival Spen-
in Cohens-that where a state prosecutes an individual and the defendant raises a federal law in
defense, adjudicating that federal claim does not involve a "suit in law or equity" against a state, since
no demand or judgment for a thing can be entered against the state.
109. In Osborn, Marshall once again stopped short of embracing this view. Counsel for the bank
in Osborn, like Ogden in Cohens, argued that even if a state were a party, the Court would have
jurisdiction "in a case arising under the Constitution and laws of the Union." 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at
798. Marshall seems to accept that the Eleventh Amendment applied to the head of jurisdiction estab-
lished by the state-citizen diversity clause, stating: "[t]he amendment has its full effect, if the constitu-
tion be construed as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the Court never been ex-
tended to suits brought against a State, by citizens of another State, or by aliens." Id. at 857-58. Yet a
thorough acceptance of the implications of this argument might have rendered unnecessary, for juris-
dictional purposes, the "party of record" rule for which Osborn is justly famous. See also id. at 847,
849 (asserting that state could not be made party because, by the Eleventh Amendment, state could
not be sued by alien or citizen of another state). But see Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1958 n.370
(suggesting that Marshall was paraphrasing counsel's argument). Marshall's lengthy discussion of
why the case could safely be regarded as one not against a state and his failure to embrace clearly the
argument that the amendment did not affect jurisdiction over federal claims suggest that the uncer-
tainty evinced in Cohens had not totally dissipated. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 846-59; infra
note 310 (Marshall's concern reflecting common law, as well as constitutional, concerns).
110. Professor Currie notes the possibility that Marshall discussed sovereign immunity in Cohens
in order to suggest that a state could be made a defendant. Currie, supra note 86, at 691. This seems
unlikely: Marshall's treatment of the issue corresponds in emphasis to that of the arguments of coun-
sel and does not extend as far as counsel for the Cohens urged.
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cer Roane attacked Cohens, arguing that whether the state or the citizen
possessed the thing in dispute was unimportant compared with the ques-
tion of which one had the right-and who could decide that.11 As
Roane's critique implied, the dividing line between affirmative and nega-
tive relief against the state as a limitation on Supreme Court review evap-
orated over time. What might have surprised Roane was that it did so
virtually unnoticed and with nearly unanimous acquiescence.
For several years after Cohens, the Court's exercise of appellate juris-
diction over state court decisions in disputes to which a state was a party
apparently occurred primarily in cases in which the state was the original
plaintiff and the federal right arose in defense.1 2 But in the 1850's, the
Taney Court was called on to review claims for affirmative monetary re-
lief filed in state court against a state. In Curran v. Arkansas,"3 the
Court, without referring to the Eleventh Amendment, reversed the state
court judgment in favor of the state, in an action seeking to hold the state
liable for debts owed by the defunct state bank." 4 Although the state ap-
parently objected to the suit against it, the Court found that whether the
state was "capable of being thus sued" was purely a question of state law,
resolved in favor of petitioner by the state supreme court and that, accord-
ingly, by "its own consent, the state" could be subject to a decree in favor
of the complainant." 5 Since Curran was a state citizen," 6 it is perhaps
not surprising after Cohens that the Court did not discuss the Eleventh
Amendment. Yet the Court's terse reliance on the state's consent to have
matters tried in its own courts contrasts sharply with the detail of the
111. Roane, supra note 85, at 157-61. Judge Gibbons notes that Roane, as a judge on the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, in Hunter v. Martin, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1813), rev'd, Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), viewed the Eleventh Amendment as not affecting federal
question jurisdiction. Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1950-52. Roane's view, however, was that Article
III's federal question jurisdiction did not permit any exercise of jurisdiction over a case in which a
state was a party defendant. Roane, supra note 85, at 117-18, 143.
112. See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (state court criminal prosecution
in which defendant raised federal defense); Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410 (1830) (state sued
Craig on promissory note in state court; Craig asserted federal defense that consideration for note
invalid as "bill of credit"); see also Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837) (same
procedural posture as Craig). But cf. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837) (adjudicating on merits contracts clause claim against proprietors of bridge which, during pen-
dency of litigation, had become property of state).
113. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1853).
114. Id. at 320-21. Plaintiff, a creditor of the state bank, alleged in his state court complaint that
the effect of several state statutes, appropriating the assets of the state bank to pay obligations of the
state, impaired his contract with the bank and entitled him to proceed against the state itself to satisfy
the debt. Id. at 306-07. The state court upheld the validity of the laws, rejecting the contracts clause
argument, and dismissed the complaint.
115. Id. at 309. The Court also observed that by owning capital stock in the bank the state had
"la[id] down its sovereignty" as to claims arising out of that ownership. Id. at 308; see Bank of the
United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824) (states have no sovereign immunity
when acting in their "proprietary capacity" as shareholder of corporation). The Curran Court's dis-
cussion of general sovereign immunity principles is not surprising in this pre-Erie opinion. See infra
notes 307-08, 316.
116. Plaintiff's Bill of Complaint, Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1853) (contained
in Supreme Court Record).
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Cohens rationale and with the later conclusion in Hans that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over
claims by a citizen against his own state.11
In later cases against Arkansas by creditors seeking repayment of debts
and challenging state laws as violating the contracts clause of the Consti-
tution, the state courts found themselves to lack jurisdiction by virtue of
changes in state law imposing restrictions on previously available reme-
dies. The Supreme Court adhered to the view that state law controlled. In
explaining its decision in a case brought on behalf of an out-of-state bank,
the Court remarked that the state could not be sued in state court without
its consent and that the courts of the United States were "expressly pro-
hibited" from exercising such jurisdiction."'
These cases can be read to hold that consent to suit was governed en-
117. See also Woodruff v. Trapnell, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190, 209 (1850) (reversing state court
decision declining to compel state Attorney General to accept former bonds in payment of debts owed
state); Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 133, 150 (1845) (writ of error to Maryland
Court of Appeals in which, according to counsel's argument, nominal defendant party was Appeals
Tax Court, but actual defendant in interest was state; state court finding of no impairment of contract
reversed and entry of judgment for plaintiff directed). Justice Story's dissenting opinion in Charles
River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), is worth noting. After the state court
decision rejecting plaintiff's contracts clause challenge to defendant's construction of a bridge, defend-
ant recouped the expenses of construction, and under the terms of its contract, the bridge became
property of the state. The parties to the litigation did not change, however, and the Court affirmed on
the merits. Story, disagreeing on the merits, addressed the jurisdictional issue first, writing that when
a state court decides against a claim of federal right, "this Court has a right to entertain the suit, and
decide the question; whoever may be the parties to the original suit, whether private persons, or the
state itself." Id. at 585. Story relied entirely on Cohens for this proposition, ignoring Marshall's
emphasis on the defensive nature of the invocation of federal jurisdiction. Story also argued that Mas-
sachusetts was not a party of record and that, under Osborn, jurisdiction could be exercised over state
agents. Id.
118. Bank of Washington v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 530, 532 (1857) ("the judiciary of the
State cannot interfere to enforce . . . contracts without the consent of the State, and the courts of the
United States are expressly prohibited from exercising such a jurisdiction"). Whether the Court was
alluding to the Eleventh Amendment in its reference to what was "expressly prohibited" is difficult to
ascertain, given the very different contours of that Court's presumed understanding of the amendment.
For one thing, the Bank of Washington was a federally chartered corporation of the District of Co-
lumbia. At that time, the Court had taken the position that a citizen of the District was not a "citizen
of a state" for diversity jurisdiction purposes, Hepburn v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805); thus
it is not clear whether the Eleventh Amendment would have "expressly prohibited" the party align-
ment, assuming the bank's citizenship were relevant. But see Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9
U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809). Moreover, until Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 446-49 (1900), it was not
decided that a federal corporation was barred by the Eleventh Amendment from suing a state. It is
also possible that the "expressly prohibited" language could refer to the language of section 25 of the
Judiciary Act limiting review of federal questions to those decided by the state court. If the jurisdic-
tion of the state court was regarded as entirely a question of state law, then jurisdiction to review the
claim was arguably prohibited by section 25. Given the context, however, it seems likely that the
Court was referring to the Eleventh Amendment, a possibility apparently overlooked by others. See
Gibbons supra note 1, at 1968 (Madrazo only pre-Civil War case dismissed as barred by Eleventh
Amendment; amendment was considered applicable only where federal jurisdiction depended solely on
party status); J. OrtH, supra note 1, at 41-42 (in no case did Taney Court apply Eleventh Amend-
ment to defeat its jurisdiction). In Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527 (1857), while purporting
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Court also reached the federal question of whether modification
of the remedy itself violated the impairments of contracts clause and concluded that it did not. Id. at
529-30 (state law only regulated jurisdiction of state courts and did not impair contract with state);
see Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1937 n. 256, 1955 n. 356 (treating Beers as merits decision); Wolcher,
supra note 66, at 264 (same).
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tirely by state law and that a state's consent to suit in its own courts ended
any question as to its immunity from federal judicial power. But by the
beginning of this century the Court reached the seemingly contradictory
conclusion that a waiver of immunity from suit in state courts was not a
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity.119 Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court continued to review state court judgments in cases involving affirm-
ative claims against states.
120
The Court's most extensive effort to rationalize these discrepant prac-
tices came in Smith v. Reeves, 2' on review of a federal circuit court action
against a state treasurer for refund of taxes. Justice Harlan, writing for
the Court, addressed two questions: whether the suit was against the state
for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, and, if so, whether the state had
consented. Harlan answered the first question affirmatively-a suit
against the Treasurer of California, in his official capacity, for the recov-
ery of previously paid taxes, was one against the state. 22 While acknowl-
119. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). Indeed, the Court has imposed increasingly strin-
gent standards for determining when a state has, by conduct or statute, waived its Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity from suit in the lower federal courts. Compare Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co., 200 U.S. 273 (1906) (state waived immunity by appearance of attorney general who was author-
ized to defend) with Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 466-68 (1945) (state
Attorney General, though authorized to defend, not authorized to waive immunity).
120. See supra note 59. In addition to Bank of Washington, 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 532, which
arguably treated the Eleventh Amendment as a constraint on the Court's appellate jurisdiction, see
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911), and Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 270 (1884). In Hopkins, the Court's treatment of the issue appears to reflect the notion, since
clearly repudiated in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980), and Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 418-21 (1979), that the Eleventh Amendment constrains the jurisdiction of state courts. The
state court dismissed plaintiff's constitutional claim for damages on the ground that it lacked jurisdic-
tion over actions against the state. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the damage claim
was not against the state because the defendant was a legally separate entity; on remand, however, it
noted that any relief requiring disposition of state-owned lands was foreclosed by Eleventh Amend-
ment doctrines of immunity. Id. at 642-45, 649. The Court thus treated the Eleventh Amendment as
applying to federal claims brought in state courts, rather than as limiting its own appellate jurisdic-
tion. See also Louisiana ex rel. New York Guar. & Indem. Co. v. Steele, 134 U.S. 230 (1890)
(affirming state court's dismissal of action against state auditor on ground that suit was against state;
both Supreme Court and state court opinions cite Eleventh Amendment cases). In Poindexter, the
state court found that it had jurisdiction over the action against a state tax collector to return property
seized for failure to pay taxes, but gave judgment for the defendant, apparently rejecting plaintiff'
constitutional claim that state laws prohibiting use of bond coupons to pay taxes and withdrawing
plaintiff's remedy against the collector for failure to receive the coupons violated the contracts clause.
Id. at 274. The Supreme Court reversed, directing entry of judgment for plaintiff. In response to the
argument that the "suit below" was in effect against a state, id. at 285, the majority discussed the
Eleventh Amendment at length, concluding that the suit should not be regarded as one against the
state. Neither the majority nor the dissent considered what significance to attribute to the state court's
exercise of jurisdiction. To the extent that Poindexter may have assumed that the Eleventh Amend-
ment might preclude Supreme Court review of federal questions decided in state court actions
"against a state," this assumption seems inconsistent with Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900); see
also General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
121. 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
122. Id. at 440. Harlan distinguished earlier cases involving prospective relief against enforcement
actions, such as Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), and Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
154 U.S. 362 (1894), from those seeking tax refunds, by arguing that in the former the suit was not
against the state, but only against the officer to restrain the performance of an unauthorized act. In
this case, however, which Harlan saw as one "to compel an officer of the state, by affirmative action
on his part, to perform or comply with the promise of the State," Reeves, 178 U.S. at 445, the action
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edging that the State had indeed consented to be sued, Harlan concluded
that "it has not consented to be sued except in one of its own courts." 2 3
In explaining why, and to what degree, a state could limit its consent,
Harlan suggested that some principle of federal law constrained a state
from insulating itself from the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over "federal questions":
[A] state [may] . . . consent to be sued in its own courts . . . in
respect of any cause of action against it and at the same time exclude
the jurisdiction of the [flederal courts-subject always to the condi-
tion, arising out of the supremacy of the Constitution of the United
States and the laws made in pursuance thereof, that the final judg-
ment of the highest court of the [s]tate in any action brought against
it with its consent may be reviewed or reexamined, as prescribed by
the act of Congress, if it denies to the plaintiff any right, title, privi-
lege or immunity secured to him and specially claimed under the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
1 24
This is the extent of Harlan's effort to explain why a state's consent to
suit is effective for state trial courts and for the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court over federal questions, but is ineffective for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction by the lower federal courts over federal questions. 25
This cryptic explanation leaves unclear the relationship between the con-
cepts of consent, on the one hand, and federal supremacy, on the other, in
justifying federal review.128
was against the state itself. See generally Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government
Officers, 1984 Sup. CT. REV. 149, 153-55 (doctrinally coherent under common law agency principles
to hold officer liable for his tortious conduct, but not for breach of state contract, though irrational to
link question of officer liability with question of whether action is one against state).
123. Reeves, 178 U.S. at 441. While the exclusion of federal courts from consent was "not ex-
pressly declared in the statute," Harlan wrote, that was its meaning. The consent statute in Reeves
authorized the Treasurer to demand trial in the Superior Court of Sacramento County, a limitation
providing some textual support for the proposition that the consent was limited to the state court
system. The principle of Smith v. Reeves, however, has been applied to seemingly unrestricted waivers
of immunity applicable to "any court of competent jurisdiction," Ford Motor Co. v. Department of
Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 461 n.3, 465 n.8 (1945), and has developed into a strong presumption that a
state's consent to suit is limited to state court. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
241 (1985); Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per
curiam); supra note 53.
124. 178 U.S. at 445.
125. Particularly in light of the emphasis Reagan, 154 U.S. at 391, and Smyth, 169 U.S. at 516-
517, placed on the importance of a federal forum for out-of-staters to vindicate rights and remedies
provided in state courts, Harlan could have concluded either that consent was equally effective in both
tribunals or that, by consenting to the suit against the officer, the state had either waived its immunity
or rendered the suit one not against itself. Cf Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 287
(1912) (in permitting refund suit in federal court against state tax collector, Court notes state law
authorizing treasurer to refund taxes erroneously paid).
126. Harlan's opinion simply does not attempt to reconcile the exercise of Supreme Court appel-
late jurisdiction over a suit in state court based on a consent limited to state court with the view,
expressed in his Hans concurrence, that Article III does not extend to any suit against a state by its
own citizens absent state consent. 134 U.S. at 21. Is Harlan in Reeves referring to a constitutional
principle, implicit in the supremacy clause, that would permit states to withhold consent to suit alto-
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Harlan firmed up his position as the modern architect of the rationale
supporting extension of the Cohens doctrine in his concurring opinion in
General Oil Co. v. Crain,2 a case also notable for the majority's willing-
ness to be less deferential to state court determinations of state court juris-
diction. The suit for injunctive relief against the enforcement of an alleg-
edly unconstitutional statute originated in Tennessee state court.12 The
state court had dismissed the action on the ground that it was effectively
against the state; by general statute the state courts were deprived of juris-
diction in such cases. 129 Viewing the lower federal courts as closed to the
claim by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment,'3 0 the Court concluded that
the state court was required by the Constitution to hear the case; its denial
of jurisdiction could, in effect, deprive the plaintiff of rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Treating the state court's decision as one de-
nying plaintiff's federal claim, the Court reviewed the merits of the con-
stitutional challenge.132 In explaining its decision, the majority implicitly
gether, but would not permit states to limit consent to suit in state court? If so, then once the state
consents, why is district court jurisdiction still barred? Is his reference to the "condition" instead a
statutory reference-to the well-established authority of section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 for
Supreme Court review of state court judgments? If so, why does Congress have power to impose such
a condition on the states, in light of the Eleventh Amendment? If Article III's grant of appellate
jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in some way establishes conditions for the exercise of state court
jurisdiction over questions of federal law, regardless of the identities of the parties, it is difficult to see
why the entire federal judicial power does not extend to such cases when Congress confers such
jurisdiction on inferior federal courts. See infra text accompanying notes 146-60 (arguing that consent
rationale is fictive and that supremacy clause rationale supports understanding of federal question
jurisdiction as unconstrained by constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity); Amar, supra
note 1, at 1477 n.211.
127. 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
128. Id. at 216.
129. Id.
130. See infra note 131. The Court on the same day decided, in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123
(1908), that the Eleventh Amendment did not preclude a federal court from granting injunctive relief
to restrain a state officer from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state statute. Thus, it is difficult
to account for the Court's assumption in Crain that the federal courts were closed to the plaintiffs. See
Sandalow, Henry v. Mississippi and the Adequate State Ground: Proposals for a Revised Doctrine,
1965 Sup. CT. REV. 187, 209 n.89. The assumption, however, is important to an understanding of
Crain's implication that, even where a state would have immunity in the lower federal courts, the
Supreme Court may require the case to be heard in state court.
131. 209 U.S. at 228. The Court wrote:
If a suit against state officers is precluded in the national courts by the Eleventh Amendment
to the Constitution and may be forbidden by a State to its courts, as it is contended in the case
at bar that it may be, without power of review by this court, it must be evident that an easy
way is open to prevent the enforcement of many provisions of the Constitution, and the Four-
teenth Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be nullified as to much of its
operation.
Id. at 226.
132. Id. at 228. Although the majority upheld on the merits the constitutionality of the regulation
plaintiffs sought to challenge, the majority's willingness to ignore the state court's jurisdictional deter-
mination, treating the jurisdictional holding based on state law as an effective denial of the federal
right claimed, is in marked contrast to the Taney Court's treatment of state court determinations of
their own jurisdiction as virtually conclusive. See supra text accompanying notes 113-20; see also
Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636, 643 (1911) (state court's determination of its
own lack of jurisdiction, on ground that suit was really against state, reversed on apparent interpreta-
tion of Eleventh Amendment); cf. McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 123-25 (1898) (rejecting
argument that jurisdiction was lacking because state legislature repealed statute authorizing refund
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asserted power to review, and override, state laws forbidding suits against
state officers in state courts, in order to assure "enforcement of many pro-
visions of the Constitution," specifically including the Fourteenth
Amendment.
1 3 3
Harlan, writing separately, argued that, once the Tennessee court de-
termined that it lacked jurisdiction based on an interpretation of state law,
its decision must be accepted by the Supreme Court. The Eleventh
Amendment was irrelevant:
Th[e] Amendment relates wholly to the judicial power of the United
States, and has absolutely nothing to do with the inquiry as to the
jurisdiction of the inferior state court. . . . In determining what re-
lief this court can or should give . . . we need not consider the scope
and meaning of the Eleventh Amendment; for, it was long ago set-
tled that a writ of error to review the final judgment of a state
court, even when a State is a formal party and is successful in the
inferior court, is not a suit within the meaning of the Amendment.
Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 
264, 408, 409.,j
This broadly recasts the holding of Cohens.135 Cohens did not hold that
in any case in which a state is a formal party and successful, a writ of
error was not a suit; rather, it held that where the state was acting as
plaintiff in the state courts and was successful, the defendant may appeal
without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. Harlan's restatement
simply eliminates the amendment as a bar to review of state court
judgments.
Harlan's concurrence completed the transformation of the Eleventh
Amendment from a prohibition applicable to the judicial power of the
action and conferring jurisdiction on state court). Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 298-303
(1884) (state law cannot deny all remedy for federal right in state court). But see Palmer v. Ohio, 248
U.S. 32 (1918) (right of individuals to sue state, in either federal or state court, not derived from
federal law but only from the consent of state as determined by state law). In Palmer, however, the
Court qualified this assertion by noting that "no federal right" was involved, id. at 34, apparently
because of the Court's view that the "taking of property" claim, pled as one under the Fifth Amend-
ment, was "palpably groundless." In support of the latter assertion, the Court cited Barron v. Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Fifth Amendment does not constrain states), ignoring that the case
had been effectively overruled by the Fourteenth Amendment as interpreted in Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1896) (Fourteenth Amendment prohibits uncompensated tak-
ings by states). Cf. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (upholding constitutionality of state
immunity statute on state law tort claim).
133. 209 U.S. at 226.
134. Id. at 233 (emphasis added). See also Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420, 585 (Story, J., dissenting) (Court may "entertain the suit" when state court rejects federal
claim, even if state is party). While Harlan's focus in Crain on whether an "appeal" is a "suit"
would not affect application of the amendment in the lower federal courts, Story's formulation-that a
suit involving a federal question may be heard by the Court-might support the view that the Elev-
enth Amendment did not affect federal question jurisdiction at all. But cf J. STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTITTrrION OF THE UNITED STATES, at 642 (Nowak & Rotunda eds. 1987) (amendment
intended to affect institution of original actions against states, not to control appellate jurisdiction over
action brought by state).
135. See supra Part II(A).
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United States to a prohibition applicable only to the judicial power of the
United States courts in its "original" form. The rationale for this transfor-
mation, such as it was, took several forms:
Cohens rested on the view that assertion of a federal defense to a state
prosecution was not a "suit" and, alternatively, that the Eleventh Amend-
ment did not apply in litigation between a state and its own citizens.
Later nineteenth century cases rested on the consent of the state to be sued
in state court. In Smith v. Reeves, Harlan offered a third justification for
the Supreme Court's power of appellate review by reference to the
"supremacy of federal law," at least where the state consented to state
court jurisdiction. He thus implicitly embraced the view that some portion
of federal question jurisdiction was unaffected by the Eleventh Amend-
ment. Finally, in General Oil Co. v. Crain, Harlan cast the decision on
the quite different, formal interpretive ground that an "appeal" from a
state court is not a "suit."
C. Inadequacy of the Proffered Rationales
None of these four rationales sufficiently accounts for the anomaly with
which this Part opened: that the Supreme Court can exercise the judicial
power in review of suits against states brought in state courts even though
such suits cannot constitutionally be initiated in federal district courts."' 6
1. Cohens. The rationale of Cohens with respect to the defensive pos-
ture of the federal petitioner does not account for, indeed is in tension
with, review of state court judgments in, for example, tax refund actions;
and where those refund actions are brought by out-of-staters,137 the alter-
native holding of Cohens cannot account for the practice either. Under the
Hans formulation, moreover, affirmative claims by in-staters are equally
suspect.
2. Appeal Not a Suit? The proposition that a "suit" does not include an
"appeal" is only barely plausible. -Such a technical construction suggests
that its legitimacy is grounded in its accurate reflection of the intent of
those who framed the Eleventh Amendment. Yet had the framers and
136. In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), the Court noted in
passing that giving state courts the first opportunity to rule on questions of state law relevant to the
federal claim is a benefit of requiring tax refund actions to be brought initially in state court. Cf
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (equitable action stayed to permit parties to
obtain state court construction of state law). Since state law questions are often present, this reasoning
suggests that another ground for the Supreme Court's practice of reviewing cases against states barred
from the district courts is an abstention principle resulting in state courts having the first opportunity
to consider certain claims against states. Yet there is little reason to think that only in actions for
monetary relief will such state law issues arise, or that in every such action state law issues will be
important or dispositive. While Ford Motor Co. illustrates a policy concern that may be animating the
structure of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, it does not articulate any connection between this
principle and the text or historic purpose of the Eleventh Amendment.
137. See, e.g., Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 409 U.S. 275 (1972). Heublein
had only one employee in South Carolina, and its home office was in Connecticut. Id. at 277.
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adopters intended the word "suit" not to include any appeals, surely
counsel for the Cohens would have so argued. But to the contrary, Ogden,
the Cohens' counsel, argued, and John Marshall wrote, that whether an
appeal (or writ of error) is a "suit" within the meaning of the amendment
turns on whether the effect of a reversal would be to award affirmative
relief against the state or only to restrain the state from obtaining the
relief it sought in enforcement proceedings.""8
That John Marshall in Cohens did not hold that "an appeal is not a
suit" does not necessarily make it wrong to interpret the amendment this
way. Given the fierce resistance of many states to the appellate jurisdic-
tion conferred by section 25 of the First Judiciary Act,"39 however, it is
unlikely that, if the amendment were intended to constrain federal ques-
tion jurisdiction at all, it would have excepted from that constraint appeals
to the Supreme Court. Certainly no difference in the coercive effect of a
judgment from the Supreme Court on appeal, and in an original federal
court action, would seem to justify any such distinction. Notwithstanding
the suggestion in Cohens that a writ of error acts "only on the record [and
not] upon the parties," '4 the effect of a reversal by the Supreme Court is
as binding, and enforceable, as an original federal judgment.1 41 Nor does
138. See supra text accompanying notes 81, 104-05; cf. infra note 140. It is true that the primary
motivation for the amendment was the prosecution of a suit within the original jurisdiction of the
Court. See Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 906
(1824) (Marshall, C.J.) (if case involving state could not have been brought in Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction, it should be regarded as outside reach of Eleventh Amendment). Yet an under-
standing that the amendment did not apply to the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, but did
apply to the federal question jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, is arguably inconsistent with the
prohibition on the "prosecution" as well as the bringing of suits. See Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at
408 ("to prosecute. . . suit[] is. . .to continue" demand for something previously sought by institu-
tion of process in court). But cf id. ("prosecution" language intended to apply amendment to then-
pending cases).
139. See Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 415-16 (1830) (Missouri made no Eleventh
Amendment objection to Court's jurisdiction, but vigorously sought to reargue constitutionality of sec-
tion 25 of First Judiciary Act); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 312-29 (rearguing constitu-
tionality of section 25 review); see generally Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks on the Su-
preme Court of the United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the Judiciary Act, 47 AM.
L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1913) (between 1789 and 1860, courts in seven states and legislatures in two others
denied constitutional power of Supreme Court to review state court judgments). Although most of
these incidents occurred several years after enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, at least one inci-
dent of state courts asserting this position occurred in the 1790's, though after the amendment was
enacted. Id. at 4-5 (quoting Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467, 473-74 (Pa.S.Ct. 1798)).
140. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 410. See also id. at 411 (citation does not require state's appearance);
supra note 82 (discussing Pinkney's argument). Marshall's characterization of the writ of error seems
intended to show that, given the defensive posture of the federal petitioner, there was nothing in the
writ that should be regarded as making an affirmative demand on the state. But cf. Gibbons, supra
note 1, at 1946 nn.309-10 (drafters of amendment would have intended prohibition to apply to all
writs of error from superior court).
141. The Court has been authorized to enforce its mandate in section 25 appeals since the First
Judiciary Act. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85-86 (writ on review of state court to
have same effect as on review of lower federal court, except that on second writ of error in same case
Supreme Court may proceed to final judgment and award execution); see P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-
TEM 458 (2d ed. 1974) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER 2D ED.] (title 28 provides Court no less
authority to enforce mandate directly than under prior law; state recalcitrance can be met by entry of
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any difference in the scope of what the federal court will decide in original
as compared with appellate proceedings readily correspond to the concept
of jurisdiction over a "suit." '142 It is generally true that the Supreme Court
will only review state court decisions of federal questions, whereas in an
original federal action, decision on questions of state law may be re-
quired. 3  But the conclusion that the federal questions reviewable on ap-
peal are not part of the suit does not follow from the observation that they
are less than the whole of the suit. While the scope of what the Supreme
Court will decide on review of state court judgments may be smaller than
what can be decided in original federal actions (and while there may be
policy reasons to prefer state courts as decisionmakers on state law is-
sues),'" this difference in scope does not readily account for the text of the
amendment.
Thus, to say that there is appellate jurisdiction because an "appeal" is
not a "suit" seems unsatisfactory as constitutional exegesis. 145 It was not
how the phrase was construed relatively soon after its enactment by a
nationalist Chief Justice eager to preserve the Court's jurisdiction to vin-
dicate federal law. And the relative powers of the two levels of federal
courts in making and enforcing their decisions, while supporting the idea
that an appeal is only part of a suit, cannot support the formalistic pro-
judgment or award of execution); see also J. GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS 481 (1971) (describing Ellsworth's experience
with state court recalcitrance as basis for authority to proceed to final judgment and award execution).
Cf. Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918) (Court can directly compel enforcement of mone-
tary judgment against state in original proceeding).
142. Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (in "Suits" at common law, amendment provides rules for trial
and subsequent appellate proceedings). Although the Seventh Amendment does articulate differences
between appellate and original jurisdiction in "Suits at common law," constraining appellate review of
jury findings, the text strongly suggests that the word "suit" was understood to include both trials and
appeals. Moreover, the concerns underlying the enactment of the Eleventh Amendment had virtually
nothing to do with fact-finding by the Supreme Court, but rather with its ruling on issues of law on
jurisdiction, immunity, and assumpsit. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
143. Compare Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (Supreme Court's
jurisdiction over state court judgments limited to deciding federal questions) with Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (federal district courts in diversity cases must decide questions of state
law in diversity cases, in accordance with state common law). The implications of Pennhurst State
School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), are important to note. If, as Pennhurst ap-
pears to hold, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from exercising pendent jurisdiction over
state law claims against state officers, then the scope of state law questions that may be decided in
federal district court litigation directly challenging state actions may be closer to that of the Supreme
Court in reviewing state court decisions. In both instances, the federal court may be limited to decid-
ing or reviewing only those questions of state law that are so interwoven with the federal issues that
the latter depend on an interpretation of the former, Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207, 210
(1935) (citing Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 163-65 (1917)), although the
Supreme Court would be deciding only whether the state court finding was "adequate" to foreclose
the federal claim.
144. Cf. infra note 398.
145. As I argue in Part III(B) below, one of the concerns underlying the Eleventh Amendment's
enactment was Congress' perceived inability otherwise to diminish the Supreme Court's original juris-
diction. In a sense, then, the amendment can be correctly understood as directed against certain origi-
nal cases and not appeals. This is so, not because of a special rule or meaning of the amendment as
applied to appeals in federal question cases, but because the thrust of the amendment was to restrict a
party-based head of jurisdiction within the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
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position that an "appeal is not a suit" for purposes of an amendment
restraining the entire judicial power of the United States.
3. Consent and Supremacy
The proposition that once a state consents to be sued in its own courts,
it likewise consents to Supreme Court review of federal questions decided
therein, accords with the general structure of judicial federalism estab-
lished in such early decisions as Cohens v. Virginia and Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee."" Yet in light of present doctrinal foundations of the
Eleventh Amendment as conferring a constitutional immunity in federal
question cases, this proposition suffers several defects.
First, if the amendment is, as its language suggests, an absolute restric-
tion on the judicial power, the proposition that a party can waive its pro-
visions is not self-evident.'1 7 The provisions limiting the judicial power of
Article III are generally not regarded as waivable.' 48 But even accepting
waivability as a "well-established" anomaly of Eleventh Amendment ju-
risprudence,' 49 extending that concept to justify Supreme Court review of
state court judgments but not district court jurisdiction is questionable.
The Court has emphasized that the constitutional immunity of states
includes not only the power to decide whether to consent to suit, but
where.150 As we saw in the discussion of Smith v. Reeves, the Court has
repeatedly construed state consent to suit provisions as inadequate to au-
thorize suits against the states in inferior federal courts. Why, then, when
those suits are brought in state court and federal questions are decided, is
that consent to suit adequate for the exercise of federal appellate
jurisdiction?
The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in some respects poses
146. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). The separate rationales of "consent" and "supremacy" were
linked by Smith v. Reeves, which held that, once a state consents to suit in state court, any dispositive
federal questions decided therein are reviewable by the Supreme Court. Because of the linkage, I treat
the two rationales together.
147. To justify the Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction on a theory of consent, then,
turns on the more general anomaly that a state can sometimes waive its Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity. The rule of waiver is, indeed, more consistent with the premise that much existing Eleventh
Amendment caselaw stems from a federal common law of state sovereign immunity from suit than
from a presumed constitutional constraint on the reach of the judicial power. This common law rule
of immunity applied only where consent was lacking. See infra Part IV.
148. See, e.g., American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951); Mansfield, Coldwater
& Lake Michigan Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379 (1884). The theory of waiver standing alone does not
distinguish between federal and state causes of action, and thus, presumably, the states may control
the Court's jurisdiction over both federal and state claims against states through waivers of immunity.
The Court, however, has already developed discretionary doctrines to limit resort to its original juris-
diction. See, e.g., Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972).
149. Employees v. Department of Pub. Health, 411 U.S. 279, 294 n.10 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
150. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985); Pennhurst State
School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Florida Dep't of Health v. Florida Nursing
Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981) (per curiam).
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less of a threat to state autonomy than does the jurisdiction of the district
courts.1"1 Thus, although hard to square with the Court's insistence that
consent not be "implied" but be clearly and unequivocally given for origi-
nal jurisdiction cases, the notion that a more relaxed standard of consent
would apply to determine whether the state had submitted itself to the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has attraction.
152
It is, however, difficult to imagine that a state could, at this juncture,
constitutionally authorize its courts to hear claims against the state subject
to ark enforceable proviso that state court rulings, even on questions of
federal law, could not be reviewed by the Supreme Court."" The consent
to Supreme Court jurisdiction thus arises both constructively and conclu-
sively from using state courts to adjudicate these claims.1 54 It follows that,
151. Although a single Supreme Court decision has broader binding effect than a similar district
court decision, the existence of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction may present less of a threat than
lower federal court jurisdiction, particularly if states can refuse altogether to consent to suit in state or
federal court. But see infra text accompanying notes 156-58. Even if states do not have such discre-
tion, limiting initiation of actions against a state to state courts offers real advantages for state auton-
omy. First, if the case is resolved in the state court on an issue of state law, appellate review is
unavailable. Even where state law is inextricably interwoven with the federal claim, the state court
may dispose of the issue differently if it rules on the state law question first. See supra note 136.
Second, given the very limited scope of appellate review of facts, state court control over the factfind-
ing process is quite important, as is initial control over the procedures and timing of a lawsuit. Third,
the Supreme Court can hear only a fraction of the cases brought before it by petition or appeal; the
federal district courts, however, are not similarly encumbered and do not have the same discretion the
Supreme Court has through certiorari review to decline to decide cases within their jurisdiction.
152. The argument in favor of a more relaxed standard of consent for Supreme Court review of
state judgments than for original district court jurisdiction should not be overstated. Whenever the
Court takes jurisdiction, the supposedly "consenting" state is as much subject to federal judicial coer-
cion as it is in a federal district court. When review is sought of a state court decision favorable to the
state, moreover, the state only stands to lose through the exercise of federal judicial power. Before the
filing of an original action, whether the state would do worse in a federal than in a state forum is
more uncertain.
153. The insistence in Smith v. Reeves that appellate federal question jurisdiction can be exercised
in cases initially heard in state courts is well-accepted. See, e.g., Chandler v. Dix, 194 U.S. 590, 592
(1904) ("of course" appeal lies from state court); Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323
U.S. 459, 470 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 57 (1944); see also Iowa Des
Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 246 n.5 (1931) (reversing state court judgment declining
to refund unconstitutional taxes, and asserting that Eleventh Amendment cases "have no bearing on
the power of this Court to protect rights secured by the federal Constitution"). But cf. Bolens v.
Wisconsin, 231 U.S. 616 (1914) (citing Smith v. Reeves, but dismissing writ of error where, under
state mandamus law, state was real party plaintiff in interest but did not seek writ or consent to it).
Bolens, which rests on several alternate grounds, has never been cited in any other federal opinion.
Under the reasoning of Cohens as to why that appeal was not a "suit," Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence might have developed to permit appeals in cases involving affirmative claims based on fed-
eral law against the states only when the state lost. Such a "one-way" result, however, would have
been contrary to the entire thrust of federal appellate jurisdiction over state courts from 1789 until
well into this century. Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (section 25 made review available
only where state court rejected federal claim or defense) with Judiciary Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 790
(review generally available of final decisions of state courts on issues of federal law). See generally F.
FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 190-99 (1927).
154. Concepts of constructive consent have played a significant role in the development of sover-
eign immunity law. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940) (action by United States
subjects it to counterclaim up to set-off on amounts owed to United States); United States v. The
Thekla, 266 U.S. 328, 340 (1924) (by submitting libel in admiralty action arising out of vessel colli-
sion, United States becomes liable for damages on cross-claim to permit "justice [to be] done with
regard to the subject matter"). Constructive waiver also played a role in some early Eleventh Amend-
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to the extent the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction is grounded on
consent, it was a consent given at the time the Constitution was adopted-
a "surrender of the immunity" inherent in the structure of the Union.15
This is suggested by Harlan's reference in Smith v. Reeves to the
"supremacy of federal law."
To say, then, that the exercise of jurisdiction rests on a state's consent
given at the ratification of the Constitution is merely to say that the exer-
cise of jurisdiction is authorized by Article III. But if the states consented,
when they adopted the Constitution, to Supreme Court review of state
court decisions even in actions against states, then surely they also con-
sented to the exercise of inferior federal court jurisdiction over federal
question cases, in the event that Congress exercised its authority to so
provide. And if that state consent survived the Eleventh Amendment-the
text of which does not distinguish between the judicial power of the Su-
preme Court and that of inferior federal courts over cases arising under
federal law-then to explain the power of the Supreme Court to review
state court judgments as a matter of consent fails to distinguish that exer-
cise of the federal judicial power from the inferior federal courts' original
jurisdiction.
Of course, if the federal judicial power can be exercised against states
only in a case that a state court has already entertained on the merits, the
appellate power over state court judgments would differ significantly from
ment cases. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (waiver accomplished by state's inter-
vention and request for affirmative relief).
The consent supposedly involved in justifying Supreme Court review of state court decisions in
cases within the prohibitory framework of the Eleventh Amendment is quite different in both degree
and principle from these cases. In terms of degree, waiver predicated simply on a state's use of state
courts in a case involving the state is obviously broader than waiver predicated on participation in an
individual case before a federal court. In the latter instance, the state has already specifically con-
sented to some exercise of federal judicial power over it. The difference in principle may be more
important: Constructive waivers were justified by the need to "do justice" and reflected the perceived
unfairness of permitting one party both to assert a claim and to shield itself from a claim by the other.
In the case of Supreme Court review of adverse state court judgments on affirmative claims against
the state, it is not unfairness to a party but the supremacy of federal law that justifies the presumption
of consent. But that principle, as suggested in the text, cannot sustain the distinction between Supreme
Court and district court jurisdiction.
155. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) [hereinafter all cita-
tions to The Federalist are to this edition]. Smith v. Reeves, then, implies that the judicial power of
the United States operates necessarily as a limitation upon the power of the states to control the uses
of their own court systems. The use of state courts to administer justice between states and citizens,
whether on affirmative claims or defenses, carries with it the appellate power of the Supreme Court
(subject to congressional limitation) and of other federal courts (if given such jurisdiction by Congress)
to review the decisions on questions of federal law. See Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884) (uphold-
ing removal jurisdiction over action initiated by state); see also Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257,
266-67 (1880) (sovereignty of states and of state judicial power is restricted by Constitution's confer-
ral of federal question jurisdiction on federal courts).
When the Eleventh Amendment was being framed, Congress rejected a proposed change in its
language that sought to preserve federal judicial power over claims against states that failed to provide
a state forum for adjudication. See Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1059 & nn.119-120. Ironically, under
Smith v. Reeves, those states that provide a state forum for adjudication of affirmative claims are more
clearly subject to the federal judicial power, over the federal questions presented therein, than those
that do not.
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the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.1"8 But General Oil
Co. v. Crain is inconsistent with the idea that the Supreme Court's power
to review state court judgments in actions against the state rests on the
state court's willingness to entertain the lawsuit."' 7 The mere existence of
the state court of general jurisdiction to which a claim against the state
might be presented, even absent the state's consent to be sued, has justified
the Supreme Court's assertion of constitutional obligations to provide rem-
edies against the state.158 If the mere existence of a state court of general
jurisdiction warrants the exercise of the federal judicial power in prescrib-
156. Since Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment to subject states to suits in federal
district courts otherwise barred by the Eleventh Amendment is well-established, the significance of
this assumed disparity would be minimized.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 128-33 and infra note 480. But see Georgia R.R. &
Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900 (1949) (contracts clause challenge to state tax collection,
unaddressed in state court on grounds of lack of consent, dismissed by Supreme Court because of
adequate state ground). Musgrove is, at first glance, substantially in tension with Crain, and some
have suggested that it in effect overruled Crain. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER 21 ED., supra note
141, at 935. To the extent Musgrove is read as holding that state sovereign immunity law can gener-
ally preclude federal review of federal claims, that tension cannot be denied. However, such a broad
reading is not required. See Wolcher, supra note 66, at 244 n.234 (Musgrove consistent with view
that refund actions, rather than restraint on collecting unconstitutional tax, is proper remedy). The
Supreme Court subsequently upheld federal district court jurisdiction to entertain the identical claim
by the Musgrove plaintiff, on a finding that the state's alternative remedies were not "plain, speedy
and efficient" within the meaning of the Tax Injunction Act. Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v.
Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952). Thus, the plaintiff in Musgrove had a federal forum to adjudicate the
merits of the constitutional claim. Musgrove, therefore, need not be read as authorizing state sovereign
immunity doctrines to preclude federal judicial review of federal claims against the state. It is, rather,
consistent with an understanding of the federal common law of remedies, described in Part IV, that
recognizes the interactive nature of state and federal remedies in the vindication of federal rights. See
P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 587-88 n.2 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER 3D
ED.]; infra note 394.
Even if a state could defeat Supreme Court review-or any exercise of federal judicial power-by
refusing jurisdiction in its own courts over claims against the state, this would not explain why, when
a state does consent to suit but only in its own courts, the Supreme Court can nonetheless review that
state court decision or, alternatively, why state consent to suit in state court is not sufficient to permit
exercise of original, as well as appellate, federal jurisdiction. See supra text accompanying note 150
(sovereign immunity implies control over both whether and where to be sued).
158. While General Oil Co. v. Crain involved injunctive relief that, despite the Court's contrary
assumption, might have been sought in lower federal courts, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 239-40 n.2 (1985), the Court implied that state courts would be obligated to hear a
statutory damage claim barred by the Eleventh Amendment from federal district courts. In addition to
Crain, in other cases the Court has found state courts to be required to provide remedies for state
misconduct, notwithstanding the state court's purported lack of jurisdiction or authority to provide the
relief. See Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U.S. 636 (1911) (reversing state court con-
clusion that defendant protected by state's sovereign immunity); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S.
270, 306 (1884) (requiring state court to furnish remedy against tax collector assertedly barred by
state law); see also Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931) (state court remedy
for unconstitutional taxation inadequate); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (rejecting state
court conclusion that state law barred refund remedy for taxes collected in violation of federal law);
McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 124-25 (1898) (questioning whether state consent to suit
could be withdrawn); see generally Gordon & Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court,
59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1145, 1171-77 (1984) (state courts obligated to entertain federal claims
against state, regardless of state sovereign immunity); Wolcher, supra note 66 (same); supra notes
120 & 132; cf Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S 1 (1980) (not deciding whether state courts must hear
claims against state under section 1983; when state court hears section 1983 claim, it must award fees
even if state law does not permit fees against state).
State Sovereign Immunity
ing the remedies available for violations of the Constitution, then to speak
of the state's consent or waiver collapses even more fully into the inquiry
of what the Constitution itself provides.
Thus, a consent theory to support the broader exercise of appellate ju-
risdiction than original jurisdiction over claims against states has several
serious problems. First, this theory is inconsistent with the standard for
determining waivers as to the original jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Second, and more fundamentally, a theory based on consent, apart from
that given in the Constitution, would seemingly accord states the right to
withhold appellate review of federal questions decided in their courts and
thus contravene the basic structure of judicial federalism.159 To the extent
that states may not withhold consent to Supreme Court review because of
the supremacy of federal law, it is difficult to justify withholding consent
to district court jurisdiction.'" And to the extent consent refers to the
mere existence of a state court system, the concept no longer seems aptly
captured by the word "consent." Finally, the theory of consent itself rests
on an anomaly of federal jurisdiction and wholly fails to account for the
text of the amendment.
The principal justifications offered by the Court for its power to review
state court judgments in actions against states for monetary relief are
therefore unsatisfactory. A fundamental tension remains between the
Hans rule-that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from adju-
dicating federal claims against the states-and Supreme Court review of
state court judgments. As the next section will argue, that tension is re-
solved by the revisionist view that the Eleventh Amendment does not con-
strain the federal question jurisdiction.
III. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, THE REPEAL OF PARTY-BASED
JURISDICTION OVER STATES, AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Court has not yet articulated an adequate rationale for its exercise
of appellate jurisdiction over federal question claims against states that
could not be brought in district courts. Yet the exercise of this jurisdiction
159. A thoroughgoing theory of consent would create obvious prospects for substantial lack of
uniformity in the articulation and application of federal law. Cf Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
160. Harlan's reference to the "supremacy of federal law" is, then, profoundly unilluminating.
The supremacy clause binds not only state court judges but also all other state officials. See Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (combined effect of supremacy clause and oath required by Article VI
makes federal law binding on state legislative, executive, and judicial officers). Thus, it cannot be said
that it is only when state courts reach erroneous conclusions as to state obligations under federal law
that the supremacy clause is threatened. Why, then, are the lower federal courts barred from enforc-
ing the supremacy of federal law in original actions against the states? Moreover, reliance on the
supremacy clause begs the question: Why is the Eleventh Amendment itself not supreme federal law
that constrains the entire federal judicial power, whether to redress erroneous state court interpreta-
tions of federal law in actions against states or to redress erroneous state action in original
proceedings?
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is a fundamental aspect of our basic jurisprudence that clearly should and
will continue. As a functional matter, the differential treatment of federal
appellate and original jurisdiction over federal question claims against
states may, by allocating some "federal" business to state courts, enhance
the state courts' role and function within the federal system.16' This allo-
cation serves some of the interests identified as important in comity and
abstention cases and presents many of the same risks to the supremacy
and uniformity of federal law. 62
But for those who take seriously the proposition that Article III courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction, the basis of appellate review of state
court decisions must go beyond "acquiescence" or "functionality." As the
inadequacy of the Court's rationales suggest, it is difficult to rationalize
this practice consistently with the doctrinal framework of Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence for district court jurisdiction.
Two sets of revisionist theories of the Eleventh Amendment presently
compete for acceptance. One argues that the amendment was intended
only to restrain judicial creativity in implying the abrogation of state sov-
ereign immunity solely from jurisdictional grants.1 "3 Under this view,
Congress has power to abrogate the states' immunity and authorize fed-
eral courts to hear claims otherwise barred. As I will show, this explana-
tion, while attractive in some respects, does not account for large elements
of the present jurisprudence, particularly Supreme Court review of state
court judgments. The second approach views the amendment as simply
repealing a party-based head of jurisdiction, without generally constitu-
tionalizing the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 4 This understand-
ing of the Eleventh Amendment, which implies that the amendment does
not constrain the judicial power over cases arising under federal law, fully
accounts for the Supreme Court's power and better accords with basic
principles of our constitutional system. Accepting this view of the Elev-
enth Amendment, however, requires a revised understanding of the consti-
tutional jurisdiction of the district courts in federal question cases.
A. Congressional Abrogation
Any effort to account for the Court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction
must consider the theory that Congress can abrogate the states' constitu-
tional immunity and authorize federal courts to hear claims against states.
Professor Tribe, for example, argues that the Constitution distinguishes
161. See infra text accompanying notes 396-98.
162. See infra text accompanying notes 404-07.
163. See, e.g., Nowak, supra note 1; Tribe supra note 1; see also Brown, supra note 1 (Eleventh
Amendment protects state sovereignty through "process federalism," permitting Congress to authorize
suit in federal court but only by clear statement); Field, Part I, supra note 1 (Eleventh Amendment
restores common law immunity, which Congress may change).
164. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1; Fletcher, supra note 1; Gibbons, supra note 1.
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"rights conferred against the federal judiciary from rights conferred
against Congress."16 5 The word "construed" in the Eleventh Amendment
is seen as a special admonition to courts to refrain from implying causes of
action against states in the "core area" of monetary damages.1 6 The Elev-
enth Amendment can be given its full force if federal courts decline to
entertain actions against states for monetary relief until Congress, with
primary constitutional responsibility for safeguarding the interests of
states in the federal system,'"7 explicitly creates such state liabilities en-
forceable in federal courts. The "clear statement" rule' 8 assures that
Congress acts deliberately and with notice to the states when creating
monetary liabilities enforceable in federal courts. The rule thereby en-
hances the ability of Congress to safeguard the federalism interests repre-
sented by the amendment.
An approach grounded in congressional power to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity in federal courts does not, however, readily account for the
distinctive treatment of appellate and original jurisdiction over claims for
monetary relief against states. Indeed, in explaining the Supreme Court's
appellate power over state court decisions in cases against states present-
ing federal questions, Professor Tribe has stated only that "neither sover-
eign immunity nor the eleventh amendment bars Supreme Court review
of suits in which a state is a party, since supremacy of federal law re-
quires review of the federal questions presented in such suits."1 6 He does
not attempt to account for this practice in terms of his general theory, nor
can it be done. True, section 25 of the First Judiciary Act authorized the
Supreme Court to review state court judgments in which the exercise of
state power was under attack. Section 25 was invoked in its early years to
review claims against states from state courts, and thus, might be regarded
165. Tribe, supra note 1, at 693. Professor Nowak advances a similar thesis, focusing on Con-
gress' powers to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Nowak, supra note 1, at 1441-50, 1453-64. See
also infra note 297 (discussing Professor Field's argument).
166. Tribe, supra note 1, at 687.
167. As George Brown has recently argued, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author-
ity, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), supports this structural premise of the congressional abrogation approach to
state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. Brown, supra note 1, at 390.
168. See, e.g.. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243 ("unmistakable language"); Employees v. Department
of Pub. Health, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) ("clear language").
169. Tribe, supra note 1, at 685. This theory resembles that of Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436
(1900), and is subject to some of the same criticisms. See supra text accompanying notes 153-58. If
Article III and the Eleventh Amendment preclude judicial abrogation of state sovereign immunity,
why do they not apply to appellate as well as original federal jurisdiction? If federal supremacy
requires correction of an erroneous state court determination of a federal question, then why is the
supremacy clause not likewise offended by the complete denial of a forum to review a nonjudicial
violation of federal law by a state official? If Tribe's theory of appellate review is founded on an
exception to the general requirement of congressional abrogation, the constitutional principles by
which that exception is limited to federal question cases within the Supreme Court's appellate juris-
diction are not readily apparent. And if Tribe's justification for the appellate powers of the Supreme
Court is not founded upon an exception to the abrogation theory, then one must ask what statutory
basis justifies the disparate treatment of states' jurisdictional immunities in the Supreme Court and in
other federal courts.
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as an abrogation of state immunity. But in the 1870's, Congress provided
both for general federal question jurisdiction and for jurisdiction over civil
rights claims in the lower federal courts to implement an amendment
aimed at restraining state action.170 These grants of jurisdiction, however,
have not been construed to abrogate state immunity, though they appar-
ently provide the basis for subject matter jurisdiction in the district courts
when Congress otherwise acts in substantive legislation to do so.1' The
theory of congressional abrogation, then, does not readily account for the
anomaly of Supreme Court review.
1 2
The congressional abrogation theory suffers from other defects. First, it
fails to account sufficiently for the specific prohibition of the amendment.
An approach relying on Congress to address federalism concerns inherent
in the Tenth Amendment has been adopted by the Court to sustain con-
gressional imposition of substantive obligations on states."' 3 But such an
approach is far less satisfying in the face of an explicit textual restraint on
the federal judicial power than in the face of the arguable redundancy of
the Tenth Amendment.1 74 To the extent that the Eleventh Amendment
has the federalism purpose of protecting states from having to litigate even
federal claims in federal courts, one can understand why a state can waive
170. See, e.g., Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (present version codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1982)); Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (present version codified at 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3) (1982)).
171. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (upholding awards of attorneys' fees against state
under section 1988). Presumably, the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the claim
and award the relief in that case arose from section 1343. See also Engdahl, supra note 17, at 72-75
(present federal question statute for district courts should be construed to embrace actions against
states without consent).
172. Another effort to apply Tribe's congressional abrogation approach to account for the differ-
ent interpretations of Supreme Court and district court jurisdiction over claims against states might
proceed from the singularity of the Supreme Court in the constitutional scheme. Because the Supreme
Court was the only federal court whose jurisdiction was set forth in Article III, and if federal question
jurisdiction over "all cases" includes cases against states, then it could be argued that Congress must
specifically remove that jurisdiction in the exercise of its exceptions clause power to deprive the Court
of its constitutionally conferred jurisdiction. Cf. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Ju-
risdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 157 (1960) (Congress' powers under exceptions
clause limited by need to preserve Court's essential functions, especially in review of state court judg-
ments). On this view, the Constitution puts the burden on Congress to show that it has reduced the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, a burden simply not met by anything in section 25 or its descendants.
By contrast, one might argue that because Congress is given plenary control over the creation of lower
federal courts, they have only that jurisdiction affirmatively granted by Congress. But see Eisenberg,
Congressional Authority to Restrict Lower Federal Court Jurisdiction, 83 YALE L.J. 498 (1974)
(authority not plenary). In determining whether Congress gave the lower federal courts jurisdiction
over claims against states, the tradition of sovereign immunity could be seen to weigh against the
presumption that general language embraces such claims. The difficulty with this approach, however,
is that it contradicts the established interpretive rule that Congress' "affirmation of [the Supreme
Court's] appellate jurisdiction implies the negation of all such jurisdiction not affirmed having been"
provided. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869); accord Luckenbach Steamship Co.
v. United States, 272 U.S. 533, 536-37 (1926); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 307,
318 (1810); Wiscart v. Dauchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796).
173. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
174. See Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1260-61 (Tribe-Nowak theory derives from nothing
peculiar to Eleventh Amendment); M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCA-
TION OF JUDICIAL POWER 150-51 (1980) (same).
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that protection. But the congressional abrogation theory might better ac-
count for constitutional text if it merely recognized a right in Congress to
create federal claims against states enforceable solely in state courts." 5
Second, given Marbury v. Madison,"'6 it is difficult to understand how a
constitutional instruction to the courts that they not construe their juris-
diction to extend to certain cases can be overcome by Congress. One abid-
ing lesson of Marbury is that Congress cannot extend the jurisdiction of
the federal courts beyond the boundaries provided by the Constitution, as
construed by the courts.1 77 Third, an underlying premise of the congres-
sional abrogation thesis-that Congress is the constitutionally appropriate
body to protect state interests-is subject to empirical and structural
doubt, especially since the matter concerns what, at the time of enacting
legislation, may appear to be a relatively minor detail of enforcement.17 '
175. See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health, 411 U.S. 279, 297-98 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Professor Tribe states that "[clongressional power to abrogate the states' sovereign immu-
nity" is limited by the principle that "Congress cannot confer upon an article III court any authority
to resolve disputes outside the textual confines of that article." Tribe, supra note 1, at 696. If suits
against states for affirmative relief under, for example, the commerce clause, are not outside the tex-
tual confines of Article III, however, then what is the constitutional basis for concluding that, in
exercising Article III powers, the courts themselves may not abrogate state sovereign immunity? Tribe
answers that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to overcome a reading of Article III as having
the self-executing force of an abrogation of state immunity and that the Court's authority absent
congressional action must accordingly be limited. Id. at 684. Chisholm, however, was an interpretation
of only one part of Article III (the "state-citizen" clause) and thus has no necessary implications for
the scope of the "judicial power" in claims "arising under" federal law. The congressional abrogation
theory, in addition, fails to explain why some forms of relief are regarded as within, and others
outside, the constitutional restraint. Id. at 687 (referring without explanation to "core area" of dam-
age suits). But see Nowak, supra note I (historical arguments that Eleventh and Fourteenth Amend-
ments permit injunctive relief but not monetary relief unless expressly provided for by Congress).
176. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
177. See M. REDISH, supra note 174, at 150-51 (Tribe's "pragmatic theory" falters on "explicit
directives" of Article III and Eleventh Amendment as limits on Congress' power to invest federal
courts with jurisdiction); Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1258 (same). In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445, 456 (1976), the Court implied that the Fourteenth Amendment modified the Eleventh with
respect to actions authorized by Congress under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But see
Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1231 (analyzing Fitzpatrick as distinguishing between Congress'
power to regulate and Congress' power to impose suits for retroactive monetary relief in federal
court).
Professor Nowak does not argue that the Fourteenth Amendment "modified" the Eleventh. Nowak,
like Tribe, views the Eleventh Amendment as directed primarily against judicial abrogation of states'
immunity without specific authorization by Congress. Nowak, supra note 1, at 1442. He argues,
however, that because of core Eleventh Amendment concerns about assigning retroactive liability to
states, even Congress cannot authorize a cause of action for monetary relief based on acts predating
the legislation. Id. at 1444. His separate historical analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment reaches a
similar conclusion: that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated that federal courts
would enjoin prohibited state action but did not contemplate judicial implication of damage actions
against states without specific congressional authorization. While the ambiguous history of the Elev-
enth Amendment can be read, as Nowak does, to reflect special concern over pre-existing debt (a
concern I construe, in view of that amendment's text, as limited to state law claims), Nowak's argu-
ment about the Fourteenth Amendment seems less convincing, as it derives its support virtually en-
tirely from the silence of the debates and weak inferences drawn from concern about northern states
not having to assume the Civil War debts of the South. Id. at 1455-64.
178. See Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Response to Supreme
Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAw. 301, 334 (1988) (Congress unlikely to
recognize federalism problem on its own); see also ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMEN-
TAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FEDERALISM: POLICY, PROCESS, IMPACT AND REFORM (1984);
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There is considerable merit in the argument that, absent congressional
abrogation of immunity, the federal courts should hesitate to infer federal
statutory authorization of monetary causes of action against states. This
has nothing to do with the Eleventh Amendment or with any constitu-
tional restraint on the federal courts' power over federal question cases
involving states. Instead, this caution derives from a federal common law
of governmental immunities that applies to claims against states in federal
courts. The section that follows will explain why the Eleventh Amend-
ment, properly understood, must be disengaged from federal doctrines of
state sovereign immunity in the adjudication of federal questions.
B. The Eleventh Amendment: Party-Based vs. Federal Question Heads
of Jurisdiction
The persistent exercise by the Supreme Court of appellate jurisdiction
over state court cases, regardless of whether the state itself is the named
party defendant or the form of relief sought, is best explained by the pro-
position that the Eleventh Amendment does not restrict the judicial power
over cases arising under federal law. In recent years several scholars have,
for somewhat different reasons, reached this conclusion. 9 As was argued
in both Cohens and Osborn, the Eleventh Amendment removed from the
federal judicial power only certain cases that had been within it solely
because of the "state-citizen" diversity clause. Implying no general consti-
tutional principle of state sovereign immunity, the amendment carefully
modified Article III by withdrawing jurisdiction that the "state-citizen"
clause had been construed to confer over state law claims by individuals
against states.
Under this view, the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to the
"head" of jurisdiction conferred by the "arising under" federal law
Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLuM. L. REV. 847, 860-68
(1979); Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia,
1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 393-95. The classic article supporting the premise that the structure of
Congress will protect states is Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543
(1954); see also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PoLrTcAL PROCESS 171-258
(1980).
179. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1, at 1467-84 (emphasizing political theory of Constitution, need
for jurisdiction over constitutional claims, and state law character of Chisholm claim); Fletcher, supra
note 1, at 1045-63 (emphasizing legislative history of amendment); Gibbons, supra note 1, at
1920-70 (emphasizing diplomatic situation of 1790's and need for jurisdiction over treaty-based
claims). For an earlier work reading similar conclusions, see R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE Su-
PREME COURT 326-28 (1969); see also J. ORTH, supra note 1, at 12-46 (approving limited readings
of amendment); Engdahl, supra note 17, at 9-11 (early cases properly construed Eleventh Amend-
ment as not barring federal question claims by citizen against own state). This body of work is re-
markably consistent in its evaluation of the historical evidence and text of the amendment as not
supporting a broad rule of constitutional immunity for states. One commentator has noted that, for
those who ascribe to an "originalist" view of the Constitution, present Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence is difficult to justify. See Lee, Sovereign Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment: The Uses of
History, 18 URB. LAW. 519, 531 (1986).
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clause.18 ° Understanding the amendment only as a repeal of the party-
based head of original Supreme Court jurisdiction implies that the judicial
power over all cases arising under federal law was unimpaired by its en-
actment, even as to cases arguably within its literal terms (for example,
those by a citizen of one state against another state), and certainly as to
cases outside its literal reach, that is, cases brought by citizens against
their own states (the great bulk of federal question cases)."" So under-
stood, the Eleventh Amendment is irrelevant to the Supreme Court's ap-
pellate jurisdiction over state cases that arise under federal law for Article
III purposes.
Not only does this interpretation best account for the Supreme Court's
exercise of appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments in cases rais-
ing affirmative claims against states, but it accords well with both the text
and history of the amendment. Without unduly duplicating the work of
others,18 2 several points in addition to the anomaly of Supreme Court re-
view bear emphasis.
First, Chisholm v. Georgia, 1 8  the case which provoked enactment of
the amendment, was a state law claim, presenting no substantive federal
issues. Original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was sustained solely on
the basis of the state-citizen clause. Because of the perception that the
original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court could not be divested by stat-
ute, a constitutional amendment was thought necessary to overcome
Chisholm's effect.'
5 4
180. Although neither Nowak nor Tribe is explicit on this point, the evident premise of their
articles is that "arising under" jurisdiction does extend to some claims against states if Congress so
provides. I dispute their view that state sovereign immunity, absent specific authorization from Con-
gress, is constitutionally required in federal question cases. I agree with Professors Amar, Field, and
Fletcher and Judge Gibbons that the Constitution did not, either in Article III or in the Eleventh
Amendment, mandate a constitutional rule of sovereign immunity for the states in federal question
cases. Like Professor Fletcher, I believe that there may be a federal basis for continued application of
sovereign immunity rules in actions against states. Unlike Professor Fletcher, I do not argue that those
federal rules are constitutionally required by implicit limits on Congress' substantive powers to impose
monetary causes of action on states. And unlike Professor Field, I do not believe that the Constitution
mandates judicial "neutrality" on state sovereign immunity, an approach that does not seem to differ
significantly in effect from the Tribe thesis that Congress, but not the courts, can abrogate immunity.
181. But cf. infra Part III(C)(1) and note 235 (discussing implications of Eleventh Amendment
for pendent state law claim under federal question jurisdiction).
182. See supra note 179.
183. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
184. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 699 (1838) (counsel argued that
Eleventh Amendment required because Congress could not divest Court of original jurisdiction); see
United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812) (of all federal courts, only
Supreme Court possesses jurisdiction derived immediately from Constitution and of which legislature
cannot deprive it); see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 332-33 (1816) (im-
plying that Congress cannot "withhold original jurisdiction" from Supreme Court though it can make
exceptions to Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction); cf Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L.
REv. 741, 824 n.284 (1984) (Court's original jurisdiction vested by Constitution and not subject to
control except by amendment). Although somewhat ambiguous, the Court's opinion in Rhode Island
implies that only an amendment could diminish the Court's own construction of its original jurisdic-
tion. Compare 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 721-22 (Congress had power to organize judicial department and
19881
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Second, the language of the amendment closely parallels the language
of Article III that extends the judicial power to cases between a state and
a citizen of another state or of a foreign state, suggesting that it was this
aspect of the judicial power that was being amended. This interpretation
is supported by Congress' failure to adopt proposed language that would
have explicitly prohibited all federal courts from entertaining any suits
against states.185 Third, the amendment was widely supported in Con-
gress by federalists and non-federalists alike, suggesting that Congress did
not intend a broad change in the power of the national government. 186
Had federal courts been made powerless to enforce federal law against
states, that would have adversely effected national interests and the sup-
posed reach of national power.
187
thus to determine mode for proceeding) with id. at 722, 723, 730 (if Court upholds its jurisdiction,
there is "but one power" superior to it that can effect change, as occurred in Eleventh Amendment;
Court will not presume that Congress in Judiciary Act failed to grant Supreme Court that original
jurisdiction which Constitution conferred). See generally HART & WECHSLER 2D ED., supra note
141, at 242; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs 764-73 (4th ed. 1983). But see Amar, supra
note 6, at 254 n.160 (arguing that Congress could abolish Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over
states).
185. One proposal read:
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant in any of the judicial courts, estab-
lished, or which shall be established under the authority of the United States, at the suit of any
person or persons whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic
or corporate, whether within or without the United States.
Pa. J. & Weekly Advertiser, Feb. 27, 1793, at 1. col. 2, cited in Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1058-59 &
n.116; see Nowak, supra note 1, at 1436 & n.132 (quoting virtually identical language from Pennsyl-
vania Journal, Feb. 20, 1793). Neither this language nor that of a similarly worded proposal de-
scribed in C. WARREN, supra note 68, at 101, can be found in the ANNALS OF CONGRESS. Compare
Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1058 (proposal introduced in House) and C. WARREN, supra note 68, at
101 (same) with Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1926 n.186 (doubtful that proposal was introduced). Its
mere existence, however, demonstrates that more comprehensive language could have been enacted.
186. Amar, supra note 1, at 1474 n.202, 1481-84; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1060-63; Gibbons,
supra note 1, at 1926-27 & n.186. The limited available legislative history of the Eleventh Amend-
ment is somewhat ambiguous. As noted above, a proposal that would have prohibited all exercise of
federal jurisdiction over claims asserted against a state, by anyone and in any form, was not enacted.
See supra note 185. It must be noted, however, that Senator Gallatin's effort to amend the proposed
text of the amendment explicitly to preserve federal power over treaty-based claims was also rejected.
3 ANNALS OF CONG. 30-31 (Jan. 14, 1794). Yet Gallatin's amendment might have been interpreted
to mean that only treaty jurisdiction was preserved when other federal question jurisdiction would
have been lost. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 287 n.40 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Because these actions of nonconsideration and rejection diverge, it may be difficult to draw
any conclusion other than that the framers specifically focused on the particular problems of state-
diverse party jurisdiction, as exemplified in Chisholm, and sought to address only that problem. But
Cf. C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 94-95 (noting rejection of Gallatin amendment and that some of suits
filed against states under Court's diversity jurisdiction presented federal questions); infra note 221.
187. Given the importance at that time of the belief that the judicial power of a sovereign should
be coextensive with that of the legislature, an understanding that the amendment constrained the
federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts is unlikely to have gone unremarked. Judge Gibbons,
for example, speculates that the framers must have understood that the Supreme Court could exercise
appellate jurisdiction to review federal questions arising in state court proceedings. Gibbons, supra
note 1, at 1935. The diplomatic goals of supporters of the amendment required that they be able to
assure Great Britain that violations of treaty rights in the state courts, some of which could involve
claims against the state resulting from the operation of state escheat laws, could be corrected by the
Supreme Court. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 348 (1821) (counsel argues that in
case of escheat violating privileges and immunities clause federal court must be open to provide relief).
Although Judge Gibbons adduces no direct evidence in support of this contention, Gibbons, supra
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Nor did Article III itself, as originally enacted, etablish a constitu-
tional rule of state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. As
others have argued, the express terms of Article III-extending the judi-
cial power to cases in which states were parties, based on the identity of
the parties of the litigation-plainly contemplated that states could be de-
fendants in such suits.18 Moreover, in the ratification debates, more com-
ments-from both supporters and opponents of the Constitution-indi-
cated that it was so understood than otherwise.1 8 9 Although there was
virtually no discussion of state sovereign immunity in connection with fed-
eral question jurisdiction, that head of jurisdiction-together with Con-
gress' power to establish inferior federal courts-was discussed as a poten-
tial threat to state autonomy. 90 And unlike the disingenuous defense of
note 1, at 1922-23, 1925-26 (and while it may be inappropriate to attribute dispositive weight to
views of framers without some basis to believe those views were disseminated among state ratifying
conventions), diplomatic concerns arising out of state court resistance to treaty obligations support
interpreting the amendment in accord with its narrow and technical phrasing.
188. Several clauses of Article III provided for jurisdiction over a state as a party without limiting
jurisdiction to cases in which states were parties plaintiff. See Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1072-73.
Some supporters of the Constitution did argue that states would not be subject to suit without their
consent under the state-citizen clause. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101, at 533
(Madison stating state-citizen clause only authorized states to sue as plaintiffs); id. at 555-56 (Mar-
shall, agreeing with Madison, though suggesting that state legislature could be sued); cf. THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 81, at 487 (A. Hamilton) (states not subject to suit without consent, except to extent they
surrender immunity in plan of convention; under that plan, states not subject to suit without consent
on their debts). Other supporters, accepting the characterization of the opponents, argued that states
should be liable for their debts in federal court. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, Supra note 101, at
207, 573-75 (remarks of Edmund Randolph of Virginia); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101, at
491 (remarks of James Wilson of Pennsylvania); see also 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101, at
549 (remarks of Edmund Pendleton of Virginia favoring jurisdiction over states); 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTrrtrrTION 204 (Kaminski & Saladerno eds. 1983)
(letter of Timothy Pickering in support of all heads of diversity jurisdiction). And while some oppo-
nents of the Constitution argued that it should be rejected as inconsistent with state sovereign immu-
nity, they clearly understood Article III to have rendered states subject to such jurisdiction under the
diversity clauses. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101, at 526-27 (remarks of George
Mason); id. at 542 (remarks of Patrick Henry); 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 245 (H. Stor-
ing ed. 1981) (remarks attributed to Richard Henry Lee); id. at 429-31 ("Brutus" letters in New
York papers). Four of the five members of the Chisholm Court, including James Wilson, a member of
the Committee of Detail that helped draft Article III, believed that the state-citizen clause extended
jurisdiction over any claim against a state by an out-of-stater. In addition, the continued exercise of
jurisdiction in suits against states by the United States and by sister states belies the claim that Article
III embraced a general principle of immunity. For more detailed analyses, see Field, Part I, supra
note 1, at 527-36; Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1068-77; Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1899-1914.
189. See supra note 188; see generally Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 279
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (majority of recorded comments contradict Hans Court's assertion
that private suits against states in federal courts not embraced within Article III); Field, Part I, supra
note 1, at 531-34 (same).
190. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 366-67, 418-20 ("Bru-
tus" letters arguing that federal jurisdiction over constitutional questions together with inferior federal
courts will lead to federal judicial subversion of state judiciaries and legislatures); id. at 147-48
("Centinel" letters claiming that state courts will fall into disuse because of federal jurisdiction). The
absence of discussion of sovereign immunity and federal question jurisdiction does raise another possi-
bility: that, while Chisholm was correctly decided, the only jurisdiction under the original Constitution
in which the states consented to be sued was the party-head clauses of Article III. On this view,
federal question jurisdiction was not a "surrender of immunity" and never embraced federal judicial
authority to hear suits against states, and the Eleventh Amendment narrowed the circumstances under
which diversity-based claims could be brought in federal court. Some support for this view can be
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the state-citizen clauses made by some powerful proponents of the Consti-
tution,191 the jurisdiction over federal questions was unflinchingly de-
fended as necessary to enable the national government to enforce its pow-
ers, including restrictions on state authority." 2 Marshall was evidently
correct, then, in Cohens, when he concluded that the jurisdiction over all
cases arising under federal law, originally given in Article III, extended to
all such cases regardless of whether a state was a party.193
found. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257, 328 (1837) (Thompson, J.,
concurring) ("state was not suable under the old confederation, nor under the present constitution,
even before the amendment ... by citizens of the same state"); see also Hans, 134 U.S. at 21
(Harlan, J., concurring) (Chisholm correct at time, but judicial power does not extend to federal
question claim against state by own citizen without state consent). There are many more reasons to
reject this view. The unanimous opinion in Cohens rejected this interpretation of the original federal
question jurisdiction, though it was forcefully urged by Virginia. Given the divergences in opinion on
the question of sovereign immunity under diversity jurisdiction, Cohens was surely correct in finding
no persuasive reason to assume that broad immunity was implicit in the power plainly conferred by
Article III over "all cases" arising under federal law. Indeed, in view of the support for the proposi-
tion that suits arising under state law but brought by a noncitizen should be heard in federal courts,
see supra note 188, the notion that states had a constitutional immunity from federal question juris-
diction cannot be sustained. See also Nowak, supra note 1, at 1436 (lack of unified press opposition to
Chisholm suggests that Eleventh Amendment intended only to remedy assumption of jurisdiction in
Chisholm and not to bar federal jurisdiction over all damage actions against state governments).
191. See supra note 188 (describing remarks of Madison, Marshall and Hamilton). As others
have argued, however, Hamilton's remarks are consistent with the view that part of what was "inher-
ent in the plan" of the convention was a surrender of immunity to federal jurisdiction over all cases
arising under federal law. See Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1909-10, 1911-12 & nn.102-04. State-
incurred debts were apparently not viewed as claims arising under federal law. See supra note 101.
192. See, e.g., 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101, at 532 (Madison defending federal question
jurisdiction as necessary because "states are laid under restrictions, and . . . the rights of the Union
are secured by these restrictions"); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 101, at 489-90 (Wilson of
Pennsylvania defending federal question jurisdiction because "I am sorry to say. . . that, in order to
prevent the payment of British debts ...many states in the Union have infringed the treaty").
Indeed, of greater concern to some opponents of the Constitution were the provisions for diversity
jurisdiction, by which federal courts were understood to have the power to intermeddle in questions of
state law. See 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 188, at 243 ("Federal Farmer"
approving federal question jurisdiction as appropriate on ground that judiciary has power coextensive
with federal legislature, but criticizing diversity-based jurisdiction as authorizing federal courts to
decide issues of state law).
193. John Marshall's failure to embrace fully the view that the Eleventh Amendment does not
constrain federal question jurisdiction should not prevent adoption of that understanding. First, Mar-
shall was quite clear that the Eleventh Amendment did not restrain federal question jurisdiction in
cases between citizens and their own states. He thus plainly did not read the Eleventh Amendment as
a broad grant of immunity. Second, Marshall may well have avoided a decision on the relationship
between the Eleventh Amendment and federal question jurisdiction in suits by out-of-state citizens
against a state to avoid the unnecessary provocation caused by reading the amendment in a manner
arguably at variance with its plain meaning. Third, Marshall may have felt constrained by the appar-
ent clarity of the amendment's text, insofar as it extended to "any suit in law or equity." Time and
reflection have made more clear the full implications of Marshall's view, first articulated in Cohens,
that the different heads of jurisdiction were independent and thus permit us to conclude that the
repeal of jurisdiction over suits under one head of jurisdiction does not affect another head of
jurisdiction.
Finally, Marshall evidently believed that both constitutional and common law doctrines would bar
some forms of relief against a state. These grounds were derived not from a constitutional immunity
from federal jurisdiction, but from the "political" aspects of particular forms of relief. See Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 19-20 (1831) (alternative ground for decision that injunction to
restrain exertion of physical force by state "savours too much of the exercise of political power to be
within the proper province of the judicial department," though "mere question of right [to the land]
might perhaps be decided by this court in a proper case with proper parties"). Marshall's opaque
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Thus, Chisholm was in all likelihood correctly decided as to the ques-
tion of jurisdiction,194 but was overruled by an amendment that withdrew
from the judicial power and the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction the
head of jurisdiction defined by the configuration of certain parties plaintiff
against states.195 The Court's appellate jurisdiction over federal question
cases was not, however, affected by the amendment, nor the power of
Congress to establish inferior federal courts to exercise original jurisdic-
tion over federal question claims against states, whether by citizens or
noncitizens.
This interpretation best resolves the anomaly of Hans: that the amend-
ment, if applied literally, would deprive out-of-staters but not in-staters of
the benefit of a federal forum on claims based on federal law. 96 Hans
discussion in Cohens of whether federal courts could award certain relief against a state can be under-
stood, in part, as reflecting both a view that such claims would arise under state law, and an aware-
ness of what might then have been understood as a general common law remedial tradition embracing
both sovereign immunity and the availability of relief against individuals for state wrongdoing. See
infra note 310 and text accompanying notes 306-35; see also Amar, supra note 1, at 1486-87 (Mar-
shall may have believed that constitutional rights against states could be fully vindicated through, e.g.,
suits against officers); Cf. J.ORTH, supra note 1, at 41 (noting Marshall's use of English common law
immunity tradition to minimize jurisdictional bar of Eleventh Amendment).
194. See supra note 188; C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 22-25, 40. Whether the state law of immu-
nity should not have applied to a state law claim of assumpsit is a separate issue. To the extent that
the Court failed to apply state law on the immunity issue, this may well have been an error under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)) (referred to as "Rules of
Decision Act").
195. As noted earlier, this constitutional withdrawal was important to the states because Congress
may well have been perceived to lack authority to diminish the Court's original jurisdiction. See supra
note 184. This understanding may have one important implication for the congressional abrogation
thesis discussed above. The protection of states from the exercise of federal question jurisdiction by
inferior courts of the United States may have been understood to arise from Congress' control over the
establishment of the inferior courts-not from a constitutional immunity from jurisdiction.
In response to repeated concerns about the threat that federal question jurisdiction and the existence
of inferior federal courts might pose to state autonomy, see supra notes 190 & 192, proponents of the
Constitution uniformly relied on the Article III compromise concerning inferior federal courts. See
generally J. GOEBEL, supra note 141, at 211, 215-16, 226, 239-40, 246 (describing controversy over
compromise giving Congress power to establish such courts and repeated efforts to undo that compro-
mise and provide only for single Supreme Court). Proponents emphasized that the Constitution itself
did not establish such courts but that Congress would decide on their necessity, arguing that in many
cases (except for admiralty) Congress would probably choose to rely first on the state courts. See, e.g.,
3 ELLioT'S DEBATES, supra note 101, at 517 (Pendleton in Virginia convention); id. at 534-36
(Madison at Virginia convention); J. GOEBEL, supra note 141, at 356-57 (describing New Hamp-
shire convention); THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 485-86 (A. Hamilton) (Congress has authority to
make exceptions and provide regulations to redress any "inconvenience" resulting from scope of judi-
cial power). States, then, could be protected from the federal question jurisdiction of the inferior
federal courts through Congress' power to control their establishment and jurisdiction. This under-
standing is inconsistent with the thesis that Congress lacks discretion not to establish lower federal
courts, see Eisenberg, supra note 172, and in tension with the view that the entire Article III power
over "all" cases arising under federal law must be vested in some federal court. Cf. Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329-31 (1816); J. GOEBEL, supra note 141, at 247; Amar,
supra note 6. It nonetheless seems to reflect the prevailing understanding of the role of Congress in
protecting states and state judiciaries from feared federal judicial power in a more straightforward
manner than does the theory that states have a constitutional immunity from federal jurisdiction that
Congress can abrogate.
196. This interpretation admittedly does not entirely account for the interpretive problems created
by the text of the amendment. The text states that "the Judicial power" shall not be construed to
extend to "any suit in law or equity." The use of the word "any" is arguably inconsistent with a view
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solved this apparent discrimination by extending the Eleventh Amend-
ment to all claims by individuals based on federal law. Instead, the Elev-
enth Amendment can best be interpreted to mean that out-of-staters were
deprived of a federal forum only as to those cases in which in-staters
lacked a federal forum as well. This interpretation fully accounts for Con-
gress' power to render states subject to suit on statutory causes of action
and for the Supreme Court's appellate practice in cases against states.
And, coupled with the understanding that a federal common law doctrine
of state sovereign immunity is available as a defense in cases within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts, it explains why states can waive that
immunity without conferring subject matter jurisdiction by consent.
197
More important, by recognizing that a general principle of sovereign
immunity is embodied in neither the Eleventh Amendment nor Article III,
this interpretation removes the contradictions that would otherwise exist
between the general constitutional structure and the doctrinal basis for
state immunity from suit."' To the extent that the doctrine derived from
the notion that sovereignty resided in the person of the monarch, it con-
flicts with the premise of the Constitution that sovereignty derives from
the people. The first premise of a constitutional system of government was
that for a violation of a right, the laws should provide a remedy, a princi-
ple in tension with a doctrine that insists on the absence of a judicial
remedy for wrongs committed by the government. A second important
premise of the Constitution, as expounded in its early days, was that the
judicial power, rather than force or impotent requests, was to mediate
conflicts between different parts of the union. Achieving this goal required
a judicial power coextensive with the powers of the national govern-
ment.19 This revised understanding of the Eleventh Amendment is thus
that the amendment does not apply to federal question suits by out-of-staters against a state. See Note,
More Plenary Than Thou: A Post-Welch Compromise Theory of Congressional Power to Abrogate
State Sovereign Immunity, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1022, 1023 (1988). But the objection of failure to
account fully for text can be raised to virtually every element of Eleventh Amendment doctrine. The
amendment itself seems poorly drafted to achieve any of the various goals ascribed to it. If its purpose
was to constitutionalize state sovereign immunity, even if only in federal court and by individual suit,
then its language was far too narrow. If its purpose was to preclude only actions for monetary relief,
then its language is too broad, including, as it does, all suits "in equity." If its purpose was, as
suggested here, to remove the "state-citizen" head of jurisdiction, then its language might better have
been qualified by the addition of the words "based solely on the character of the parties." Cf Amar,
supra note 1, at 1482 & n.233 ("construed" language inserted to indicate that jurisdictional repeal
applied only to head of jurisdiction based on party status). Since no interpretation conforms fully to
the text of the amendment without offending a sense of coherence, and since this interpretation, in my
judgment, best accounts for its peculiar language, I do not find this objection dispositive.
197. This interpretation also resolves an anomaly of the Ex parte Young doctrine: that the action
of an officer can be "state action" for purposes of defining a constitutional violation, but not for
purposes of jurisdiction to grant relief. It would instead be clear that relief can be granted against a
state for state action that violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
198. See generally infra Part IV(B) (discussing comparative immunities of federal, state, and
foreign governments, and arguing that doctrinal bases of common law of sovereign immunity have no
application to constitutional relationship of states to courts of union, at least on federal claims).
199. Even some anti-Federalists conceded the appropriateness of a judicial power over questions
arising under federal law. See supra note 192.
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more consistent with the general principles of governmental accountability
and full judicial power than present doctrine."' 0
C. Cracks in the Present Framework: An Appreciation of Pennhurst
and a Critique of Green v. Mansour
The view of the scope of federal question jurisdiction set forth above
seems inconsistent with much prevailing doctrine. Why change now, a
skeptic might ask, if the courts have gotten along fairly well with a com-
plex, but relatively established, set of doctrines that ameliorate many of
the worst consequences of the Hans view?
First, the difficulty of relying on the political process to redress constitu-
tional error places a special burden on the Court to reevaluate its past
constitutional decisions, particularly when they have led to a body of in-
consistent and fictive doctrines the application of which consumes substan-
tial energy and time.20 ' If the Eleventh Amendment only repealed the
party-based head of jurisdiction, it would be unnecessary to resort to the
highly fictionalized analyses needed to determine jurisdiction over federal
question claims against state officers.
Second, while stare decisis may protect parties' reliance interests in
some settings, as Congress has increasingly expanded efforts to regulate
states and subject them to suit, states presently face substantial uncertainty
as to their liabilities-uncertainty that remains, partly due to statutory
ambiguity and in equal measure due to the Court's failure to resolve fully
the question of congressional power to overcome state immunity.20 2 Given
Congress' established power to abrogate states' immunity under the Four-
teenth Amendment, and the large number of potentially applicable provi-
sions enacted thereunder, questions of statutory interpretation may have
far greater immediate effect on the states than will the Eleventh
Amendment.203
200. The implications of this understanding of the Eleventh Amendment apply equally to admi-
ralty jurisdiction. The Eleventh Amendment was not intended to restrict federal jurisdiction over ad-
miralty claims, a conclusion strengthened by the amendment's pointed exclusion of "suits in admi-
ralty" from the description of prohibited litigation. Because the remedial traditions of admiralty and
maritime law differ significantly from those of law and equity, however, I do not seek to elaborate a
federal common law of state sovereign immunity in admiralty.
201. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 627-28 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring);
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 491-92 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (overruling prior summary affirmances awarding
past due welfare benefits on ground that Eleventh Amendment prohibited such awards). If the con-
gressional abrogation theory were adopted, however, the ordinary process of legislation would be
available to correct rulings that barred relief against states. Yet, as noted infra text accompanying
notes 449-66, individual rights arising from the Constitution itself may be impaired through the Hans
interpretation even as modified by the congressional abrogation theory.
202. See infra text accompanying notes 412-33. Moreover, it is likely that states are more con-
cerned with the substantive liabilities federal law imposes on them, than with the forum that enforces
those obligations.
203. See infra Part V(A). On the "statutorification" of American law generally, see G. CALA-
BREST, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1-7 (1982); G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF
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Finally, to the extent that stare decisis is intended to promote con-
tinuity in the development of legal doctrine, as well as the image of judi-
cial decisions flowing from discernible principles rather than from com-
peting personal views about policy, 04 these purposes can no longer
realistically be served by mere adherence to Hans. The increasingly fierce
division in recent Eleventh Amendment opinions" 5 and threats by various
members of the Court to "withdraw" stare decisis protection from one set
of doctrine if changes are made in another,2 0 6 undermine these values and
make stare decisis a weak and inadequate answer to the pressing case for
abandoning Hans.
These general arguments in favor of correcting the error of Hans can
be illuminated by a consideration of two cases, Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman0 7 and Green v. Mansour.05 Pennhurst shows
that the Court itself has begun the movement towards a more authentic
and limited understanding of the Eleventh Amendment, albeit in a case
that at the same time wrongly expands the potential reach of the sovereign
immunity doctrine. Green dramatically illustrates the doctrinal incoher-
ence to which continued reliance on Hans leads the Court, undermining
its authority and legitimacy as a reasoned expositor of constitutional
law.2
09
1. Pennhurst and the "Original" Eleventh Amendment
In Pennhurst, the closely divided Court held that the Eleventh Amend-
ment prohibited granting injunctive relief against state officials to comply
with state law concerning conditions at a residential facility for the men-
tally retarded.21 0 The decision, I believe, correctly recognizes that the
Eleventh Amendment should apply differently to issues of federal law
than to state law claims. Nevertheless, the Court fails adequately to ad-
AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
204. See City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 419-20 (1983)
(stare decisis fosters respect for "rule of law"); Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 403
(1970) (respect for judiciary).
205. The following decisions were by a 5-4 vote: Welch v. State Dep't of Highways, 107 S. Ct.
2941 (1987); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
206. See, e.g., Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2956 & n.27 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (if Hans over-
ruled, other cases concerning, for example, municipal liability for civil rights actions in federal courts
or state immunity in state courts, will have to be reconsidered); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 304 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (majority's lack of respect for stare decisis in
Pennhurst contributed to his change in view on need to overrule Hans).
207. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
208. 474 U.S. 64 (1985).
209. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 312 (1984) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("decent regard" for
orderly development of law requires that controlling cases be either followed or candidly overruled).
Parts IV and V below explore a somewhat different consideration relevant to stare decisis: that the
functional content of most of what is now called Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is likely to be
retained even if the Hans mistake is corrected.
210. 465 U.S. at 105-06.
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dress the implications of its own revisionist view of Ex parte Young211 for
sovereign immunity law. While the Pennhurst decision has met with con-
certed academic criticism," 2 it reflects a move toward a better and more
historically authentic understanding of the amendment.
In Pennhurst, the Court addressed "whether a federal court may
award injunctive relief against state officials on the basis of state law" and
concluded that, even where the state law claim was pendent to federal
question claims, it could not. 13 Emphasizing that the "principle of sover-
eign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power
established in Art[icle] III," Justice Powell's majority opinion asserted
that a suit against a state officer that would operate against the state is a
suit against the state, whether it seeks damages or injunctive relief.214
Ex parte Young, according to the Pennhurst majority, was an "excep-
tion" to a more general rule that bars suits against a state officer that
would interfere with public administration. 5 Rejecting the articulated
theory of Young itself-that a state officer's unconstitutional acts were ul-
tra vires and not those of the state-the Pennhurst Court recast the
Young rationale as resting on the need to vindicate the supremacy of fed-
eral law while "accommodat[ing] . . . the constitutional immunity of the
states.2 6 Under this overt balancing theory, injunctive relief based on
federal law is permitted although monetary relief is not.21 7 But when state
211. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
212. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 1; Smith, Pennhurst v. Halderman: The Eleventh Amendment,
Erie and Pendent State Law Claims, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 227 (1985); see also Brown, Beyond
Pennhurst-Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge
Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343 (1985); Dwyer, Pendent
Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 129 (1987). But see Althouse, How to
Build a Separate Sphere: Federal Courts and State Power, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1485, 1514-27
(1987) (approving of Pennhurst); Amar, supra note 1, at 1480 n.224 (approving in part).
213. 465 U.S. at 117-21. Plaintiffs, residents of the Pennsylvania State School and Hospital for
the mentally retarded, sued state and county officials responsible for the residential facility. Id. at 92.
Alleging that conditions at the institution violated the Constitution, federal statutes, and state statutes,
they obtained massive injunctive relief from the district court. Id. at 93. In its first decision, Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Pennhurst I), the Court had reversed the
lower court's conclusion that a federal statute supported the relief. 465 U.S. at 95. The Supreme
Court directed a remand to consider whether the Constitution, state law, or other federal statutes
would support the injunctive order. On remand, the court of appeals held that state law, as inter-
preted in a recent state supreme court decision, supported the relief. Pennhurst II reversed this deci-
sion. Id. at 124-25 [hereinafter all references to Pennhurst are to Pennhurst III. The Court essen-
tially held that it had erred in remanding the major institutional conditions suit to the federal court of
appeals two years earlier for consideration of whether injunctive relief could be granted on, inter alia,
state law grounds.
214. Id. at 98. Without deciding whether there were any acts "without color of authority" for
which a state officer could be sued for injunctive relief, the Court indicated that the scope of any such
ultra vires doctrine based on wrongs under state law was very narrow. Id. at 101-02 n.11, 114 n.25.
215. Id. at 101 n.l & 102.
216. Id. at 105. The Court sought to distinguish earlier cases upholding injunctive relief against
state officials based on violations of state law as either not fully reasoned, not addressing the Eleventh
Amendment, or involving the performance of ministerial duties. Id. at 109 & n.18. That the duty
involved is ministerial rather than discretionary, however, offers no coherent basis for distinction
under a theory in which relief is available only to vindicate the supremacy of federal law.
217. Id. at 105-06.
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law is the ground on which relief is sought, according to Pennhurst, the
supremacy of federal law is not at issue and thus the balance tips always
against jurisdiction to award relief. 18 Pendent jurisdiction, which the
Court described as a "judge-made doctrine inferred from the general lan-
guage of Art[icle] III," could not "displac[e] the explicit limitation on fed-
eral jurisdiction contained in the Eleventh Amendment." 219
The Court's view that the Eleventh Amendment bar applies with
greater force to claims arising under state, rather than federal, law is con-
sistent with the understanding that the amendment was intended only to
repeal a party-based head of jurisdiction.2 0 The principal object of the
Eleventh Amendment was to remove the head of jurisdiction that permit-
ted a federal forum, unwilling to apply state sovereign immunity doctrine,
to adjudicate monetary claims against a state under a jurisdiction based
solely on the identity of the parties and thus embracing purely state law
causes of action.221 The Chisholm decision reactivated concerns over the
218. Id. at 106 (all federal interests "disappear" when state law is basis for claim).
219. Id. at 117-18. Pendent jurisdiction, resting on judicial interpretations of what a case is for
Article III purposes, is no more judge-made than many of the Eleventh Amendment doctrines the
Pennhurst majority found applicable. See Smith, supra note 212, at 261. Pennhurst also held that the
Siler doctrine, announced in Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), under which
constitutional issues were avoided by reliance on state law grounds, did not displace the "constitu-
tional" status of the states' sovereign immunity. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 118. The many prior cases
granting relief against state officials on state law grounds under Siler were, apparently, simply in
error. See also Werhan, Pullman Abstention After Pennhurst: A Comment on Judicial Federalism,
27 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 449, 502 (1986) (criticizing Pennhurst for undue rigidity; federal courts
do not intrude on state autonomy by enforcing clear state law).
220. Although some argue that Pennhurst should be read to turn on the structural nature of the
relief sought, see Dwyer, supra note 212, at 131; cf Shapiro, supra note 1, at 83 (suggesting intru-
siveness of structural relief as possible motivation for holding), the opinion itself repeatedly treats the
state law source of the claim as dispositive. See 465 U.S. at 121 (claim that "state officials violated
state law in carrying out their official responsibilities is a claim against the State"); id. at 106
(describing intrusiveness of federal court instructing state officials on "how to conform their conduct to
state law"; Young exception "inapplicable" to state law claims).
221. If the purpose of the amendment was to repeal Article III's conferral of jurisdiction over
claims against states under the state-noncitizen clauses of Article III, it was presumably the exercise
of that jurisdiction that was problematic. And where the basis for federal judicial power lay solely in
the fact that a state was a party, federal jurisdiction would extend to state law causes of action that
otherwise could not be brought before the Court. It is true that some of the cases against states
pending at the time the Eleventh Amendment was enacted may have involved assertedly federal ques-
tions. See C. JAcoBs, supra note 1, at 94; see also Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1934-36 (amendment
intended for immediate political reasons to affect these particular cases but not federal jurisdiction to
hear types of issues raised therein). Because the basis for jurisdiction in those cases was the state-
citizen clause and not the presence of a federal question, they were dismissed upon enactment of the
amendment. See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798). The principal articulated
purpose of the diversity heads, however, was not to vindicate substantive federal law, but rather to
provide a neutral forum for adjudication of disputes between diverse parties. See Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61,
87-88 (1809); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (discussing both impartiality and
federal privileges and immunities clause); but see Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 41 HARv. L. REV. 483, 492 n.44 (1928) (criticizing Hamilton's privileges and immunities argu-
ment as specious because of federal question jurisdiction). It was a portion of this party-based jurisdic-
tion that was withdrawn in response to a case involving no federal claims whatsoever. In view of the
particular case that prompted its enactment, as well as the compelling political and structural reasons
for presuming that there was no change in the breadth of the judicial power to vindicate federal law
under the federal question jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment cannot be read as directed at juris-
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party-based jurisdiction over claims against states, which had figured
prominently in the ratification debates over the Constitution.222 Congress'
perceived inability to control the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction
over such cases may have been thought to require action by
amendment.
223
To the extent that the historic purpose of the Eleventh Amendment
may be useful as a guide to modern decisionmaking, it suggests that the
primary objective of the Eleventh Amendment was to ensure that the
Constitution not be construed to permit an adjudication against a state,
where suit was (1) based only on liabilities arising under state law, and
(2) brought originally in a federal forum whose jurisdiction was not sub-
ject to legislative change or direction. As the Pennhurst majority saw the
case, it involved one of these two elements: Although the suit was brought
under the federal question head of jurisdiction of an inferior court subject
to some congressional control, the particular claim at issue arose under
state law. The Court should have focused on the relationship between the
source of the federal court's jurisdiction and the state law basis for the
claim of right. Assuming that inferior federal courts may, in effect, exer-
cise federal question jurisdiction over a state defendant,224 does this con-
clusion necessarily imply that the case which the lower federal courts have
power to decide includes causes of action based on state law?
The historical interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as directed at
diction over federal claims against states.
222. Although the ratification debate over Article III did not specifically distinguish claims
against states arising under state law from those under federal law, the state-citizen clause of Article
III gave rise to more concern than did federal question jurisdiction. The preoccupation with the state-
citizen clause was understandable. First, it was that clause in the Constitution that most clearly laid
open the possibility of a state being sued in a federal court. Second, more concern in general was
expressed over the diversity-based jurisdictions over state law than over federal question jurisdiction.
See supra note 192. Third, to the extent that the debate concerned creditor suits, see THE FEDERAL-
iST No. 81, at 488 (A. Hamilton), state debts were evidently perceived to arise under state law,
subject to federal adjudication only through the Court's original jurisdiction under the party-based
heads of Article III jurisdiction. See supra note 101. Finally, since Congress' power to make "excep-
tions" to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was arguably limited to appellate cases, see supra note
195, there was no statutory check on the Court's jurisdiction under the party-based head to attempt to
enforce state law obligations on the states. But cf. Nowak, supra note 1, at 1425 (suggesting that
drafters of Article III intended Congress to control jurisdiction over diversity-based suits against states,
but ignoring distinction between congressional power over original Supreme Court jurisdiction and
other exercises of federal judicial power).
223. While Congress' control over the establishment of the lower federal courts and the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction was widely referred to during the ratification debates to reassure those
fearful of judicial intermeddling with the powers of the states, such assurances were generally not
offered concerning the Court's original jurisdiction. See supra notes 184, 195.
224. The grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in cases to which a state was a party
may have been intended to recognize the sensitivity of states being subject to adjudication in federal
courts and to assure that the highest federal court could be available for such an adjudication. See,
e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 639-40 (1892). However the proposition that original
federal jurisdiction may be exercised over a state as party litigant only in the Supreme Court has been
rejected. See supra notes 45, 80 (discussing removal jurisdiction and jurisdiction in federal question
cases brought by states); HART & WECHSLER 3D ED., supra note 157, at 305-06 (collecting cases and
statutes permitting United States to sue states in federal district court).
1988]
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the exercise of federal jurisdiction over claims arising under state law
demonstrates a reason to except from the reach of pendent federal juris-
diction state law claims against the states themselves. Since the amend-
ment was enacted to overcome a prior interpretation by the Court of the
scope of its Article III jurisdiction over states, the Court may have less
latitude in defining the scope of a federal question case where the party
defendant on the putative pendent or ancillary claim is a state.2" An or-
der based solely on state law and issued against a state by a federal court
would seem to fall within the purview of the Eleventh Amendment's pur-
pose that is advocated as the basis for its inapplicability to federal ques-
tion cases."' If one calls on history and original intent to demonstrate the
error of the Hans decision and to read the Eleventh Amendment (and
Article III) as not barring federal question jurisdiction in suits against
states, one must recognize that history also lends support for the conclu-
sion reached in Pennhurst, insofar as the claim against the state public
officials is regarded as one against the state. If the drafters of the Eleventh
Amendment sought to prevent the adjudication of state law claims against
states by withdrawing the head of jurisdiction permitting such cases to be
heard in federal court, adjudication of state law claims against a state,
even where an independent basis of federal jurisdiction exists, would be
inconsistent with one underlying purpose of the amendment. 27
225. In this respect, the presence of the Eleventh Amendment might have a different effect on the
scope of federal jurisdiction than would have resulted from the original enactment of Article III with-
out the state-noncitizen clauses, since we know that there was something objectionable about the exer-
cise of jurisdiction over the claim in Chisholm. Cf Ourrie, supra note 122, at 151 n.l1 ("People are
not likely to amend constitutions just to change captions on complaints."). But see Bank of United
States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 906-07 (1824) (if suit could not have been origi-
nally brought in Supreme Court, it is not within Eleventh Amendment), discussed infra note 235.
226. Although in some respects Pennhurst would be easier to understand if it had been decided
before rather than after Erie, federal court application of state sovereign immunity doctrines on state
law causes of action is not as complete a solution to the perceived evil of Chisholm as it might appear.
First, the interpretive questions that arise in resolving sovereign immunity issues are no less difficult
under state law than under federal law; accordingly, federal courts, in good faith application of Erie
principles, may reach different results than would state courts. Cf Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 129 n.2
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (inappropriate for Supreme Court to review unanimous lower federal court
rulings on issues of state law). It is also possible that federal court decisions on issues of state sover-
eign immunity law would tend more than state court decisions to derogate state sovereign immunity.
See Althouse, supra note 212, at 1522-23 (Pennhurst promotes value of leaving to state governments
control over interpretation of remedies available to vindicate state rights); Dwyer, supra note 212, at
163-64 (greater sensitivity of state court judges to full meaning of state law); cf Pennhurst, 465 U.S.
at 122 n.32 (if state law claim adjudicated in federal court, state has no opportunity to review inter-
pretation of state law or choice of remedies). Given the polycentric range of remedial choices in litiga-
tion like Pennhurst, moreover, it may be hard to ascertain in advance what the state law is. The
efficacy of federal abstention and certification of the issue to state courts seems doubtful because myr-
iad factors must be weighed in structuring (and possibly in modifying) the remedy. But cf. Cullison,
Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment (A Case of the White Knights' Green Whiskers), 5 Hous.
L. REv. 1, 19 (1967) (Eleventh Amendment requires recognition of state law immunity defenses on
state-created claims); Smith, supra note 212, at 229 (state adequately protected by federal court appli-
cation of state immunity law).
227. Given the present scope of substantive federal law and the consequent reach of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction, a view of pendent jurisdiction wholly unrestrained by the purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment might permit federal jurisdiction over, for example, state law debt claims against states,
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This does not mean the Court was necessarily correct in concluding
that the judicial power under Article III does not extend to such pendent
state claims. The text of the amendment itself does not require such a
result,22 and a basis for federal jurisdiction exists independently of the
identity of the state as a party defendant.229 The Court's balancing ap-
proach rings hollow: The majority failed to consider whether pendent ju-
risdiction may be necessary fully to effectuate the constitutional and statu-
tory federal question jurisdiction.230 Federal interests in complete federal
adjudication of civil rights actions are far more compelling than the Court
recognized.2 31 The adverse impact on claimants under federal right of
situations paradigmatic of the central concerns of the amendment. But while a state law debt claim
may have occasioned enactment of the amendment, it would be a mistake to conclude that the amend-
ment was generally concerned with protecting states from monetary liabilities and that this concern
ought to constrain federal question jurisdiction with respect to monetary relief on federal claims. It is
one thing to say that, because the Eleventh Amendment sought to remove a jurisdiction that permitted
adjudication of state law claims against states, exercise of pendent jurisdiction over such claims ought
to be constrained. What the diversity head of jurisdiction limited by the amendment plainly permitted
that federal question jurisdiction did not was adjudication of purely state law claims against
states-not claims for monetary relief. To draw a similar inference concerning monetary relief on
federal claims is unwarranted. Indeed, scholars disagree on the extent to which the amendment was in
fact primarily motivated by fiscal concerns. Compare Nowak, supra note 1 (protection of states from
retroactive monetary liabilities imposed by courts as central concern) with C. JAcoBs, supra note 1, at
69-71 (explanation that amendment was supported because states feared being compelled to pay debts
very "doubtful"; instead, amendment was adopted largely as a formal concession to state sovereignty).
The federal question jurisdiction has long been regarded as the one source of jurisdiction most essen-
tial to the union because of the need to declare and enforcefederal rights and federal law, a percep-
tion that counsels against any inference restraining that aspect of the judicial power from an amend-
ment directed at a diversity-based head of jurisdiction.
228. In Pennhurst, plaintiffs were residents and apparently citizens of Pennsylvania so that, in
any literal sense, the amendment was no bar to jurisdiction.
229. If we assume, furthermore, that Congress could limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts to preclude relief on state law grounds, then at least one possible purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment is not at issue. See supra text accompanying note 184; cf Brown, supra note 212, at
381-82 (Congress should act to authorize grants of relief on state law grounds provided relief is no
more extensive than relief that would have been available under federal law creating jurisdiction).
The traditional view is that Congress has substantial, if not plenary, control over the lower federal
courts' jurisdiction. See, e.g., Bator, Congressional Power Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts,
27 VIL_ L. REv. 1030, 1034-35 (1982); Gunther, Federal Court Power to Curtail Federal Court
Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1363-65 (1953); see also Redish, Constitutional Limitations on Congressional
Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction: A Reaction to Professor Sager, 77 Nw. U.L. REV. 143, 150
(1982) (language of salary and tenure provision consistent with congressional authority over federal
courts). Others have argued, however, that Article III requires Congress to vest certain jurisdiction in
the lower federal courts or in some federal court either as an original or appellate matter. See, e.g.,
Amar, supra note 6; Clinton, supra note 184; Eisenberg, supra note 172; see also Sager, The Su-
preme Court, 1980 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regu-
late the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981).
230. This concern could have been understood as one of competing constitutional magni-
tude-whether prohibiting the exercise of pendent jurisdiction would so disable the effectiveness of
federal question jurisdiction as to warrant retention of the pendent claim. See Dwyer, supra note 212,
at 152-61; see also Smith, supra note 212, at 290-91 (Pennhurst's pressure to litigate in state court
inconsistent with purposes of federal question jurisdiction).
231. Although the interest in having a uniform and correct interpretation of federal law does not
directly support the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, the Pennhurst rule may, as a practical matter,
make it more difficult to vindicate that interest by routing cases into state courts from which Supreme
Court review is difficult to obtain. See supra note 151; infra note 232.
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having either to bifurcate their litigation into two fora or to abandon their
right to a federal forum on their federal claim and consolidate their claims
in state court raises serious questions of the genuineness of the majority's
concern with vindicating federal rights. 2 ' Important federal interests,
moreover, are ordinarily regarded as being served by avoiding decision on
constitutional grounds,233 as well as by preferring state grounds for deci-
sion over any federal grounds which state governments cannot change.234
Yet to the extent that the Court's construction of the amendment in
Pennhurst rests on its application to state law claims against states, it is a
far more plausible explication of constitutional purpose than, for example,
the decision in Hans as conventionally understood.235 Because there was
232. As others have shown, the implications of Pennhurst appear to drive plaintiffs to state courts
for the adjudication of both state and federal claims. See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 81; Smith, supra
note 212, at 288. Questions of costs and concerns over claim and issue preclusion may force many
plaintiffs to the choice of abandoning reliance on the state law claim altogether, no matter how sub-
stantial, or abandoning their congressionally-established right to a federal trial forum for adjudication
of their federal claim. If Congress found it important to provide an initial federal forum for adjudica-
tion of civil rights claims against state officials, this adverse impact cannot be brushed off as mere
concern over efficiency.
233. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
234. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 150-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court's apparent
abandonment of the Siler doctrine in litigation against a state may have detrimental consequences for
states, as well as for federal plaintiffs, since federal courts are now forced to resolve claims solely on
the basis of federal law that a state acting by itself cannot change. Compare Chemerinsky, State
Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment after Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12
HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 643, 657 (1985) (injunction against violating state law infringes sovereignty
less than one based on federal law) with Althouse, supra note 212, at 1523 (injunction based on state
law interferes with state's control of its own law-making capacity). On the other hand, it might be
argued that when a federal judgment rests on pendent state law grounds without decision of the
underlying federal law claim, states are deprived of guidance on questions of federal law that might
avoid time-consuming efforts to modify the state law on which relief was granted, only to find out
later that federal law was an obstacle. This is true, in theory, whenever a federal question case is
decided on state law grounds. Yet especially when the state is sued for prospective relief concerning its
future conduct, the need for guidance on requirements of federal law may outweigh other state and
federal interests.
235. One could argue that since the only purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to withdraw a
party-based head of jurisdiction, it has no implications at all for cases brought under other heads of
jurisdiction. See Bank of United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 906-07 (1824)
(amendment has full effect if state-citizen clause construed not to authorize suits in Supreme Court
against states). Planters' Bank arguably implies that where jurisdiction is based on the presence of a
federal question, the amendment would have no application even to adjudication of a state law debt
claim. But see id. at 907-08 (apparently resting decision on ground that bank was separate entity
from state that incorporated bank). On this view, the state law character of the claim in Pennhurst
would be irrelevant to the constitutional jurisdiction of the Court. Nonetheless, adjudication of the
state law claim might still be improper. Under Erie, state law principles of immunity would still be
applicable. Beyond that, the ordinary exercise of discretion in pendent jurisdiction might counsel
against decision of complex questions of state law. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
726 (1966).
Alternatively, the federal common law of state sovereign immunity, see infra Part IV, might take
different forms depending on whether the cause of action arises under state or federal law. Under this
view, however, the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment to eliminate federal jurisdiction over purely
state law claims against states would influence my analysis. A proper understanding of what the
Eleventh Amendment did-withdraw the party-based head of jurisdiction-should embrace some idea
of the nature of what was offensive about use of that party-based jurisdiction. The purpose can be
characterized in many ways-for example, as protecting states from original Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion, from any original federal jurisdiction, from jurisdiction over state law claims, or from creditor
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an independent basis for jurisdiction over the federal question raised, the
Court should have more fully considered whether the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction over the state claims was necessary to exercise federal question
jurisdiction and the degree to which adjudication of this claim impinged
on the state's constitutional interest in avoiding federal court adjudication
of state law claims against the state itself.236 The constitutional inquiry,
framed as whether this particular state law claim was one against the
state, might have focused on particular features of the claim and relief
sought that impinged on this interest.
' 7
suits. Cf Baker, supra note 1 (discussing different characterizations of purpose). If, as argued above,
the amended Constitution was intended to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction over state law claims
within the Court's original jurisdiction, this would suggest at least a cautionary note where lower
federal courts seek to adjudicate purely state law claims against states.
236. A full-fledged theory of states' constitutional immunity on state law claims would need to
address the issues of waiver and congressional abrogation. Some tentative thoughts on the resolution of
these issues are presented here.
There might be considerable play for a doctrine of state waiver for state claims pendent to federal
question cases. The state is already properly before the federal tribunal, and there are competing
federal interests in assuring complete adjudication of the federal case. Reserving to the state the choice
of whether to permit federal courts to interpret state law may sufficiently meet the underlying pur-
poses of the constitutional immunity on state law claims to tip the balance in favor of exercising
jurisdiction over the pendent claims. See also Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1092-93 (no federalism-based
need to dismiss sua sponte when state's presence as party permits it to protect itself through timely
objection). With respect to purely diversity-based claims, however, exercising jurisdiction based on a
waiver seems to conflict with an express textual limitation without serving any competing federal
constitutional policy. Yet, unless the Eleventh Amendment were seen as protecting federal courts as
well as states, the purpose of the amendment to protect states might permit waiver on a theory that
this Article III restriction was intended for the protection of the litigants and was thus waivable.
Where a state law claim is pendent to a federal question, congressional action to abrogate immunity
might be relevant, if not dispositive, in defining the balance of constitutional interests between main-
taining an effective federal question jurisdiction and avoiding adjudication of state law claims against
states. Where there is no other basis for federal jurisdiction, however, I would read the Eleventh
Amendment as an absolute bar to the creation by Congress of federal jurisdiction over claims against a
state by a citizen of another state or of a foreign state. No federal interest simply in providing a
neutral forum may legitimately be invoked after the Eleventh Amendment to support such jurisdic-
tion. For a discussion of the relationship of protective jurisdiction to Eleventh Amendment problems,
see Brown, supra note 212, at 367-82.
237. For example, the Court might consider the degree to which the content of state law-both
substantive and remedial-was clearly established. The greater the clarity of the state law principles,
the less federal reliance on those state law grounds would intrude on the state's interest in controlling
the meaning of state law. Cf. Werhan, supra note 219 (arguing that Pennhurst concerns more appro-
priately resolved through flexibility of Pullman abstention than absolute jurisdictional bar based on
Eleventh Amendment). Although the question is difficult, I am inclined to think that, given the com-
prehensive nature of the relief and the broad and loosely defined contours of the state law right to the
"least restrictive environment," it was appropriate in Pennhurst to reject jurisdiction on the ground
that this state law claim was one "against the state." See also Dwyer, supra note 212, at 138-40
(Pennhurst might have rested on grounds that structural relief is more clearly "against" state than
other forms of injunctive relief because of sizeable monetary costs and difficulties of state legislative
response); cf. Rudenstine, Pennhurst and the Scope of Federal Judicial Power to Reform Social Insti-
tutions, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 71, 92 (1984) (noting that state law was unclear).
Apart from the state's interest in controlling the interpretation of its own law-as to rights, applica-
tion of law to facts, and remedies, see Althouse, supra note 212, at 1511-27-a fully developed theory
of state immunity from suit in federal court on state law claims might consider other possible underly-
ing values. For example, if a primary value is protecting state treasuries, the definition of when a suit
is one against a state on state law claims would focus on the financial impact of the relief
sought-whether prospective or retrospective. If, however, the relevant interest is protecting the juris-
diction of the state courts over such claims, a broader definition of when a suit is one against a state
might be more appropriate. These interests, moreover, can only be evaluated against the common law
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Instead-and more troubling than the refusal to exercise jurisdiction
over state law claims against a state as such-the Court undertook a
broad revision of the rationale of Ex parte Young to support the conclu-
sion that virtually all state law claims for injunctive relief against state
officers should be regarded as claims against a state.2"' Pennhurst quite
properly recognizes that Young rests on a fiction insofar as it pretends that
the litigation is not against a state.2"' What is troubling is that the Court
justifies this fiction, not by reference to the unfairness of the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, nor by reference to the traditional range of remedies
available at common law against officers, but rather solely by reference to
the superior demands of the Constitution in the face of prohibited state
conduct.240 This shift from more traditional formulations may herald a
willingness on the part of the Court to jettison other traditional remedies
against governmental officers in the name of its own unmoored sense of
balance, impairing significantly the range of remedies available to cure
governmental misconduct. 4 1
Further, because of its sweeping rejection of the Young rationale, the
Court's analysis of when a claim nominally against an officer is really
against a state fails to account for the competing constitutional policy of
providing diversity jurisdiction in cases in which state law claims are as-
serted by an out-of-stater against a state official or employee. Pennhurst
held that, as to injunctive relief, pendent jurisdiction could not be exer-
cised if state law claims were asserted by a citizen against his state's of-
ficers. But insofar as it rests on a presumption that any action for prospec-
understanding, when the amendment was adopted, since there were some remedies, see, e.g., Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (damages available against officers at common law), that the
amendment would not have been understood to affect. Full consideration of this problem is beyond the
scope of this article.
238. See supra note 214. If the Eleventh Amendment is to be given any significant meaning, its
reach cannot be avoided simply by naming an officer as a defendant. Thus, it remains necessary,
whether solely for diversity jurisdiction cases or for state law claims asserted under other jurisdictional
heads, to determine when a suit against an officer is really against a state. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 239-44. For this purpose, I agree with Professor Shapiro's condemnation of the Court's
expansion of a sovereign immunity doctrine that stands as an obstacle to achieving individual justice.
See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 85. I disagree in part with his criticism of Pennhurst as an Eleventh
Amendment decision, however, since the logical implication of Pennhurst is that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not bar federal question claims against states in district court.
239. 465 U.S. at 105. The fiction is that an injunction against a state officer is not an injunction
against the state, even though the injunction may be binding on successors and agents-in short, on
every person capable of acting who would be bound by a decree against the state itself. See, e.g., id. at
114 n.25.
240. See id. at 105.
241. The Court's approach raises a number of unanswered questions. Is the Court's new, realistic
view of when an action is one against the state likely to affect its balance of interests in deciding
whether federal relief is available, on concededly federal grounds, against state officers? What are its
implications for suits against officers to recover specific property? For suits against individual officers
for damages sounding in tort, or sounding in implied constitutional rights of action? For suits against
state officers in ejectment or otherwise to try title to land? The Court's continued expansion of the
contours of sovereign immunity law is troubling given these questions. See Chemerinsky, supra note
234, at 657-58; cf. Currie, supra note 122, at 166-67 (criticizing Pennhurst for departure from prior
ultra vires principles).
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tive relief against a public official based on performance of her duties as a
public official is really one against the state, its reasoning would apply a
fortiori to cases in which there is an independent basis for federal jurisdic-
tion based on the diversity of the parties. If the injunction is really against
the state, then the Eleventh Amendment expressly forbids federal courts
hearing the claim since it would be regarded as a claim brought by a
citizen of one state against another state.
2 42
Yet the seeming simplicity of the Pennhurst analysis in this setting is
now confronted with the constitutional policy of affording citizens of one
state a federal forum for their state law claims against citizens of an-
other.243 There is thus a competing, textually-based federal constitutional
policy that would support the exercise of jurisdiction under a balancing
analysis. Determining what the federal interest is turns on whether the
defendants are really individuals or the state, which in turn depends, in
the Court's new view, on what the federal interest is. The circularity of
the methodology eludes principled capture.
The Court's gross articulation of the balancing test-federal versus
state law, stopping future misconduct versus compensating for past
242. For example, assume a New York citizen is arrested by a New Jersey State trooper. The
arrest and the officer's subsequent abusive treatment of the plaintiff is improper under state law and
also violates the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff sues for injunctive relief and damages in federal court,
alleging federal question jurisdiction over the constitutional claims and diversity jurisdiction over the
state law claims against the officer. An injunction may be available to vindicate the federal constitu-
tional claim if plaintiff can show that he is likely to be injured by a repetition of the arrest. Compare
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (showing of likely future harm to plaintiff injured
by police chokehold not made) with Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (showing of likely
future arrest made). Under Pennhurst, however, an injunction seemingly could not issue against the
officer to restrain violations of state law, since it would control him in the performance of nonminis-
terial duties as a state employee. To recover damages on the federal claim, plaintiff must show that a
reasonable trooper would have known that the arrest violated clearly established rights, Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). But even if monetary relief would be available in state court when
the officer acted either maliciously or in violation of established law, under Pennhurst, this form of
relief may not be available in federal court. See 465 U.S. at 135 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing
that under majority reasoning, damages against individual officers are barred). While Stevens may
have made his point too broadly, if the state indemnifies its officers, a damages award, on the state
and possibly even the federal claim, may in effect be against the state and thus barred by the Eleventh
Amendment under the majority's reasoning: Suits against state officers for official wrongdoing will be
expansively characterized as against the state; and only where prospective relief is necessary to vindi-
cate the supremacy of federal law will such an action be permitted. Although Pennhurst evinces no
intent to overturn the settled sovereign immunity doctrine that permits damage suits against an officer
individually, cf. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1146-50 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (indemnity
does not invoke Eleventh Amendment bar on federal claim against state officer individually; reserving
question as to state law claims), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1127 (1985), the logic of Pennhurst's aban-
donment of the Young rationale in fact may threaten its viability.
243. For application of this approach, see Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 221-22 (1872)
(principle of affording federal forum to out-of-stater supports exercise of jurisdiction in action against
state governor to restrain performance of his official duties). See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 477 (A. Hamilton) (impartial national
judiciary should hear all cases in which one state or its citizens are opposed to another state or its
citizens); see also Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1868) (state law limiting jurisdic-
tion of suits against counties to state courts ineffective in restricting federal diversity jurisdiction);
Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711, 718 (4th Cir. 1961) (discussing Erie and reaching
same conclusion as to state statute governing tort actions against city).
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wrongs-does not readily account for important federal law interests. The
Court neglects the federal interests in providing an effective federal forum
for adjudicating federal question claims and in providing a neutral federal
forum for adjudicating claims by out-of-staters against in-staters.2 " Para-
doxically, though, the vision of the Eleventh Amendment as a broader bar
to the exercise of jurisdiction over state law claims against state officers is
a real advance towards seeing the Eleventh Amendment as not con-
straining the exercise of jurisdiction over federal questions.24  So, too, is
the Court's recognition that Young is a fiction-that injunctive relief
against state officials under federal law is, in fact, a form of equitable
relief against a state. If the judicial power extends to this form of relief on
federal claims, then the Court has offered only an ill-defined account of
the values that permit the fiction to evade a constitutional barrier to juris-
diction for one type of relief but not for others treated alike by the text of
the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the frank recognition of the Young fic-
tion should hasten the death of the fiction that a constitutional principle of
state sovereign immunity constrains the federal question jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts.
2. Green v. Mansour and the Problem of Preclusion
If Pennhurst points the way towards a more coherent and limited the-
ory of the Eleventh Amendment, Green v. Mansour2" demonstrates the
necessity for a revised understanding.24 7 Green held that federal district
courts lack jurisdiction to issue declaratory judgments against state officers
concerning federal welfare benefits issues if the state is no longer engaged
in the challenged conduct. 4" The Court's reliance in Green on the preclu-
sive effect of the federal judgment in state court proceedings as a ground
for dismissal in light of the Eleventh Amendment is in tension with the
Supreme Court's accepted authority to review state court judgments in
actions against states. The decision thus brings into vivid relief the inter-
nal inconsistency of the present framework of Eleventh Amendment
analysis.
In Green, AFDC recipients sued the Michigan Director of Social Ser-
244. If this constitutional policy were given greater weight in determining when a suit against an
officer will be regarded as one against the state, it would facilitate the continued availability of tradi-
tional remedies on common law claims against official misconduct. See supra note 242.
245. See Amar, supra note 1, at 1480 n. 224 (viewing Pennhurst as returning to core of Eleventh
Amendment, inviting reorientation of caselaw from distinctions based on nature of relief to distinctions
based on source of right); see also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 83-84 (silver lining to Court's treatment
of Young in context of federal claims is that it provides theoretical basis for expanding nature of relief
available on such claims).
246. 474 U.S. 64 (1985).
247. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 195 (2d ed. 1988) ("The need for a reex-
amination of the Court's fundamental premises about the Eleventh Amendment has never been more
pressing.").
248. 474 U.S. at 67-68, 72-73.
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vices in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming
that two of the defendant's policies for calculating AFDC benefits were
inconsistent with the controlling federal law. On one of the two claims,
the district court entered a preliminary injunction. While both cases were
pending in the district court, Congress amended the statute to clarify both
requirements, and the state brought itself into compliance with the
amended law.249 Plaintiffs nonetheless pressed their claim for a declara-
tory judgment that the state's past practices had violated then-controlling
federal law and for notice to members of the class they sought to represent
advising them of the outcome of the litigation. 50
In Quern v. Jordan,2 51 the Court had earlier upheld issuance of notice
relief to similarly situated class members, advising them of the possibility
of asserting claims for past due benefits against Illinois.252 In Green, how-
ever, the Court concluded that neither a declaratory judgment nor "class
notice" was permissible.2 53 Resolving the Eleventh Amendment issues by
reference to a balance between the supremacy of federal law and state
sovereign immunity from suit, the Court distinguished sharply between
"[r]emedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law. . . nec-
essary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that
law" and remedies intended to serve only "compensatory or deterrence
interests." 254 The latter, such as monetary awards for past misconduct or
the notice relief sought here, could not "overcome the dictates of the Elev-
enth Amendment" because they were not needed to prevent ongoing viola-
tions.2 55 Absent such ongoing violations, the notice could not be justified,
as it was in Quern, as a "case-management device . . . ancillary to...
prospective relief;' 258 thus, the availability of the right to a notice turned
on whether the court could properly grant a declaratory judgment.
On that issue, after observing that there was discretion as to whether to
249. Id. at 65-66.
250. Id. at 65.
251. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). For a useful discussion, see Burnham, Federal Court Remedies for
Past Misconduct by State Officials: Notice Relief and the Legacy of Quern v. Jordan, 34 AM. U.L.
REv. 53 (1984).
252. Illinois had been found in violation of federal law in Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651
(1974). While upholding injunctive relief, the Court had forbidden, in the name of the Eleventh
Amendment, an order directing the state to make restitution to the plaintiffs. Id. at 677-78. An order
that the state give notice of available state remedies, however, was later upheld in Quern, against the
argument that notice was a form of retroactive relief prohibited by Edelman. Quern v. Jordan, 440
U.S. at 346-49.
253. 474 U.S. at 67-68.
254. Id. at 68.
255. Id. The Green Court sought to distinguish Quern by the fact that at the time of the district
court's final judgment granting a permanent injunction, of which notice was later given in Quern,
there was an ongoing violation. Id. at 69, 71-72, 74. Final judgment had not been entered in Green at
the time the alleged violations stopped. But see infra note 261.
256. 474 U.S. at 71. Quern, however, arguably treated notice relief itself as a form of prospective
relief. 440 U.S. at 346-49; cf Burnham, supra note 251, at 85-88 (order enforcing current and future
duty under federal welfare statute to compensate is prospective).
1988]
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issue the declaratory judgment, 57 the Court concluded that granting the
relief "would be useful in resolving the dispute . . . only if it might be
offered in state-court proceedings as res judicata on the issue of liabil-
ity. .... ,,"1 But if it were res judicata, this would circumvent the Elev-
enth Amendment principles articulated in Edelman v. Jordan.259 Thus,
because "issuance of a declaratory judgment in these circumstances would
have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or restitu-
tion by the federal court, the latter kinds of relief being of course prohib-
ited by the Eleventh Amendment," a declaratory judgment was
unavailable.26 °
The four dissenters, maintaining that the case was not distinguishable
from Quern l26 argued vigorously that the balance struck by the majority
insufficiently protected the supremacy of federal law, since it permitted
states to have "one bite at the apple" of skirting federal requirements
without incurring liability to repay what was withheld. 62 Justice Mar-
shall, in a separate dissent, disputed the majority's characterization of the
relief as equivalent to a federal court entering a monetary award.263 He
pointed out that, as in Quern, the declaratory judgment and notice relief
would impose neither direct liability on the state nor significant costs on
the institutions of state government. Indeed, he argued that giving "notice
of . . . possible relief through existing state administrative remedies,
257. The opinion is thus ambiguous about whether it rests on an interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment or the Declaratory Judgment Act. See 474 U.S. at 65-66 ("We now affirm. . . holding
that the Eleventh Amendment . . . and applicable principles governing the issuance of declaratory
judgments forbid the award of either form of relief."). To the extent that the Court's exercise of
discretion under the act was based on a perceived constitutional barrier to the award of the judgment,
however, the two inquiries merge. To the extent that the Court exercised discretion not compelled by
the Constitution, its failure to consider the congressionally-established remedial structure in deciding
how to exercise that discretion is striking. See infra text accompanying notes 447-48.
258. 474 U.S. at 73.
259. Id. In Quern, by contrast, the Court reasoned that notice relief, even when accompanied by a
declaratory judgment that the state had violated federal law, would not require payment of monetary
relief in violation of the Eleventh Amendment because the "chain of causation" between the federal
relief and the ultimate payment of state benefits was too contingent. 440 U.S. at 347-48.
260. 474 U.S. at 73. The Court added that, if the judgment were not res judicata, there would be
no reason to issue it. See discussion infra at notes 274-82.
261. Id. at 76 & n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (notice relief in Quern issued long after injunction
became moot through termination of federal program). As Brennan's dissent suggests, the only practi-
cal effect of the Quern notice was to facilitate recovery of past due benefits. The majority's willingness
in Green to describe the notice in Quern as a "case-management" technique is one example of its
insensitivity to the importance of procedure in the vindication of rights through litigation. In a puta-
tive class action, notice serves the important purpose of letting those whose interests had been repre-
sented in the litigation know what the district court decided. See id. at 75 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); see also id. at 79 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Quern did not approve notice as "mere case-
management device"; notice of state administrative procedures does not serve case management func-
tions in federal court litigation).
262. Id. at 77. (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("States may refuse to follow federal law with impu-
nity. . . . During the period of noncompliance, States save money by not paying benefits according to
the criteria established by federal law."). To the extent that litigation costs and possible attorneys' fees
in suits for prospective relief are less than the money saved from skirting federal requirements, the
point appears to be true. But see infra text accompanying notes 283-89.
263. Id. at 80-81 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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where the state agency and state courts would be the sole arbiters of what
relief would be granted, assists in the vindication of state law by inform-
ing class members that they may have causes of action under that law."' '
Both the majority and dissent, however, overlook a more fundamental
difficulty with the approach employed: Why should the possibly preclu-
sive effect of the federal court judgment have any bearing on the jurisdic-
tion of that court? Assume for the moment that the Eleventh Amendment,
or some other constitutional principle, prevents the federal courts from
granting monetary relief against the states: Why should that principle re-
strain federal courts from ruling on nonremedial issues of substantive fed-
eral law where a ruling might constrain state organs of government to
grant relief?
2 5
Surely if a state provided for judicial review of administrative denials of
welfare rights and, in such a proceeding, erroneously concluded that the
grounds for denial of benefits were consistent with federal law, the Su-
preme Court of the United States would have the power to review that
state court determination and to reverse it by ruling that the state grounds
for denial were inconsistent with federal law. That Supreme Court ruling
would be binding on the state courts. Given this, it cannot be correct that
the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal courts from issuing declara-
tory rulings on questions of federal law simply because those rulings may
have preclusive effect in state courts.26" The linchpin of the Court's rea-
264. Id. at 80 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
265. The argument from preclusion is present in cases involving both ongoing and past violations.
Although preclusion effects are tolerated in ongoing violation cases, Green v. Mansour was not the
first case to hint that the preclusive effect in state court proceedings of a federal judgment would
invoke an Eleventh Amendment-type bar. See Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S.
670 (1982) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (Eleventh Amendment does not bar attachment of property
in hands of state officers but state not bound as to its interests in property); see also Land v. Dollar,
330 U.S. 731 (1947); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). But see HART & WECHSLER 3D ED.,
supra note 156, at 1125 (sovereign immunity should not prevent United States from being bound by
judgment in action against officer which it defended).
266. If the district court's issuance of a declaratory judgment were, through res judicata, to pre-
clude states from raising unadjudicated defenses of state law in the state court proceedings, the preclu-
sive effect of such a judgment might be broader than the preclusive effect of Supreme Court review.
On appeal from or certiorari to a state court judgment, the Supreme Court can review only decisions
on matters of federal law. But the Court in Green v. Mansour did not raise any concern about the
preclusive effect of the judgment on state law defenses, nor would such concern have been apposite.
The declaratory judgment sought by the plaintiffs did not appear to speak to the state's obligation to
make retroactive payments, but only to the question of whether, in denying payments based on certain
regulations, it violated existing federal law. See Banas v. Dempsey, 742 F.2d 277, 280 (6th Cir. 1984)
affd sub. noma. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); infra note 274. Contrary to the Court's
assumption, the declaratory judgment might have determined only one issue concerning the state's
possible liability-the fact of past violations-leaving state courts initially to decide whether retroac-
tive payments should be made. Moreover, since no individualized determinations of entitlements were
sought, the claim being adjudicated would not, in any event, have embraced those particularized de-
fenses in state law to retroactive payment that might be asserted in defense of particular state adminis-
trative claims. See Burnham, supra note 251, at 80 (previously unadjudicated defenses to federal
claim could be raised in state benefit proceedings).
It is, moreover, a question of federal law whether a state, in the administration of a federal benefits
scheme, is obligated to make retroactive payments to the beneficiaries. Behind the assertion of a state
law defense to a claim made in state tribunals for retroactive payments stands the federal question
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soning in Green, then, is impossible to square with the power of the Su-
preme Court to review state court judgments in claims against states.267
Indeed, the Court's reasoning in Green is also inconsistent with its deci-
sion that Term in United Automobile Workers v. Brock,26 which upheld
district court jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment concerning fed-
eral unemployment compensation regulations that were no longer in ef-
fect, but whose meaning was central to the administrative determination
by states of claims for past due benefits. The benefits, while funded from
federal revenues, were to be administered by the states, with review of
eligibility determinations to be made "in the same manner and to the
same extent as determinations under the applicable State law and only in
that manner and to that extent." '69 Despite this statute, the Court re-
jected the government's argument that Green precluded entry of the de-
claratory judgment, distinguishing Green on the ground that the statute
"does not foreclose review in federal court of every claim relating to the
Act's application by federal and state officials" 270-but neither does the
Eleventh Amendment. While Auto Workers differentiated individual enti-
tlement questions from "statutory or constitutional challenges to the fed-
eral guidelines themselves," 71 the Eleventh Amendment likewise permits
statutory or constitutional challenges to state regulations-but, according
to Green, not when the violation of federal law has ended. The impact of
the federal declaratory judgment, in either case, on state eligibility deter-
minations resulting in monetary liabilities appears to be identical. 7 2
Thus, the Green Court's concern about the preclusive effect of a lower
federal court's ruling in subsequent state court proceedings is simply un-
acceptable as a principled account of the constitutional relationship of fed-
whether the state law defense is consistent with the federally-mandated remedial scheme. Federal law,
then, constrains the relevance of state law in delimiting any such obligation. Cf Field, Sources of
Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARv. L. REv. 881, 888, 973-74 (1986) (arguing that
very little state law operates truly of its own force, but must be seen as operating within constraint of
federal power to preempt or change it).
267. The inconsistency does not depend on any assumption that state courts must entertain the
claim. Even if one assumes states could deny a forum entirely, this does not distinguish Supreme
Court review from the preclusive effect of a district court judgment: in either event, if the state pro-
vides a forum a federal judicial decision on issues of federal law may be binding.
268. 477 U.S. 274 (1986) [hereinafter Auto Workers].
269. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2311(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 284-85. The majority consisted of the dissenters in Green and Justice O'Connor, who
did not write separately to indicate what factors she felt distinguished Green. The government's argu-
ment implied that, because Green would preclude declaratory relief for individual claimants against
state officials in a state-funded program absent ongoing violation, the statutory limitation of jurisdic-
tion likewise precluded this action even though the Secretary of Labor rather than a state official was
the defendant.
271. Id. at 285.
272. Indeed, later in Auto Workers, the Court emphasizes that, as a practical matter, states will
be obligated to comply with the Court's ruling on the meaning of the federal regulation and regards
that obligation of compliance as supporting the grant of relief. Id. at 288-93. While Auto Workers
involved only federal funds, the cases cannot easily be reconciled on the basis of the impact on the
state treasury in view of the provision of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2311(d), quoted supra
text accompanying note 269.
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eral and state courts in the adjudication of federally-based claims for relief
against states.27
The Court in Green also indicated that, if plaintiffs "would make no
claim" of res judicata in subsequent state proceedings,2 7  the federal de-
claratory judgment would "serve no purpose" and be improper.27 5 While
Michigan provided for judicial review of AFDC determinations, the
Court's cryptic comment may have been referring to the possibility that
state law would provide no judicial forum before which a claim for bene-
fits and reliance on the federal judgment could be made.27 6 But even if the
state provided no such forum, its administrative officers and state legisla-
tors are "bound by Oath or Affirmation" to support the Constitution and
the supremacy of federal laws enacted thereunder. 77 That obligation,
even absent any possibility of judicial compulsion, might confer sufficient
benefit on the plaintiff to avoid a claim of "futility. 27 8 Moreover, mere
273. Had the Court ignored the Eleventh Amendment in Green, it might still have exercised
equitable discretion to abstain from giving a declaratory judgment, if it found that the state had
provided an adequate forum for the determination of claims arising from past benefit awards in the
state administrative and judicial system; without ongoing violations, an equitable balance of the inter-
ests within the context of "Our Federalism," see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), might cau-
tion against premature federal intrusion on a state remedial scheme set up in response to congressional
requirements. See Green, 474 U.S. at 72 (citing Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237
(1952)) (declining to grant declaratory judgment in absence of particular dispute and where judgment
either would displace opportunity of state decisionmakers to make initial decisions in carrying out
state scheme of regulation or would serve no useful purpose as final determination of right). But,
unless the Court decided that there was a state forum open to consider the claims, abstention could be
functionally indistinguishable from closing the door to all federal review. See also infra text accompa-
nying notes 447-48. And, unless contemplated by Congress in establishing the AFDC scheme, such
abstention is arguably inconsistent with Congress' general policy to give such litigants a choice of
forum. Cf. Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 495, 516 (1982) (exhaustion of state remedies
not required in section 1983 actions).
274. Although the Court used the words "res judicata" effect, I do not understand it to have used
the term to refer to "claim preclusion." See C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 45, §
4402. If the federal judgment had claim preclusion effect, presumably no proceedings on the same
claim could be had in the state tribunal. What I believe the Court meant by its use of the term might
more properly be called issue preclusion. See also Burnham, supra note 251, at 79 ("collateral estop-
pel" effect of merits determination important to plaintiffs in subsequent state court proceedings).
275. 474 U.S. at 73 & n.2. It remains unclear, see supra note 257, whether the Court was refer-
ring only to an exercise of discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act, or whether it was imply-
ing that the judgment would have been "advisory" and thus beyond the powers of an Article III court.
Cf. Fanty v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare, 551 F.2d 2, 8 (3d Cir. 1977) (Garth, J., concur-
ring) (Article III bars issuance of notice or declaratory relief where benefits could be made available
only in state courts or agencies), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 957 (1979).
276. On the availability of judicial review in Michigan, see infra note 288; MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 24.301 (West 1981); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.921 (1979). There is no apparent reason for
plaintiff not to assert a favorable federal declaratory judgment as conclusive on the federal issue if
there is a state forum to hear the claim. If the Court in Green was suggesting that the federal judg-
ment would not have preclusive effect on the issue it decided, this seems simply incorrect. See Shapiro,
State Cases and Federal Declaratory Judgments, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 759, 763-64 (1979); compare
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 477 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (judgment would be preclusive
in later-filed prosecution against federal plaintiff) with id. at 482 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
(reserving question).
277. U.S. CONsT. art. VI. Since federal law required that states establish administrative decision-
making bodies, those decisionmakers would be obligated to apply controlling federal law to the partic-
ular dispute.
278. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). There, the House of Representatives ar-
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uncertainty whether a federal judgment ultimately will be given effect is
no impediment to the exercise of jurisdiction. 79 In Auto Workers, the
lower court found that declaratory relief would be futile, since any benefit
to the claimants would turn on compliance by states, which were not par-
ties to the lawsuit.2 " The Court rejected this argument, having "little
doubt" that state agencies would comply with federal administrative direc-
tives in a federal benefits program which the states had agreed to partici-
pate in.2 8 ' The Court emphatically stated that it would not "prevent this
suit from going forward simply because there is a slight chance that peti-
tioners will not be able to obtain the full extent of the relief they seek." '
gued that the claim by Adam Clayton Powell to be reseated and to receive his salary was not justicia-
ble because it was impossible for the Court to "mold effective relief for resolving this case." Id. at 517.
This contention was based on the premise that coercive relief was unavailable against officers of the
House to perform specific official acts because of the speech and debate clause. The Court, expressing
"no opinion about the appropriateness of coercive relief," concluded that declaratory relief was availa-
ble if there is a "live dispute between the parties." Id. at 517-18. Such relief may be granted, "inde-
pendently of whether other forms of relief are appropriate." Id.; see also Monaghan, Constitutional
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1387-89 (1973) (sovereign immunity and
possible unavailability of coercive relief should never bar declaratory judgment). The Declaratory
Judgment Act itself is consistent with the view that the exercise of Article III power does not turn on
whether further enforcement can be given. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982) (court may "declare the rights
and other legal relations of any interested party . . . whether or not further relief is or could be
sought"). And the Court has repeatedly recognized that "case or controversy" requirements can be
met without an award of process or execution. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241
(1937); Fidelity Nat'l Bank & Trust v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 132 (1927).
279. That complete cure of the injury may depend on subsequent acts of state courts, or legislative
or executive officials, cannot by itself defeat the exercise of the judicial power. The ultimate depen-
dence on other branches or levels of government to give effect to federal judgments, and the possibility
of other government officials evading the consequence of the courts' rulings, are impermissible bases
on which to limit the courts' power because they are often present. Cf. Rees v. City of Watertown, 86
U.S. (19 Wall.) 107, 124 (1873) ("(tlhe want of a remedy and the inability to obtain the fruits of a
remedy are quite distinct...," implying that inability to secure payment of judgment does not impair
judicial power to issue judgment itself). What is important is whether the judgment of the federal
court is binding as to what it decides and whether it is sufficiently related to the plaintiff's injury as to
be likely to effect a cure. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (relief must be likely to cure
injury complained of); cf. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945) (Court sits to correct judgments,
not revise opinions and thus will not review state court judgments resting on independent and ade-
quate state ground). Where an independent and adequate state ground sustains the state court judg-
ment on which Supreme Court review is sought, it is relatively certain that the ruling on the federal
law issue will have no effect on the parties' legal rights and relations. That is quite different from
where the ultimate effect of the federal judgment is uncertain because it depends on possibly relevant
but unresolved issues of state law, or on the willingness of state officials to implement its conse-
quences. Compare La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 461 (1899) (as long as
judgment was "final [and] conclusive" on government, Court could render decision on obligation to
pay claim) with District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901) (where, after judgment in Court of
Claims, Congress enacted law directing that no appropriations be spent to satisfy judgment and re-
pealing jurisdiction over claims, Court lacked judicial power to review).
280. 477 U.S. at 291-92. Plaintiffs had conceded that states could not be joined because of the
Eleventh Amendment. The lower court found that the states were "indispensable parties" and that the
case should be dismissed. Cf Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review:
Sovereign Immunity, Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1479, 1482, 1522 (1962)
(discussing relationship of indispensable party, mandamus, and sovereign immunity questions).
281. 477 U.S. at 292. The Court noted that it was unlikely that a directive from the Secretary of
Labor would be resisted: State agencies were amenable to a sanction of having employers in their state
lose tax credits on their federal unemployment tax, and the federal government fully reimbursed state
agencies, for both the benefits and administrative cost of processing the benefits. Id.
282. Id. at 293.
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The reasoning of Green v. Mansour, therefore, appears to fall of its
own weight, and its result cannot be sustained as a reasoned and princi-
pled interpretation of the Constitution. The opinion, however, is not just
another example of the faulty reasoning that seeps from the Court's quag-
mire of Eleventh Amendment law. It keenly illustrates the misleading
symbolism that this terribly complex body of doctrines serves and marks a
further reason for its abandonment.
A reading of the opinions in Green might leave one with the impression
that the effect of the refusal to exercise jurisdiction over the claim for
declaratory relief was to leave state tribunals, designated by the states,
entirely free to decide (1) whether federal law had been violated by the
challenged practice, (2) if it had been, whether welfare recipients who
were wrongly denied benefits should recover retroactively to the date of
the wrongful decision, and (3) if so, whether particular recipients were
entitled to recover. 283  But since 1981 federal law had required states that
had underpaid AFDC benefits to "take all necessary steps to correct" un-
derpayments, including specifically, "corrective payment[s]" to the claim-
ants.284 Federal law had long required states to provide administrative
tribunals to adjudicate welfare benefit disputes and, in such contested
cases, federal regulations specified the procedures and required states to
provide "payments retroactively to the date the incorrect action was
taken," where the claimant prevailed. 85
The federal AFDC law did not, it is true, require that states provide
for judicial review of the agency decision; regulations required only that
the claimant be notified of his right to judicial review "to the extent it is
283. Both the majority opinion and the dissenting opinions proceed on the premise that all of
these questions have now been left to state organs of government to decide. See 474 U.S. at 70-71
(majority opinion) (in Quern, notice relief allowed only because ancillary to permanent injunction and
"state agencies rather than federal courts would be the final arbiters of whether retroactive payments
would be ordered"); id. at 480 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (notice would mean that "state agency and
state courts would be the sole arbiters of what relief would be granted"). Justice Brennan's powerful
"one bite at the apple" argument is surely based on the premise that, as a result of the court's deci-
sion, states are now free-even where federal requirements were violated-to fail to restore wrongly
withheld benefits. See supra text accompanying note 262.
284. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2318, 95 Stat. 357;
42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(22) (1982 & Supp. 1987). Although the disputed payments predated this statute,
petitioners argued that the affirmative statutory obligation, one apparently not dependent on a claim-
ant's request for a hearing, applied. Brief for Petitioner, at 26, Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64
(1986); see 45 C.F.R. 233.20 (a)(13)(iii) (1984) (implying that statutory repayment requirement ap-
plies to underpayments identified after September 30, 1981). The state argued, in response, only that
no "underpayments" had yet been identified. Brief for Respondent, at 35. Since 1973, moreover,
federal regulations required states to provide hearings to a recipient challenging state reductions or
denial of benefits, and, if the recipient's claim was upheld, to "make corrective payments retroactively
to the date the incorrect action was taken." 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1973-86); see also MICH.
ADMN. CODE r. 400.918 (1979) (implementing federal retroactive payment requirement). Each opin-
ion, except for Justice Marshall's, simply ignores these provisions, and Marshall refers only tangen-
tially to section 602(a)(22) in a footnote arguing that notice relief should be regarded as prospective
because states have a continuing duty to repay. 474 U.S. at 80 n.*. Cf Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651, 674 (1974) (no intent to create cause of action in federal court based on HEW regulations).
285. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(18) (1973-86); see 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(4); 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5).
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available to him."2 ' The federal regulatory scheme itself, then, did not
require that the agency's decisions on issues of federal law be subject to
ultimate federal judicial review, as plainly would be the case if states were
required to provide judicial review of the agency decision.28 7 In Michigan,
however, as in many other states, the decisions of state agencies on AFDC
claims were subject to state judicial review." " Plaintiff Green, subsequent
to the Supreme Court decision, filed a request for hearing under the state
administrative code. The state administrative law judge rejected the argu-
ment that the request was barred by a ninety-day statute of limitations,
and adjudicated the claim on the merits; the former federal plaintiff re-
ceived the full relief requested-$347.2"'
What then did the Eleventh Amendment decision in Green really mean
for enforcement of the plaintiffs' federal law claims to monetary relief
against the state? Instead of proceeding to judgment on the merits in a
federal district court section 1983 action, the plaintiffs in Green were
forced to utilize the state-provided administrative forum. Class-wide notice
was not granted, and presumably fewer recipients were informed of their
potential entitlement to back benefits. Attorneys' fees for the legal work
related to recovery of the back payments were not available, as they would
have been had the matter been litigated in district court. The parties were
required to acquaint a new decisionmaker with the case. A state deci-
sionmaker, whose presence was mandated by federal law (and paid for in
part by federal funds),290 then concluded that under federal law plaintiff
was entitled to the additional amount sought.
286. 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(17) (1973-1986).
287. Even if a state failed to provide for judicial review of administrative determinations, Supreme
Court review of such determinations might be obtainable. Were state courts to deny review for lack of
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court might conclude that this was not an adequate state ground for deci-
sion and, accordingly, reach the merits of the federal claim. See supra notes 156-58. Moreover, the
absence of state judicial review might itself be challenged, in state or federal court, as an independent
violation of federal law. Cf. Redish, Congressional Power to Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Ju-
risdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and External Examination, 27 ViLL. L. REV.
900, 915 & n.61 (1982) (due process requires some "independent" court, state or federal, to be open
to hear constitutional claims). But cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 677 n.19 (noting dispute
whether Illinois permitted suits in state court to recover benefits).
288. McKee v. Dempsey, 424 Mich. 404, 381 N.W.2d 679 (1986); Pease v. Social Servs. Direc-
tor, 105 Mich. App. 689, 308 N.W.2d 432 (1981); Evans v. Department of Social Servs., 22 Mich.
App. 633, 178 N.W.2d 173 (1970); in other states, see, e.g., Porter v. D'Elia, 522 N.Y.S. 2d 618
(App. Div. 1987); Woodman v. Department of Health & Social Servs., 101 Wis.2d 315, 304 N.W.2d
723 (1981).
289. Telephone Interview with Professor William Burnham, plaintiff's counsel (June 1987); In
re Green, Case No. K8148787A (Mich. Dep't Social Servs., May 28, 1986).
290. See 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(b)(4)(iii) (1974-86). If state courts are to serve as the natural line of
defense against congressional contraction of federal court jurisdiction to vindicate the Constitution, see
Hart, supra note 229, at 1401, using the federal spending power, with its potentially broad conditions
and addictive side effects on state autonomy to finance state tribunals, see State Justice Institute Act of
1984, 42 U.S.C. §§ 10701-10713 (1986), may raise concern. Moreover, scholars and plaintiffs' attor-
neys, frustrated by the retrenchment in availability of federal judicial redress for governmental
wrongs, increasingly seek to develop theories for why state courts are obligated to provide relief for
federal claims that federal courts cannot or will not provide. See, e.g., Wolcher, supra note 66;
Gordon & Gross, supra note 158; Taylor, Section 1983 in State Court: A Remedy for Unconstitu-
[Vol. 98: 1
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What seems to be protected, then, in this decision is a facade of state
sovereignty. States are not, in fact, acting autonomously to determine what
remedies to provide, but rather are compelled by federal law both to es-
tablish decisionmaking mechanisms and to provide specific remedies. Had
the state administrative law judge denied relief and been affirmed in state
courts, review would then have been available in the Supreme Court as to
any issue of federal law.2"'
It is thus impossible, upon analysis, to see Green as supporting a prin-
cipled argument that the judicial power does not extend to claims for de-
claratory relief against states when the disputed issue may affect potential
monetary liabilities under federal law. 22 The Court's manipulation of
doctrine in Green does require litigants to resort to state court before be-
ing able to invoke the ultimate federal forum for review of their federal
claim.293 Thus stated, Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence takes on the
character of a peculiar form of abstention, stemming not from the text or
structure of the Constitution, but from a more discretionary doctrine
designed to promote a vision, over time, of a particular "federalist rela-
tionship" between state and federal court systems.2 "
Green's unconvincing and misleading rationale and its inconsistency
with Supreme Court review of state cases involving federal questions sup-
tional State Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 414 (1985). These two trends together could diminish the practi-
cal ability of state judiciaries to set and control their agendas and their dockets and thus their indepen-
dence in the federal scheme. But cf. Meador, Federal Law in State Supreme Courts, 3 CoNsr.
COMMENTARY 347, 355 (1986) (approving federal funding of state courts).
291. These would include (1) whether federal law generally required the states to make the pay-
ments and (2) whether any of the state grounds interposed to reject the federal claim were consistent
with the requirements of the federal statute and regulations, as well as the due process clause, and
were otherwise independent and adequate.
292. Under a proper understanding of the Eleventh Amendment, there was no constitutional bar
to the exercise of jurisdiction in Green. This does not mean, however, that the federal courts should
have made individualized awards; Congress may have intended awards of monetary relief to such
claimants to have been made only in state administrative tribunals. The Court could have undertaken
a more useful remedial inquiry: whether, in light of the possible availability of relief through state
administrative proceedings mandated by Congress, a declaratory judgment was consistent with Con-
gress' intent or otherwise appropriate. Cf Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 422-23 (1970) (Congress
sets welfare policy and Court enforces it). This inquiry was either not undertaken or was not candidly
disclosed. See infra Part V(A).
293. The Supreme Court may be motivated to expand Eleventh Amendment doctrines protecting
states from federal courts because of its inability or unwillingness to curtail Congress in its substantive
regulation of the states, even in areas traditionally reserved to state law. See, e.g., South Dakota v.
Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985);
North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), affd, 435 U.S. 962
(1978); see also REGULATORY FEDERALISM, supra note 178 (detailing expansion of federal regula-
tion affecting states). But if so, the Court's use of the Eleventh Amendment to serve as a surrogate for
the impotent Tenth has severe difficulties. See H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION:
POLICY AND PRACTICE 152 (1984). But see Brown, supra note 1 (approving "process federalism"
achieved by Court's Eleventh Amendment cases). Not least among them is the pervasive sense of
dishonesty that characterizes many of the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment decisions-dishonest
treatment of past precedents and misleading implications for the freedom that states retained, as in
Green v. Mansour.
294. See generally Baker, supra note I (arguing that diverse strands of Eleventh Amendment law
are part of effort to define demands of federalism on judiciary).
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port the proposition that the time is ripe to abandon the erroneous doc-
trine that the Eleventh Amendment embodies a constitutional rule of state
immunity from adjudication in federal tribunals. Doing so will have only
a modest effect on the results of so-called Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence. Federal common law doctrines will continue to protect states from
some forms of relief in federal courts, but will provide a firmer foundation
for striking the correct balance in state-federal judicial relations and in
assuring proper remedies for violations of federal law.
IV. FUNCTIONALITY AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW: THE REMEDIAL
HIERARCHY AND FORUM ALLOCATION PRINCIPLES OF ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT LAW
For over a decade, Eleventh Amendment scholarship has sought to
demonstrate that the amendment cannot be regarded historically or textu-
ally as embodying the doctrines of immunity attributed to it. That task
has been substantially accomplished.2"5 What stands in the way of the
fruition of that scholarship is an explication of what happens if the consti-
tutional theory of state sovereign immunity is abandoned. Scholars have
focused less attention on this point and appear to hold more divergent
views.29 As I argue below, the functional effect of state sovereign immu-
nity is likely to survive as part of a federal common law of remedies for
governmental wrongdoing.297
295. The persuasive historical work by Professors Field, Fletcher, Jacobs, and Orth, and by
Judge Gibbons, in rebutting the Hans Court's claim that Chisholm was an unexpected and erroneous
decision and that the drafters of the Eleventh Amendment plainly intended to constitutionalize state
sovereign immunity under all heads of federal jurisdiction has been widely acknowledged, see, e.g.,
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 68, and even by those who do not share their prescription for the future. See
L. TRIBE, supra note 247, at 175 n.8 (calling work "powerful").
296. Field, Part I, supra note 1 (common law immunity survives Article III, though whether that
immunity is form of federal common law is unclear); Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1108-30 (Tenth
Amendment, not Eleventh, may supply immunity from liability in some cases); Gibbons, supra note
1, at 2004 (acknowledging possible retention of "federal doctrine of state sovereign immunity"); Tribe,
supra note I (states immune from judicially implied but not congressionally established causes of
action); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (only
surviving immunity is state law immunity to state law claims); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (even as to state law claims, if state law forbids
official's actions, he would not have immunity).
297. Ten years ago, Professor Field concluded that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to
overcome an interpretation of Article III that construed it affirmatively to authorize suits against
states in abrogation of their common law immunity. In her view, the amendment did not "constitu-
tionalize" state sovereign immunity but rather reinstated a "common law doctrine" of sovereign im-
munity. Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 541-46 & n.98. My approach differs from Professor Field's in
several respects. Professor Field believes that remedial limitations of sovereign immunity for states
generally derive from "attitudes reflected in the eleventh amendment, and . . . the interpretation of
article III thereby adopted . . . ." Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1265. I argue instead that the
Eleventh Amendment prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction over states only with respect to diversity-
based jurisdiction and, possibly, certain state law claims. Similarly, while I argue that the Eleventh
Amendment limits the jurisdiction of federal courts over diversity claims against states, Professor
Field's understanding of the Eleventh Amendment does not set outer limits on the constitutional juris-
diction of federal courts. Thus, Professor Field argues that the amendment and its principle of "neu-
trality" with respect to common law sovereign immunity are addressed only to the courts, id. at
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A. A Functional Description of "Eleventh Amendment" Law: Remedial
Hierarchy and Trial Forum Allocation
The complexity, arcanity and deviousness of modern Eleventh Amend-
ment law warrant continued efforts to understand what purposes it actu-
ally serves so that its operation may be more understandable, even without
a major overhaul of its doctrinal framework. A functional description of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence reveals that the jurisprudence con-
tains an arguably coherent content. This functional content, however, is
not accurately described by present doctrine and does not flow from the
Eleventh Amendment itself. While present doctrine purports to focus on
when a suit is one against the state, the real inquiry concerns what relief
will be made available, for what state misconduct, and in what forum.
The functional content of present Eleventh Amendment law consists in
large measure of (1) defining a remedial hierarchy for state violations of
federal law and (2) allocating certain cases arising out of that governmen-
tal misconduct to different courts of initial resort.298 The present remedial
hierarchy generally precludes a monetary judgment against state treasur-
ies for past wrongs2" and allows federal district courts to grant prospec-
tive injunctive relief to prevent ongoing violations of federal law.300 This
preference is based on the nature of the remedy rather than on its cost;
prospective relief requiring significant expenditures of state funds is sus-
1261-62, and possibly with respect to all heads of federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1264 & n.272. I main-
tain that the amendment does not constrain jurisdiction over federal questions but that, with respect to
diversity-based jurisdiction, it would constrain Congress as well as the courts.
Apart from these constitutional differences, our approaches to the common law of sovereign immu-
nity differ significantly. First, Field does not clarify whether common law immunity derives from
federal or state law. Compare Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 544 (federal and state sovereign immu-
nity have same source, the "common law of sovereign immunity") and id. at 545 n.98 (referring to
"federal common law") with Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1269 ("true federal common law" irrele-
vant to judicial interpretation of federal statutes arguably imposing liabilities on states). I argue that
federal common law principles support a doctrine of state sovereign immunity, but that the doctrine is
not mandated by Article III or the Eleventh Amendment. Second, Field asserts that the only basis for
judicial abrogation of the supposedly common law immunity (apart from statutory claims created by
Congress) is where a specific clause in the Constitution was intended to abrogate states' immunity
from suit. Id. at 1266-68. 1 argue that where jurisdiction is otherwise present, courts must abrogate
states' common law immunity where necessary to vindicate the constitutional claim in light of all the
circumstances including otherwise available remedies. See infra text accompanying notes 451-66. Fi-
nally, Field does not, as I do, attempt to account for the particular form of remedial structure em-
braced within the concept of sovereign immunity. See infra text accompanying notes 352-403. For
further discussion of Field's articles, see infra notes 449, 457, & 496. For critiques of Field's view of
the amendment, see M. R-DISH, supra note 174, at 148-49; HART & WECHSLER 3D ED., supra note
157, at 1167-68.
298. Cf. 0. Fiss, THE CIvI. RIGHTS INJUNCTION 38 (1978) (describing relation between injunc-
tion and other remedies as part of "remedial hierarchy").
299. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (all declining to award judgment perceived to be for past
accrued monetary liabilities).
300. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664 (injunction concerning states' future application of federal welfare
standards). An exception even to this principle comes when the ongoing violation is a breach of a
continuing duty to pay monetary liabilities accrued in the past. Papasan, 478 U.S. at 279-80 n.12;
see also Green, 474 U.S. at 80 n.* (Marshall, J., dissenting) (notice relief barred by Eleventh Amend-
ment might be seen as relating to continuing duty to repay wrongly withheld benefits).
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tained while modest monetary relief for past wrongs is barred.3 °1 Indeed,
the Court has said that "compensatory" or "general deterrence" remedies
do not overcome immunity; only "specific deterrence" remedies to stop an
ongoing violation of federal law are permitted.
30 2
The rigors of the remedial preference principle are mitigated by the
forum allocation principle. Under the forum allocation principle, the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar review of any federal question
presented in a case originating in the state courts, even those in which the
amendment would bar initially filing the case in federal district court. In
this respect, Eleventh Amendment doctrine functions as a form of absten-
tion, deferring, as Younger v. Harris°30 does, to state courts for initial
adjudication of certain federal claims for relief.304 Thus, suits for damages
against a state for violation of federal law or for recovery of wrongfully
withheld federal welfare benefits or of unconstitutional taxes may be
brought in state, rather than federal, court, with review by a federal court
after judgment. Nevertheless such suits are as surely "against the state" as
those filed initially in federal court. 05
As argued above, the present framework does not adequately account
for why federal judicial power extends to cases seeking some forms of
relief as an original matter and to cases seeking other forms of relief only
in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. There is no constitutional man-
date to apply these principles to the states. Nonetheless, these principles
301. Compare Green, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (declaratory judgment in action involving wrongly
withheld benefits for named plaintiff of $347 barred by Eleventh Amendment) and Burnham, supra
note 251, at 69 n.87 (ultimate aggregate recovery in state courts in Edelman-Quern litigation was
$533,335) with Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 292-93 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring) (upholding
order to state to fund half of remedial education programs in Detroit at estimated cost of $5.8 mil-
lion). Even these functional principles, however, do not account for such decisions as Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (Eleventh Amendment precludes suit for ongoing injunctive relief against
state as named party defendant, although state officials could be sued). Pugh's prohibition of suit
against the state eo nomine, while consistent with the fictive theory of Ex parte Young, is inconsistent
with the Court's present view that the supremacy of federal law overrides the Eleventh Amendment in
situations involving ongoing violations of federal law to permit injunctions to issue. See Pennhurst,
465 U.S. at 152-53 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
302. See supra text accompanying notes 254-56.
303. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). As I explore infra at note 400, however, if the allocation of damage
claims to state courts is to be sustained in its present form as a principled, or (less ambitiously)
constrained, form of abstention, existing categories of abstention cannot supply the limiting principle.
304. If state courts can constitutionally refuse to provide a forum for claims barred from district
courts, "Eleventh Amendment abstention" would completely foreclose access to any federal court, in a
way that neither Younger v. Harris nor other recognized abstention doctrines do. As discussed supra
notes 130-33, General Oil Co. v. Crain suggests that states cannot do so. See supra notes 157-58; see
generally Wolcher, supra note 66. At a minimum, federal law poses substantial constraints on the
validity of state courts' refusal to entertain actions on grounds that discriminate against federal claims.
Brown, supra note 1, at 391; Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 CoLum. L. REv. 1109, 1131-35
(1969); Wolcher, supra note 66, at 238-44; accord Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). But cf.
American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Conway, 107 S. Ct. 3262 (1987) (denying certiorari to review state
tax case in which, inter alia, state court found that sovereign immunity barred refund of unconstitu-
tional taxes).
305. But cf Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. at 135 n.10 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that where relief is authorized by state law, claim is not one against state).
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can be sustained as a form of federal common law, which the Court can,
within the jurisdictional parameters provided by Congress and the Consti-
tution, shape in response to its changing experiences and views of consti-
tutional exigencies.
B. State Sovereign Immunity as Federal Common Law
If neither Article III nor the Eleventh Amendment grants states a gen-
eral constitutional immunity from private suits in federal court, does it
follow that any such immunity enjoyed by the states exists solely as a
matter of state law? Will the remedial hierarchy and forum allocation
principles in federal question cases necessarily fall with the abandonment
of the Hans view of the federal judicial power? I think not."'
1. Sovereign Immunity Existing Only as State Law?
Some Eleventh Amendment scholars have concluded that the only
source of state immunity from suit in federal court is state law. Such law,
while perhaps providing defenses available in federal courts under the
Erie doctrine to claims arising under state law, would never bar relief on
federal claims.3 0 But to conclude from history or the lack of textual sup-
port from the Constitution that state immunity is based solely on the laws
of the states is to impose a post-Erie consciousness on a document framed
and interpreted by men for whom the sources of law were not so narrowly
or discretely cabined and described. 08
306. See also H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 163
(2d ed. 1987) (suggesting that "except for the precise case addressed by the amendment, the federal
courts may develop a common law of state sovereign immunity").
307. See, e.g., Cullison, supra note 226, at 19, 35 (Erie doctrine should control immunity cases;
federal courts need only honor state immunity when enforcing state-created rights); see also Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. at 300 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Professor Amar's argument
generally appears to defeat any claim of state sovereign immunity from relief except where such
immunity is supplied by state law with respect to a purely state law claim. Amar, supra note 1, at
1473-75, 1486-87, 1490 & n.261. Although Amar also writes that states may immunize themselves
for unconstitutional conduct provided that other remedies, such as an action against a non-judgment
proof officer, can "guarantee victims full redress," id. at 1490-91, perhaps implying some role for a
doctrine of state immunity even in claims arising under federal law, he earlier indicates that actions
against officers for monetary relief can rarely provide full redress (even if existing "good faith" immu-
nities for officers were eliminated) consistent with the Constitution's "remedial imperative." Id. at
1487-88. Professor Fletcher argues that, apart from constitutional limitations on Congress' authority
to create damage liability enforceable in either state or federal courts, no federal doctrine of jurisdic-
tional immunity protects states from particular forms of relief in federal courts. Fletcher, supra note
1, at 1106-30.
308. See H. FINK & M. TUSHNET, supra note 306, at 858 (pre-Erie cases may have regarded
state sovereign immunity as general common law); see also Fletcher, The General Common Law and
Section 34 of theJudiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513
(1984) (characterizing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), as articulation of established prac-
tice of federal courts in areas of commercial law uncontrolled by state statute to develop and apply a
"general common law," that did not necessarily displace states' development of differing approaches to
same issue); Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1039-1111
(1985) (debate over federal common law complex, continuous and intensely political in early decades
of Constitution); cf Hill, supra note 304, at 1124, 1131-35 (even where claim may be brought under
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Common law concepts of sovereign immunity were part of the back-
ground against which the demands of the Constitution were to be inter-
preted. 09 These concepts, whether seen as part of a general or specifically
federal common law, were felt to constrain the remedial choices of federal
courts in actions against states throughout our constitutional history. John
Marshall's struggle in Cohens to grapple with the concept of federal af-
firmative claims against states suggests that he did not see sovereign im-
munity-and the host of related common law traditions as to the appro-
priate form of redress for injury-as a creature only of state law, of no
relevance to claims arising under federal law.310
Further support for the proposition that sovereign immunity arises
from federal, rather than only state, law derives from the breadth of the
federal courts' application of the principle. Attempts to account for the so-
called "immunity" of states from federal court suits frequently gloss over
the immunity of the United States and generally ignore the judicial immu-
nities enjoyed by Indian tribes, United States territories and foreign sover-
eigns.3" Yet Marshall and succeeding Supreme Court justices have con-
state common law, substantive federal law constrains shape of liability and remedial rules in actions
against government officials for official wrongdoing).
309. Justice Field wrote that "[ilt is a familiar doctrine of the common law, that the sovereign
cannot be sued in his own courts without his consent. . . . This doctrine of the common law is
equally applicable to the supreme authority of the nation, the United States." The Siren, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 152, 154 (1868); see Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 126 (1869) ("[e]very
government has an inherent right to protect itself against suits"); Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 527, 529 (1857) (states not suable in any court without consent); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) at 411-12 (immunity of United States); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 333-36 (1816) (dicta suggesting that party-based jurisdiction did not permit suits against United
States because not proper to submit sovereignty to judicial cognizance); Compare Engdahl, supra note
17, at 21-23 (sovereign immunity came into favor only after Civil War) with Collins, supra note 33,
at 221-28 (emphasizing continuity in Court's treatment of immunity).
310. Scholars generally explain Marshall's struggle in Cohens with whether "affirmative claims"
could be made against a state as reflecting his view that claims on a contract do not arise under
federal law. D. CURRIE, supra note 69, at 99 n.56; C. JACOBS, supra note 1, at 87-89; see also
Engdahl, supra note 17, at 9. This interpretation is in some tension with Marshall's broad view of
federal question jurisdiction in Osborn v. Bank of United States and in Cohens itself. See supra note
101. Marshall's evident unease and uncertainty over the question discussed in Cohens-whether a
state could be sued to recover taxes unconstitutionally collected-together with his lengthy discussion
and justification of the nominal party rule in Osborn, may be accounted for in part by his familiarity
with the remedial traditions of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. See also Baker,
supra note 1, at 155-56 & n.81 (noting Marshall's use of common law sovereign immunity doctrines
in Osborn as offering hope to states that federal courts would recognize sovereign immunity principles
even if not constitutionally required to do so); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875)
(recognizing seemingly common law sovereign immunity principle and need to avoid interference with
executive discretion, but permitting some forms of relief against state board).
311. The ready extension of federal and state sovereign immunity principles to territories of the
United States and to Indian tribes suggests, in some cases explicitly, that the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is in the nature of federal common law. On tribal immunity, see, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (tribes possess "common law immunity from suit traditionally
enjoyed by sovereign powers"); Note, Tribal Sovereign Immunity: Searching for Sensible Limits, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 173, 181 (1988) (tribal immunity doctrine is one of federal common law). On terri-
torial immunity, see, e.g., Bonet v. Yabucoa Sugar Co., 306 U.S. 505 (1939) (Puerto Rico not suable
without her consent in tax refund action notwithstanding organic act including sue and be sued
clause); Porto Rico v. Rosaly y Castillo, 227 U.S. 270, 276 (1913) (same in suit to recover specific
property; "American system" is one in which legislative power over claims against the government is
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sistently stated that the United States government was not suable without
the government's specific consent.312 And early on, Marshall's Supreme
Court recognized as a principle of federal common law the public interna-
tional law rule of sovereign immunity for vessels owned by foreign gov-
ernments, 13 a principle later aptly described by then-Justice Rehnquist as
'judicially created to effectuate general notions of comity among nations
and among the respective branches of the Federal Government.
'31 4
These doctrines of immunity for foreign, federal and state governments
have developed in some respects along similar lines. It is commonplace for
cases involving one to refer to reasoning in cases involving others.315 At
least two important common elements inform these schemes: the distinc-
tion between "the sovereign" and its agents, 1 6 and the influence of acts of
not subordinate to the judiciary); Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (Hawaii
immune from suit without consent on claim under local law).
312. See, e.g., Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 411-12; United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4
How.) 286, 288 (1846); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204 (1882). The Lee Court, analyzing
why the United States could not be sued without consent, said that the rule has "never been discussed
or the reasons . . . given, but . . . treated as an established doctrine." As the Court explained, the
rule had a misguided common law basis, derived from the common law of England, in which the
sovereign king could not be sued without consent. The Lee court concluded that there were no justifia-
ble reasons to require legislative consent to suit in a constitutional republic, but that the rule had been
"adopted in our courts as a part of the general doctrine of publicists." Id. at 206. Treating the rule as
"settled," the Court nonetheless held that the action for ejectment filed against federal officers in
possession of the former Lee estate would not be treated as a suit against the United States for which
consent was required. See also infra text accompanying notes 458-59.
313. Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812) (foreign vessel of war belong-
ing to friendly foreign sovereign is immune from libel, even as against claim by United States citizens
that vessel is their private property). Neither the counsel arguing on behalf of the immunity nor the
Court's opinion itself rests the decision in favor of immunity on constitutional principles. Id. at 133
(counsel arguing in favor of immunity concedes that "constitution . . . decides nothing"); id. at 146
(Marshall, C.J.) (conclusion as to sovereign immunity of vessel rests on "the nature of sovereignty"
and "universal practice of nations").
314. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972) (plurality
opinion) (quoted statement used to describe both act-of-state and foreign sovereign immunity doc-
trines) (emphasis added); accord Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (Court
explicitly formulates federal common law act-of-state doctrine foreclosing adjudication of certain issues
concerning legality of acts of foreign government).
315. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 112-13 (discussing federal sovereign immunity cases on
enjoining officers); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 737 (1947) (referring to state sovereign immunity
cases on right to sue officers to recover property).
316. See, e.g., J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY vii, 53 (1963)
(in public international law, officials have immunity only where "suit is in effect a suit against the
state"). In this country, individual representatives of foreign governments are generally protected by
"diplomatic immunity," while the state itself is protected by a now codified federal version of sover-
eign immunity. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982). Even
that codification, however, distinguishes between foreign states and their separate state agencies, gen-
erally rendering the latter more readily liable for both judgment and execution. Compare 28 U.S.C. §
1610(a) (immunities of property of foreign states) with 28 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (immunities of property
of foreign state instrumentality) and 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (easier to obtain jurisdiction over claim
of taking in violation of international law where instrumentality has property in United States than
where only foreign state itself has property in United States).
Eleventh Amendment law protects states, but not municipalities or "separate" and subordinate
agencies of government from suit in federal court. See Mount Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977);
Lincoln County v Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). Moreover, it does not necessarily extend to relief
sought against state officers. See infra note 356. Similarly, federal sovereign immunity does not neces-
sarily protect separate government corporations. See Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp.,
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another branch of government on the Court's willingness to let adjudica-
tion go forward.""7 Yet the law of foreign sovereign immunity was, until
the recent Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, clearly a species of judi-
cially created federal common law. It has not been regarded as committed
solely to other branches for the determination of its scope, at least where
the other branches have been silent; rather, the courts' judicial power per-
mits them to define the scope of the doctrine.31 "
2. State Sovereign Immunity and the Constitution
As my earlier analysis implies, the justification for these related doc-
trines of governmental immunity is for the most part not founded upon
constitutional text, particularly not upon Article III. Federal courts have
jurisdiction over some claims against state, federal or foreign governments
with their consent or with congressional authorization. Article III necessa-
rily embraces the authority to adjudicate such claims if consent or authori-
zation is given. However, nowhere in Article III is a principle of consent
or of congressional abrogation articulated. Despite the Court's repeated
and often eloquent insistence that state sovereign immunity is a principle
fundamental to the Constitution, the doctrines of sovereign immunity ap-
plied to claims against states in federal courts cannot be justified by exege-
sis of any portion of the Constitution itself.
306 U.S. 381 (1939); Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922). While these
cases may turn on interpretation of congressional acts, some early sovereign immunity cases suggest
that when a sovereign entity engages in a proprietary or private activity, it loses its immunity as a
matter of law. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824) (state-
owned bank). While the proprietary activity exception to sovereign immunity has declined in impor-
tance in the domestic common law of sovereign immunity, it has become increasingly important in the
federal law of foreign sovereign immunity. See Victory Transp. v. Comisaria General de Abasteci-
mientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 360-62 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965)
(foreign government not immune from suit for its commercial activities); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)
(permitting suit against foreign governments for their commercial acts).
317. States may waive their Eleventh Amendment protection and subject themselves to suit. Clark
v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883). The United States may consent to the jurisdiction of the courts,
Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982), and Congress can abrogate state immunity, see infra text
accompanying notes 412-15. The executive branch can refuse to recognize a claim of foreign sovereign
immunity and thus permit the Court to adjudicate the claim. See, e.g., Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30 (1945); see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972) (Rehn-
quist, J., plurality opinion) (recognizing exception to act-of-state doctrine when State Department
formally advises that it has no objection to court proceeding with adjudication). Finally, Congress has
exercised its power to tell the federal courts that foreign sovereign immunity should not be recognized
in certain instances. See Verlinden v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (discussing For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act).
318. See, e.g. Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587-88 (1943) (in absence of executive branch recog-
nition of foreign sovereign immunity, district court would have power to decide whether ship entitled
to immunity); compare Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926) (despite State Depart-
ment failure to so assert, court finds commercial vessel immune) with Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S.
30 (1945) (silence of executive branch implies that courts should not recognize immunity). Further
support for the proposition that the law of sovereign immunity is one of federal common law (at least
insofar as it applies to states on federal claims) derives from the Court's common law approach to the
determination and scope of immunities of both federal and state officers when sued in their personal
capacity for damages. See infra text accompanying notes 338-40.
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That a principle of law is not compelled or supported by constitutional
text or clear intent of the framers does not necessarily render it non-
constitutional.319 Several other factors suggest, however, that the consent
and abrogation requirements are, especially with respect to states, far less
clearly derived from the Constitution than the competing claims of right
asserted against them. 20
The doctrinal bases of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity
have no application whatsoever to the constitutional relationship of the
states to federal courts, especially on federal claims. At common law the
doctrine of immunity barred suit against a sovereign, without his consent,
in his own courts.321 While foreign sovereigns were often accorded a simi-
lar immunity from suit in domestic courts, their immunity resulted not
from a requirement of constitutional law but from a judicially created
principle of comity.3 22 Indeed, as the Court held in Nevada v. Hall,23
because of this common law feature of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
states could subject sister states to suits in their own courts. The doctrine,
however, had no application at common law to suits against lesser lords in
the courts of a higher sovereign.3 24 Thus, whether states are regarded as
foreign to the jurisdiction of federal courts or, as seems more consistent
319. See, e.g., C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969);
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 2041 (1980); Simon,
The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1985). But cf. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amend-
ment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). I do not believe that either structural principles or an original-
ist view of the Constitution supports the conclusion that state sovereign immunity is required except
under the diversity head of jurisdiction. By contrast, I do believe there is a structural constitutional
argument, supported loosely by text, for the principle of sovereign immunity as applied to the United
States. See infra text accompanying notes 378-83. But the dividing line between interpretation of
constitutional text and development of federal common law is not capable of precise demarcation. One
distinction between the two, generally, is Congress' power to overcome the judicial ruling; but given
the established role of congressional abrogation, at least in Fourteenth Amendment cases, this distinc-
tion is less helpful in defining a demarcation. Another distinction is that resorting not only to prece-
dent, founding intent, and structure, but also to experience and public policy may be more legitimate
in the design of common law than in the articulation of constitutional law. See Monaghan, The Su-
preme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1975)
("debatable policy choices" and "uncertain empirical foundations" characteristic of constitutional com-
mon law); cf The Siren, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1868) (immunity of United States "rests upon
reasons of public policy"). One result of my argument that state sovereign immunity, in federal ques-
tion cases, is a matter of federal common law may be to draw attention to the more varied sources of
guidance to which the Court can legitimately turn in creating rules of immunity, the greater degree of
choice the Court exercises when it invokes sovereign immunity as a bar to relief in federal claims, and
the concomitantly greater need to justify and explain why such a rule should continue to be observed.
320. The uncertainty over the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the early days of the republic,
when questions of state-federal power received great attention, makes it difficult to accept that a broad
requirement of state sovereign immunity from suit was embedded in the structure of the Constitution.
See supra note 188.
321. See Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv.
1, 2-5 (1963) (English common law rule of sovereign immunity arose in unitary system); see also
Brown, supra note 1, at 369 (common law rule not developed in federal system).
322. See supra text accompanying note 314; Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 416 (1979).
323. 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
324. Id. at 414-15; 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 516-17 (2d ed.
1952); Engdahl, supra note 17, at 2-5.
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with the constitutional scheme insofar as claims arise under federal law,
more like "lesser lords," the doctrine of sovereign immunity itself would
not require recognition of their claim of immunity.
Two other themes in the common law of sovereign immunity are often
sounded, neither of which readily corresponds with the constitutional sta-
tus of states in our Union. The first, a concern about the Court's possible
inability to enforce its judgments, while of some force with respect to
claims against the United States, is far less persuasive with respect to
claims against states based on federal law. 25 The second, the logical posi-
tivist view of sovereign immunity "that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends,"
M6
is completely irrelevant to the legal position of the states with respect to
federal law. The states do not make the laws on which either a constitu-
tional or federal statutory claim of right depends; the people, in conven-
tions assembled, "made" the Constitution, 2  and Congress makes the
laws.
More fundamentally, the common law doctrine was founded on a no-
tion that sovereignty resides in the person of the monarch, whereas the
premise of the Constitution was that sovereignty derived from the people
and that the government created under the Constitution was subject to
that written law. Consequently, as John Marshall wrote in Marbury, the
first premise of the courts was that for a violation of a right, even by the
government, the laws should provide a remedy-a principle in opposition
to that which insists on the absence of judicial remedy for government
wrongs.328
In the face of these general aspects of the constitutional structure incon-
sistent with a pervasive constitutional incorporation of the common law
doctrine, one might expect the doctrine of sovereign immunity to be sup-
ported by some clear and explicit text. Yet, to the contrary, the text of the
Constitution, particularly Article III, consistently bedevils the Court's ef-
325. In litigation between states, or by the United States against a state, the Court has consist-
ently asserted a power to render judgment and a concomitant power to enforce the judgment, even if it
were for accrued monetary relief. See Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918) (after entry of
substantial judgment on decades-old debt against West Virginia, Court asserted power to enforce
judgment, possibly by compelling a tax levy, a seizure of property or otherwise, though formal decree
not entered).
326. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). In Polyblank, the claim arose solely
under the mortgage redemption law of Hawaii.
327. The positivist principle is hardly more relevant with respect to the immunity of the federal
government as to claims arising under the Constitution itself. For it was not the government itself that
made the Constitution, but the people who, through the Constitution, created a government with
powers both given and limited by that instrument. See supra note 312; McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401-05 (1819); see generally Amar, supra note 1, at 1440-41.
328. See Amar, supra note 1, at 1426-27, 1466-92 (theoretical underpinnings of Constitution
inconsistent with sovereign immunity, in sensethat without legislative consent court may provide no
remedy against government for its wrongdoing). Amar argues that under the original Federalist the-
ory of the Constitution, "governments have neither 'sovereignty' nor 'immunity' to violate the Consti-
tution." Id. at 1427.
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forts to draw principled lines of distinction. While the Constitution explic-
itly extended jurisdiction to suits between a state and a foreign state, and
while the Eleventh Amendment is silent on that configuration, the Court
nevertheless found that the "postulates" of the Eleventh Amendment pre-
cluded the exercise of judicial power over unconsenting states sued by a
foreign state. 29 However, while Article III does not explicitly grant juris-
diction over controversies to which the United States and a state are par-
ties, that jurisdiction was found necessarily to arise from the extension of
judicial power to any case to which the United States was a party and to
preclude the assertion of state sovereign immunity."'0 The same language
that is found to authorize suits by the United States against a state does
not similarly permit suit by a state against the United States . 3 1
Finally, although debated during ratification, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity was not discussed in terms of a principle provided and man-
dated by the Constitution-but rather as a pre-existing common law doc-
trine whose survival was at issue." 2 In his defense of the provisions of
Article III in The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton declared that it was "in-
herent in the nature of sovereignty not to be subject to suit except upon
consent," and that, except to the extent that there was a "surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the Convention," no change would result.33 The
329. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
330. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892); see generally Monaco, 292 U.S. at 328-32.
Without disputing that Court's well-known admonition that "[blehind the words of the constitutional
provisions are postulates which limit and control," id. at 322, the postulates of sovereign immunity at
common law would not have required that state's immunity be recognized in the court of a different
sovereign. See supra text accompanying notes 322-23. Moreover, to the extent that this understanding
was not widely shared at the time of ratification, the conferral of jurisdiction over "all cases" arising
under federal law amounted to a "surrender" of any such immunity. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at
383.
331. Compare Texas, 143 U.S. at 621 (United States can sue state originally in Supreme Court)
with Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907) ("[I]t does not follow that because a State
may be sued by the United States without its consent, therefore the United States may be sued by a
State without its consent. Public policy forbids that conclusion."). Although it is well-established that
the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over suits against the United States to which it consents, in
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 573, 577 (1933), the Court suggested that this was not
correct, at least insofar as judicial power was premised on the United States party-status clause of
Article III. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 542-43, 550-51 (1962) (repudiating Williams'
reasoning). The Court's confusion in Williams may stem from the failure of Article III to reflect or
justify the divergent uses of judicial power in actions against state or federal governments that have in
fact occurred.
332. See Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 536-38 (debate between those who saw Article III state-
citizen clause as taking away state immunity and those who saw Article III as leaving common law
immunity unimpaired); cf. supra note 188.
333. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (A. Hamilton). Arguing that the diversity head of jurisdic-
tion would not permit states to be sued in federal court on their public securities held by out-of-
staters, Hamilton suggested that the Constitution had not changed the rule that contracts with a
sovereign "confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will." Id. at 488. Since Hamilton
also suggested that there could be a "surrender of [sovereign] immunity in the plan of the Conven-
tion," and implied that states could be sued for violations of the federal privileges and immunities
clause, see THE FEDERALIST No. 80 at 478; Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 535 n.75, his position
apparently was that the Constitution did not change the law of government contracts so as to create a
cause of action, and not that there was a general principle of state sovereign immunity preserved in
the Constitution. See also Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1266 (reading Hans as contracts clause
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question was whether Article III did away with the principle of sovereign
immunity-not whether it constitutionalized the doctrine.3 " The principle
itself was one of the common law.
35
3. Federal Interests Underlying a Common Law Immunity
As we have seen, the Constitution itself does not readily account for the
existence or content of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity from cer-
tain forms of relief in federal courts. Historically, though, doctrines of
immunity have been pervasively applied by federal courts to sovereign en-
tities, domestic and foreign, indicating that an interest transcending state
law has been at work in providing some protection in derogation of plain-
tiffs' rights, and that the judicial power was broad enough to develop such
federal common law doctrines. With respect to state conduct that violates
either the Constitution or federal statutes, a similar power can be
exercised.
At least two important federal interests in defining the remedial struc-
ture for state conduct in violation of federal law can be identified: assuring
that some remedy be available to vindicate individual rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States and, at the same time, assuring
that the remedial structure not intrude unduly on the performance of
other branches and levels of government. State law remedies for govern-
mental wrongdoing may not appropriately give effect to those federal in-
terests, and therefore federal courts must be free to decide what remedies
should be provided to redress violations of federal right. Federal courts,
when exercising jurisdiction over federal question claims arising out of
conduct by state officers or legislatures, will frequently confront remedial
questions not answered by congressional statutes. In providing the answer
case). Despite their ambiguity, Hamilton's words have been treated as an assurance to states that they
would not be subject to suit in federal courts. See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1890).
334. See Field, Part I, supra note 1, at 536-37. Field believes Hans regarded the sovereign im-
munity of the states as a common law doctrine that survived, but was not compelled by, Article III.
Id. at 537 n.81, 541-42 nn.90-94. She finds the language of the opinion, which posed the question
whether Article III itself "created a power to enable the individual citizens of one state to sue another
state in federal court," as inconsistent with the view that Article III requires state sovereignty. She
also argues that, to the extent the Eleventh Amendment was intended to enact Justice Iredell's
Chisholm dissent, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429 (1793), it rested primarily on the presence of a common
law immunity.
335. See United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207-09 (1882); Borchard, Government Liability in
Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1924); Jaffe, supra note 321, at 209. The law of sovereign immunity may
have been treated by early courts as a form of general common law, emanating from no single sover-
eign but based on custom among states. See supra note 308. Such "general" common law differed
from supreme federal law that bound the states, see Fletcher, supra note 308, at 1513, 1521-25, and
after Erie is beyond the power of federal courts to promulgate. While federal common law must
derive from the Constitution and laws of the United States, I do not believe there is anything inconsis-
tent in conceiving of sovereign immunity as flowing from the Constitution in the sense of being within
the power of the federal courts, acting under Article III, to effectuate, without seeing it as having a
constitutionally mandated content.
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to the remedial question posed by a violation of federal rights, those courts
must necessarily make decisions in the common law method.336
Federal common law in the area of governmental accountability is typi-
cally thought of as a law that provides for causes of action or remedies not
spelled out in constitutional or statutory text. But federal common law
may, through immunity doctrines, restrict remedies for government
wrongdoing as well as confer them.3 7 For example, in damage suits
against state or federal employees, the Court has expanded the doctrine of
qualified immunity so that many presumptively injured plaintiffs, assert-
ing bona fide claims of violation of federal right, nevertheless cannot re-
cover.338 In formulating the standard of official immunity, moreover, fed-
eral courts have not constrained themselves to applying the common law
as it existed at any particular time and as referred to in constitutional or
statutory text. 3 Rather, they have felt free to modify substantially those
common law standards, exercising a power that can be most accurately
described as a federal common law power.34 Both the law of official im-
munity and of sovereign immunity revolve around the essential question of
judicial redress for official wrongdoing. That the Court exercises a com-
mon law power to adjust officer immunities strongly suggests that it pos-
336. While constitutional and federal common law decisions may be made in a similar common
law method, it is conventional to understand constitutional decision-making as involving interpretation
of a text or policy clearly laid out in the Constitution itself, whereas federal common law is regarded
as a judicial elaboration of rules of decision less firmly anchored in the text of either the Constitution
or a statute. See supra note 319; infra note 346.
337. Cf Boyle v. United Technologies, 108 S. Ct. 2510 (1988) (establishing federal common law
"government contractor" defense applicable to tort actions brought against military contractor with
United States); Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988) (defining federal immunity for federal offi-
cial sued for common law tort).
338. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court abandoned its formerly articulated
standard of officer immunity, developed in cases against state officials, see, e.g., Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308 (1975), and adopted the so-called "objective" standard for determining immunities of
both federal and state officials when sued for damages.
339. In Harlow, the Court quite frankly explained its decision on the basis of its own recent
experience and the demands of public policy. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19; see also Anderson v.
Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3041-42 (1987) (describing Harlow as complete reformulation of Ameri-
can common law tradition). Although the Court at times has justified its development of officer immu-
nity law under section 1983 on the theory that it was interpreting Congress' intent, see, e.g., Briscoe v.
LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 326, 334 (1983) (implying that Court, in formulating immunities, has been
interpreting legislative intent of section 1983 to preserve common law immunity); Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 554 (1967); see also Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922-23 (1984) (denying court's power
to establish immunities based on public policy), the Court's modification of the immunity standard in
Harlow is a type of decisionmaking that was not (and cannot reasonably be) justified as "interpreta-
tion," particularly since the same standard is applied to nonstatutory actions against federal officials
and statutory actions against state officials. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978) (no reason to
distinguish between official immunities in actions against state officials under section 1983 and im-
plied constitutional claims against federal officials).
340. See, e.g., Field, supra note 266, at 893 n.48, 897 n.61 (treating federal officers' immunities
as form of federal common law); Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 291 &
n.243 (1988) (immunity doctrines shielding state and federal officials as federal common law); see also
United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 372 n.10 (1980) (legislative immunity in section 1983 cases
based on "federal common law").
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sesses a similar power with respect to the immunities of the government
itself.
Some form of state sovereign immunity-understood as part of a special
law of remedies against state wrongdoing-may, therefore, be regarded as
a part of the federal common law, not compelled by the Constitution, but
shaped by its earliest interpretations and informed in its development by
the allocation and separation of powers under the Constitution.341 This
special law of remedies, however, is subject to varying application not only
by Congress, but, under appropriate circumstances, by the courts as
well. 42
4. Source of Authority
The authority of the federal courts to develop and apply a federal com-
mon law of remedies against the government may be seen to arise from
the judicial power itself."' While grants of jurisdiction do not always jus-
tify the articulation of substantive rules of federal common law,3 44 the
341. See infra text accompanying notes 378-86; cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (explaining "constitutional underpinnings" of federal common law act-of-state
doctrine in actions against foreign government); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472
(1942) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Federal common law implements the federal Constitution and stat-
utes, and is conditioned by them.").
342. Federal courts play a special role, in a government of cross-checking and separated powers,
by providing a forum which must hear and decide something about each complaint filed with it.
Structural constitutional principles thus should constrain courts in expanding immunity doctrines that
undermine this individually invoked mode of redress and restraint on other levels and branches of
government. Cf Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1193,
1318 (1982) (judicially created remedies for statutory rights justified by "amalgam of concerns, includ-
ing the desirability of enforcing statutory limits on official discretion [and] the need for judicial checks
in a system of separated powers"). But cf. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988) (Congress in
better position than Court to decide whether to permit monetary relief on constitutional due process
claim against federal official). Thus, the Court's power to articulate and apply federal common law
rules of immunity ought not be used to expand governmental immunity so as to impair significantly
the availability of judicial redress. See Engdahl, supra note 17, at 79 (arguing that expansion of
officer immunities makes necessary a contraction in sovereign immunities to preserve "the tradition of
judicially enforceable legal and particularly constitutional limitations").
343. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532,
1541, 1552 (1972); see Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983) (federal question jurisdiction under
section 1331 authorizes courts to fashion "wide variety" of nonstatutory remedies for constitutional
violations by state and federal officials); Hill, supra note 304, at 1113-14, 1156-57 (same); see also
Field, supra note 266, at 973 n.394 (implying that where federal right is violated courts always have
power to define federal remedy). But see Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 640-41
(1981) (power to develop common law does not arise from jurisdictional grants alone). Dellinger
argues that federal courts have power, in order to enforce the affirmative rights established by Bivens
under the Fourth Amendment, either to abrogate the good faith immunities of individual federal
officers or to "mak[e] a direct assault" on the citadel of sovereign immunity. Dellinger, supra, at
1556. Because I believe there is a firmer constitutional basis for federal rather than state sovereign
immunity with respect to claims arising under federal law, Dellinger's argument would apply aforti-
ori to remedies allegedly barred by state sovereign immunity.
344. Compare Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (diversity jurisdiction does not
carry with it power to make federal common law, but only to apply state law as states would) with
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (grant of admiralty jurisdiction embraces
judicial and legislative law-making capacity) and Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 456-57 (1957) (statutory grant of jurisdiction over breach of labor contracts carries with it power
to develop substantive federal common law governing disputes). Controversy surrounds the federal
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grant of power over cases arising under federal law necessarily carries
with it the power to make "principled choices among traditional judicial
remedies" for the vindication of federal rights.345 Organic statutes like the
federal question jurisdictional provisions authorize federal courts to con-
sider both background understandings of remedial traditions and evolving
public needs to create "the best rule of law" in situations not addressed by
more specific statutory pronouncements or constitutional requirements.
3 8
courts' power to imply or provide remedies that have not traditionally been available or that are not
expressly authorized by statute. See Field, supra note 266, at 923-25 (power to develop federal com-
mon law does not arise from grant of jurisdiction alone); Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Fed-
eral Courts, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 1 (1985) (same). Merrill argues that only where a constitutional or
federal statutory policy would clearly be threatened by applying an existing state rule, or where the
Constitution or a federal statute has delegated, with clear and specific guidance, a power to the Court
to declare law (as in the Bill of Rights), is such judicial law-making legitimate. See also Field, supra
note 266, at 928 (although only requirement for promulgation of federal common law is some federal
enactment that authorizes its creation, Erie means that jurisdictional provisions in Constitution are not
sufficient "enactments"). But see id. at 915-19 (acknowledging argument that constitutional basis
exists for concluding that federal courts' common law-making powers extends to any case over which
they have jurisdiction, and that while judicial power does not encompass power to make rules in
diversity cases, it does in other jurisdictional categories).
As I argue below, the grant of jurisdiction must be exercised in a manner consistent with the role of
the courts in the federal separation of powers scheme and in a way that does not itself violate the
Constitution. If, as to a case within its jurisdiction, a federal court finds a federal right violated and a
particular remedy essential to that right's protection, the Constitution may not only authorize but
compel the Court to give it effect. See also Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242 (1979) (victims of
constitutional wrongs, without other effective redress, "must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction
of the courts for the protection of their justiciable constitutional rights"). Here, however, I argue that
the grant of federal question jurisdiction also embraces power to recognize certain remedial
limitations.
345. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 408
n.8 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); cf Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions,
Roots and Prospects, 1979 WAsH. U.L.Q. 817, 818 (1979) (problem of judicial legitimacy associated
with creation of new rights, not new remedies). Given Justice Harlan's emphatic limitation of this
principle to "traditional" remedies (not necessarily including "special prophylactic" remedies such as
the exclusionary rule), it is unclear whether he would regard an action against a government for
monetary relief as traditional, where consent had not been given. See also Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367, 374 (1983) (court may "choose among available judicial remedies" to vindicate federal right);
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (where federal rights invaded, courts will adjust remedies to
grant necessary relief). Those who argue that the implication of damage actions under the Constitu-
tion is constitutionally required might question whether the Court's authority to recognize such causes
of action in any way supports authority to recognize a nonconstitutional doctrine of state sovereign
immunity. But while Bivens claims are clearly constitutionally inspired, recent cases seem to suggest
that they are not constitutionally required, at least in the sense that Congress' provision of alternative
remedies may counsel against judicial recognition of damage actions. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462
U.S. 367 (1983) (declining to recognize constitutional cause of action for federal employee in light of
statutory remedies); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988) (same for public benefits recipi-
ents). Thus, implied constitutional rights of action appear to be somewhat closer to federal common
law than to the kind of constitutional law on which congressional action would not be expected to
have a significant impact. Moreover, even if Bivens claims are regarded as constitutionally required,
this has not prevented the Court from articulating nonconstitutional doctrines of official immunity
which frequently foreclose recovery on the Bivens claim. This suggests that the Court has some
power, even where a remedy might be regarded as constitutionally required, to limit the circumstances
in which it will be made available in order to serve other goals. See supra notes 339-40.
346. G. CALABRESI, supra note 203, at 215 n.30; see also Bator, The State Courts and Federal
Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 605, 622 n.49 (1981) (importance of back-
ground understandings in statutory interpretation); Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 543, 548-50 (1985) (inevitability of discretion in exercise of jurisdiction guided by traditions
of equity). This is not to say that federal question jurisdictional statutes are limited by the particular
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The federal courts' power to determine appropriate remedies for gov-
ernmental wrongdoing for cases within their jurisdiction can be and has
been exercised in developing the federal common law of state sovereign
immunity. 4  As a common law doctrine, it can be modified by federal
courts acting under a jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and Con-
gress, and should be modified where essential to protect specific federal
interests or rights. 48 I The courts' determination of what remedies are es-
sential may change based on legislative action or the development of reme-
dies in state courts.349 But if the federal courts are to function as an effec-
remedies existing at the time of their enactment, an understanding that would be inconsistent with
their intentionally broad grant of decisionmaking power.
Although some have argued that the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982), should be
read to restrict federal common law, see, e.g., Merrill, supra note 344, at 27-32, the language of the
act, which requires use of the "laws of the several states" only "in cases where they apply," can be
read to exclude those cases in which a federal common law rule applies. See M. REDISH, supra note
174, at 81; Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1128, 1168 n.194
(1986); see also DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 159-60 n.12 (1980)
(reading Rules of Decision Act to contemplate exception for federal common law).
347. In Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979), the Court held that the state of Nevada could be
sued without its consent in California state courts on a state tort claim. Much of what the Court said
in that case about the nonconstitutional nature of state sovereign immunity is consistent with the view
that there is no constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity that should limit the remedies
available against states in federal courts for violations of federal law. Yet, if a federal common law of
state sovereign immunity were to survive the disavowal of the supposed constitutional basis for the
doctrine, why would that federal common law doctrine not compel the state of California to recognize
Nevada's claim of immunity?
One possibility is that Nevada v. Hall was wrongly decided, and that, except where necessary to
vindicate a more important federal constitutional or statutory requirement, the presumptive federal
interest in permitting states to control the development of remedies in their own courts for state
wrongdoing is sufficiently weighty that states should not exercise jurisdiction to award accrued mone-
tary relief against sister states without their consent or congressional authorization. Vindication of this
interest in state autonomy, however, can be achieved only at the expense of the autonomous decision of
a sister state seeking to exercise jurisdiction over another. Another possibility is that Nevada v. Hall
is not inconsistent with the federal common law of immunity, because such immunities may apply
only to claims arising under federal law (and possibly admiralty claims). There may be no federal
interest in departing from a nondiscriminatory state law denying sovereign immunity on a claim aris-
ing only under state law and in state courts. But see id. at 424 n.24 (in some circumstances full faith
and credit clause might require recognition of another state's immunity).
Even as to federal claims, a state may enjoy a federal common law immunity in federal court that it
does not enjoy in state court. This form of federal common law need not preclude the development of
alternative remedial schemes within the state judicial systems. See infra notes 349, 394. How this
view would apply where a state forum seeks to hold another state liable on a federal claim may raise
some additional concerns. However, states would be restrained from unfairly applying such remedies
to sister states by both the possibility of retaliation (which states do not enjoy in their relations with
the federal government) and the requirement of nondiscrimination that Nevada v. Hall embraces. For
a different view of Nevada v. Hall, see Simson, The Role of History in Constitutional Interpretation:
A Case Study, in POWER & POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF EUGENE VICTOR
RosTow, 211, 217-20 (M. McDougal & W. Reisman eds. 1985) (Eleventh Amendment should be
construed to prohibit suits against state in another state's court on state law claim).
348. Notwithstanding his view that the availability vel non of a particular remedy presents ques-
tions of legitimacy when decided by the Court and not by Congress, Professor Merrill has argued that
judicial development of remedies for conduct in violation of federal law, where other remedies are
inadequate, is justifiable as "preemptive lawmaking"-that is, as law-making necessary to protect a
clearly specified federal interest or right. Merrill, supra note 344, at 51.
349. Cf id. (necessity of remedy for constitutional violation turns in part on adequacy of remedies
created under state law and remedies provided by Congress); Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitu-
tion: Institutional Remedies and Judicial Discretion, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 692-97 (1982) (Court's
exercise of discretion in imposing detailed affirmative decrees in institutional litigation is illegitimate,
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tive third branch of the national government, they must, as to cases within
their jurisdiction, have the power not only to limit the availability of cer-
tain remedies, but also to grant remedies essential to avoiding defeat of the
right found to exist.350
except where other branches or levels of government default in their responsibilities). The proposition
that federal common law, conceived of in post-Erie terms, is uniformly applicable in both state and
federal courts, is widely assumed. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 405 (1964); see Meltzer, supra note 346 (because "independent and
adequate state ground" doctrine is form of federal common law, it should apply to states and control
procedure for deciding federal questions in state courts); Merrill, supra note 344, at 57-58 (distin-
guishing between forms of federal common law that can and cannot be changed by Congress, but
assuming that federal common law is applicable in state as well as federal courts). An evident ques-
tion is whether the federal common law of state sovereign immunity is applicable in state as well as
federal courts. This question has two aspects: First, must any remedy normally available in federal
district court against state wrongdoing be available in state court as well? Second, if a remedy is
normally unavailable in federal court, can the state rely on that federal common law immunity to
protect itself from relief in state court?
Two arguments support the proposition that the content of the federal common law of remedies
may be complementary to state court remedies for state misconduct rather than binding upon state
courts in such litigation. First, if the power to develop a federal common law of stati sovereign immu-
nity flows, at least in part, from the conferral of the judicial power itself, one can conceive of the
remedial rules established thereunder as an elaboration of the form in which that federal judicial
power will, and will not, ordinarily be exercised. If so, this form of federal common law would bind
other federal courts but not necessarily state courts. See Merrill, supra note 344, at 13-14 n.53; cf-
Monaghan, supra note 319, at 18 n.25 (implying, although critically, that if grant of judicial power is
basis for federal common law, it would not bind state courts). Second, if the remedial requirements of
federal law are determined by an inquiry bounded by the need for a federal court to provide a partic-
ular remedy-a need determined in light of other available remedies-then the federal common law
remedies may be understood to complement remedies available in state courts. Cf Amar, supra note
1, at 1518-19 (existence of federal and state sovereignties can protect individual freedoms by provid-
ing complementary remedies for governmental wrongdoing).
On the other hand, where state courts have ordinary remedial authority and jurisdiction, for exam-
ple, to issue injunctions against state officers on state law grounds, principles of nondiscrimination
would preclude their denying such relief on federal grounds. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); see
generally Hill, supra note 304. Thus, in state courts with broad general jurisdiction, federal remedies
against official wrongdoing by state or local governments will also be available in state courts. Yet the
availability of relief in a federal forum might caution against an overly liberal interpretation of what,
absent clear discrimination based on the federal character of the claim, the state court's "ordinary
jurisdiction" would include. Cf Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900 (1949)
(state sovereign immunity adequate ground for state court's denial of federal claim for injunctive
relief); infra note 480.
Even if the federal common law of remedies does compel state courts to meet minimal federal
standards of remedial efficacy, the federal common law of immunity should not preclude state courts
from granting more protection to federal rights than is available in a federal court. Where the alleged
violators of the federal right are state officials, it is doubtful that any substantial federal interest would
be injured by a state court providing "too much" remedy for the federal right (although with respect
to statutory rights, additional remedies may be preempted). Cf Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal
Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1212, 1248-50 (1978) (no federal
interest harmed in state courts' more expansive interpretation of federal constitutional rights). Thus,
states are free to develop supplementary state remedies for violations of federal rights, especially con-
stitutional rights. The federal common law of state sovereign immunity, like other federal doctrines of
abstention, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), or comity, e.g., Fair Assessment In Real
Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), need foreclose relief only in the lower federal courts.
Cf Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong, 19 GA. L. REv. 1097, 1121-32 (1985) (viewing absten-
tion as form of federal common law).
350. See supra notes 342-44; cf. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 342, at 1229-32, 1317-21 (gen-
erally supporting judicial lawmaking to provide remedies to vindicate individual rights and to enhance
accountability of government entities, but suggesting that most judicially created remedies for review
of administrative programs are federal common law that Congress can displace).
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As has been true in the development of other areas of federal common
law,351 the Constitution is by no means irrelevant to the content of the
federal law of sovereign immunity. The federal common law of sovereign
immunity is shaped not only by common law and public international law
traditions, but also, as it applies to the United States government, by the
constitutional allocation and separation of powers among the three
branches of government. As applied to the states, the federal common law
of sovereign immunity has been influenced not only by the shape the doc-
trine took with respect to the federal government, but also by the per-
ceived value in retaining a role for state courts in the vindication of federal
rights.
C. The Content of the Federal Common Law of Sovereign Immunity:
Rationalizing Remedial Preferences
Although sovereign immunity, understood as a common law doctrine, is
not an absolute bar to a radical shift in the existing remedial preferences,
respect for the case-by-case method of adjudication and for the value of
reasoning from precedent in promoting judicial legitimacy supports some
effort to seek rational explanations for the present doctrinal configura-
tion.3 52 In this section, I make such an effort with respect to the much-
criticized distinction drawn in Edelman v. Jordan between prospective
injunctive relief, which can be issued against state officers, and retroactive
monetary relief against the state treasury, which cannot be issued.353 This
351. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) (under federal
common law act-of-state doctrine, with its "constitutional underpinnings," state courts must give effect
to foreign expropriation decree, without regard to validity of expropriation under controlling princi-
ples of international law).
352. Such an effort is also warranted by the disinclination to correct the presently erroneous con-
stitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity that may result from a fear that such a correction
would result in the substantial and immediate reallocation of judicial business from state to federal
courts by judicial fiat. See infra text accompanying notes 467-68 (discussing Powell and Scalia opin-
ions in Welch); cf. Merrill, supra note 344, at 69-70 (emphasizing importance and legitimacy of
relying on precedent in constitutional adjudication under "delegated law-making" provisions such as
Bill of Rights); Schrock & Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91 HARV. L.
REv. 1117, 1132 (1978) (common law adjudication not "experimental" but confined through "pre-
sumptive adherence to precedent and commitment to a course of principled development").
353. See, e.g., Burnham, supra note 251, at 74; Currie, supra note 122, at 160-61; Lichtenstein,
Retroactive Relief in the Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip Through The Twilight
Zone, 32 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 364 (1982). The distinction, insofar as it purports to distinguish
those cases that are and are not against a state under the Eleventh Amendment, has been criticized on
numerous grounds. First, it is unsupported by the language of the Eleventh Amendment, which does
not distinguish between legal and equitable relief. Second, prospective relief requiring future pay-
ments can burden the state as much as past due monetary awards. Third, the Edelman distinction is
unclear whether it is the compensatory purpose of the relief that is to be condemned (which might
permit, for example, punitive monetary awards against the state) or whether it is any order to pay
funds that is problematic (in which event prospective injunctive relief, for example to comply with
federal welfare regulations, would be troublesome, although states do have the theoretical option not
to participate). If both elements are required to render the relief prohibited, why does the conjunction
of compensation and monetary awards make those cases "against a state" more than others? Finally,
some have criticized the distinction on the ground that the dividing line between the two forms of
relief is difficult to draw and has not been drawn consistently by the Court. Compare Milliken v.
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distinction draws support from legislative primacy over the taxing and
spending powers and from a corresponding reversal of the remedial hier-
archy in the vindication of public rights.
One of the mysteries of sovereign immunity law is its ambivalence to-
wards the remedial hierarchy-that is, the preferred remedies for govern-
mental misconduct.354 In private litigation, the history of equitable reme-
dies as supplementary to the monetary remedies of the common law courts
persists in the general requirement for injunctive relief that the movant
demonstrate irreparable injury that cannot be adequately redressed by
remedies at law. 55 Indeed, in common law actions against government
officials for official wrongdoing damages were once permitted far more
freely than they are today. 8' However, in litigation seeking a monetary
award directly against state or federal treasuries, that remedy is usually
unavailable unless expressly provided for by explicit legislative consent.
357
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (upholding order directing state to fund one-half of locality's expendi-
tures to provide remedial education) with Edelman, 415 U.S. 651 (reversing order that state remit to
plaintiffs welfare benefits wrongfully withheld).
In contrast, under a federal common law approach we need no longer be concerned about precisely
which entity the relief is against on federal claims; a broader range of concerns can be considered,
including common law traditions, perceived judicial competence in providing different forms of relief,
ease of execution, advantages of different types of remedies in light of contemporary experience, and
legislative guidance. Indeed, the Court's new constitutional balancing approach, see supra text accom-
panying notes 216-17, though framed in terms of a constitutional theory of immunity, might lend
itself to the more flexible, policy-oriented inquiry of the federal common law approach advocated here.
354. See also Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 42- 47 (1979) (exploring
ambivalence towards damage remedies against individual officers). Where relief is sought against a
nonconstitutional sovereign, the Court's apparent ambivalence as to the preferred remedy is even more
marked, with the Court at times seeming to prefer damages instead of injunctions against local gov-
ernments. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (damages liability against city
whose attorney had authorized illegal search); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983)
(denying plaintiff standing to seek injunctive relief against police "chokehold" practice of which he
had been victim, though permitting claim for damages to proceed); Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 662 (1980) (damages against city notwithstanding good faith immunity of officers); ef. Scalia,
Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: Some Conclusions
From the Public Lands Cases, 68 MICH. L. REv. 867, 909-20 (1970) (sovereign immunity cases not
consistent outside of discrete historical groupings).
355. See generally 0. Fiss, supra note 298 (arguing against "irreparable injury" requirement as
one that improperly subordinates injunction to other forms of relief and obscures its major role in
vindication of civil rights).
356. Engdahl, supra note 17, at 15-21; see HART & WECHSLER 3D ED., supra note 157, at
1091-95 (until recently, basic judicial remedy for governmental wrongdoing was damage action
against individual officer); cf. HART & WECHSLER 2D ED., supra note 141, at 1377-85 (discussing
mandamus). Until the modern development and expansion of protective doctrines of qualified immu-
nity, government officials sued on certain common law causes of action were treated as having the
same liability to the plaintiff as would any private individual, unless the official was legally author-
ized to take the challenged action. Compare Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (no
official immunity for damage caused by good faith obedience to President's order not authorized by
statute) and Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851) (army officer cannot defend tres-
pass action for wrongful seizure of plaintiff's property by showing that seizure was ordered by supe-
rior officer) with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (strong governmental interest in protect-
ing officers from suits requires immunity even where lack of subjective good faith alleged) and Barr v.
Mateo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (to permit performance of government function, absolute immunity re-
quired for officers sued for libel).
357. See, e.g., Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986); McMahon v. United States,
342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951); Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 341 (1879); HART & WECHS-
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By contrast, injunctions to restrain conduct by state or federal officials in
breach of federal law have often issued without explicit waiver of
immunity. 8'
Why are courts willing, absent explicit legislative direction, to issue in-
junctive decrees but not monetary relief against the political branches of
federal or state governments? 59 Are there reasons, apart from constitu-
tional misunderstandings and adherence to tradition, that support this dis-
tinction? Why are actions for accrued monetary relief "the core area" of
the sovereign immunity doctrine?36
It is pure fiction to presume that prospective decrees do not impose
significant burdens and demands on public treasuries. 6 ' Yet for public
law claims, there are important differences in the way injunctive and pure
monetary relief vindicate noneconomic political values, affect the discre-
tion of the other branches in exercising their constitutional powers, and
put the Court into potential confrontation with other agencies of govern-
LER 3D ED., supra note 157, at 1110. Although this element of the remedial preferences of public law
is strong, it is neither absolutely nor consistently applied. Compare Osborn v. Bank of United States,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (suit to recover funds seized from plaintiff bank) and Atchison T. &
S.F. Ry. v. O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280, 287 (1912) (suit against state officer in federal circuit court to
recover taxes paid under duress) with Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900) (suit against treasurer for
recovery of tax barred by Eleventh Amendment). But see Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47,
50-51 (1944) (attempting to reconcile Reeves and O'Connor on ground that O'Connor was action
against officer individually, even though in both cases state law provided for action and for use of state
funds to make repayment). In suits against federal officers, moreover, mandamus relief to compel tax
refunds or credits has been available, in limited circumstances, despite its obvious impact on the trea-
sury. See Vishnevsky v. United States, 581 F.2d 1249, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1978) (collecting cases).
358. The principle of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), permits injunctive relief to restrain
unconstitutional action not only by state but by federal officials as well. See Philadelphia Co. v. Stim-
son, 223 U.S. 605, 619-21 (1912). Federal injunctions against state officials have been issued in many
different areas, ranging from ballot access and reapportionment cases, see, e.g., Anderson v. Cele-
brezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), to desegregation and prison
reform, see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
Injunctive relief will not necessarily avoid a sovereign immunity bar, however, especially where the
government has expressly provided a limited monetary remedy and no claim of constitutional or fed-
eral statutory violation is made. See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682,
703 n. 27 (1949) (denying relief against federal contracting officer, although Court of Claims can give
monetary relief); Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962) (ejectment action against federal official);
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963) (action to restrain impoundment of waters). Larson, a much
criticized opinion that revised the standards for when sovereign immunity would bar nonmonetary
relief against officers, demonstrates the ambivalence of any preference even for injunctive relief. See
infra note 463.
359. See HART & WECHSLER 3d ed., supra note 157, at 1181 (treating Ex parte Young as recog-
nition of implied federal cause of action for equitable relief under Fourteenth Amendment). For an
attempt at historical justification, see Nowak, supra note 1, at 1455-60.
360. Tribe, supra note 1, at 687. Part of the reason for the importance of injunctive remedies in
vindicating rights against sovereigns under general jurisdictional statutes may be deference to a misun-
derstood common law tradition. See Jaffe, supra note 321. Those first charged with interpreting the
Constitution gave meaning to constitutional rights through those remedies most familiar and comforta-
ble. Understanding state sovereign immunity as a common law, not constitutional, rule does not mean
that remedial traditions will or should ipsofacto be abandoned because, as shown below, other factors
might support federal common law retention of those traditions. See also infra note 363.
361. See supra note 353. Even in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), where the
power of mandamus over an officer of the executive branch was upheld, the mandamus-had it been
issued-might well have imposed financial consequences, in the form of Marbury's salary as a judge,
on the public treasury.
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ment. These features, discussed below, may distinguish retroactive mone-
tary relief from other forms of relief, especially the nonstructural prospec-
tive injunction, and justify retention of these remedial distinctions," 2 at
least in part, under a new federal common law regime of state sovereign
immunity. 363
1. Appearance of Public Benefit From Exercise of Judicial Power
against Other Branches of Government
Monetary awards for past wrongs to an injured citizen represent a di-
rect transfer of public resources to a single individual or group of individ-
uals. Where these resources are awarded as compensatory damages, the
public has no control over the ultimate use of the transferred funds."
Prospective injunctions, by requiring future compliance with law, can be
seen to benefit the entire citizenry more directly." 5 Delivery of the com-
362. My references to a remedial hierarchy should not be taken to imply that remedies for public
wrongs are preferred by federal courts in a clear, descending order. In addition to the ambivalence of
the presumptions for or against providing monetary or simple injunctive relief, structural injunctions
imposing detailed affirmative obligations are often skeptically viewed when compared to monetary, or
prohibitory injunctive relief. See P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 150-71 (1983); Fletcher, supra
note 349, at 635. These concerns are usually not expressed under the rubric of sovereign immunity
but rather in terms of a lack of judicial competence to make a clearly correct choice of decree (and to
implement decrees once entered) and the intrusion of the remedy into the competence of other
branches. See, e.g., D. HORowiTz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 265 (1977) (courts lack ability
to respond to consequential facts resulting from decrees for broad social change).
363. It is not my argument that the present remedial hierarchy has necessarily resulted from the
values and concerns discussed in text. Indeed, many of the peculiarities of sovereign immunity law and
the law of remedies for governmental wrongdoing result from a history that relates to these values
only accidentally. See, e.g., I F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 324, at 516-17 (sovereign
immunity in England was historical accident, resulting from pyramidal structure of feudal courts, not
from inherent concept of sovereignty); Hill, supra note 304, at 1129 (injunctions to enforce federal
rights against government officers became more broadly available than damage actions because of
pleading differences between pre-merger equity and law practice that made it easier in initial plead-
ing to show presence of federal question on equity side). Rather, it is my argument that some elements
of the functional hierarchy of remedies can be justified today without reference to an Article III
principle of constitutional sovereign immunity.
364. This is not to say that Edelman itself was correctly decided as a matter of federal common
law or as a matter of statutory interpretation. Requiring payment of past-due welfare benefits may
differ significantly from awards of compensatory damages, since the public, through its representa-
tives, had already decided that the welfare benefits should go to persons so situated and in amounts
relatively predetermined. But cf. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666 n.11 (no assurance award would meet
Congress' goal).
365. See Whitman, supra note 354, at 48-52. Whitman argues that equitable relief is superior to
damages in its capacity to deter both specifically and generally-"to give a clear message," and at less
cost to the public end of controlling official behavior. Id. at 48. The relative efficacy of damage awards
against the government in achieving deterrence of wrongful conduct has been questioned. See Meltzer,
supra note 340, at 285; cf Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 363 (1984) (delay of awards against large firms hinders deterrence); Sugarman, Doing
Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555, 568-69 (1985) (noting incompetence of firms to reduce
liability exposure). But see P. SCHUCK, supra note 362, at 102-05, 147-48 (government liability
encourages appropriate levels of deterrence better than individual liability and with less intrusion than
injunctions on executive decisionmaking); cf. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 350, at 1297 (injunc-
tions may result in over-enforcement). My argument, however, does not entirely depend on which
type of remedy in fact best serves the public interest, but rather depends at least in part on the
premise that the appearance of a direct public benefit is important when an electorally unaccountable
judiciary imposes costs on politically accountable agencies of government without legislative guidance
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mission in Marbury v. Madison would have benefitted not only Marbury,
but also the public for whom he would have served as a judge. Desegrega-
tion decrees benefit not only the individual plaintiffs, but also other citi-
zens who may obtain access to integrated educational facilities. Even
structural injunctions directed at reorganizing institutions like prisons or
mental hospitals benefit the future occupants of those facilities in a way
that damages awarded to individual prisoners do not.3 66
In Milliken v. Bradley, 7 for example, a case frequently relied on to
demonstrate the incoherence of the distinction between retroactive and
prospective relief, the Court's injunctive order confers diffuse potential
benefits on an uncertain class of children and citizens. 8 ' Rejecting an
Eleventh Amendment challenge, the Court upheld an order directing the
state of Michigan to fund half of the costs of a remedial educational pro-
gram to assist black children in recovering from the effects of past de jure
segregation in Detroit. The children were not given a monetary award to
expend in accord with private preferences; rather, the order directed funds
to be dedicated to a specific public purpose. 69 In terms of public percep-
tion, providing remedial education to school children in Detroit may have
a better chance of producing good citizens and economically self-sufficient
members of the community than would the use of the same state money to
pay compensatory relief directly to the children.
Because of the potential of forward-looking injunctions to affect larger
and less readily identified groups,37 0 such an injunction may foster a par-
as to remedial choice. This appearance can be better achieved by controlling the uses to which public
resources are put than by simply placing those resources at the disposal of private citizens making
autonomous economic decisions.
366. See generally Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1979) (structural reform as central mode of constitutional adjudication in
modem bureaucratic state). But cf. supra note 362. When relief is granted in possessory actions
concerning ownership of specific property, see Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947); United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882), the perceived public benefit may be no different in kind or degree from one
resulting from an award of monetary damages to a private plaintiff. To some extent, then, the percep-
tion of public benefit flows from the nature of the substantive right being vindicated, as well as from
the form of relief.
367. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
368. Professor Currie criticizes Milliken's effort to distinguish Edelman on the ground that, in
Milliken, the money the state was required to pay, for remedial purposes, did not go directly to the
plaintiffs. Currie, supra note 122, at 162. While this feature of Milliken may derive, not from the
relief's prospectivity, but rather from the relief's in-kind basis, the injunction characteristically pro-
vides in-kind relief, unlike the damage award which assesses a penalty for engaging in prohibited
conduct, but does not directly constrain the conduct. Distinctions based on the in-kind nature of the
relief may result in a more acceptable mode for the exercise of judicial remedial discretion in vindicat-
ing rights against state governments because of the perception that such relief achieves the desired
public purpose.
369. Cf. Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 262-63
(1979) (consistent with Eleventh Amendment, compensatory relief may be provided to individual vic-
tims of unlawful conduct so long as it is provided in-kind to restore plaintiffs to status quo ante).
370. But see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976). In these cases, the Court indicated its skepticism about awards of injunctive relief that would
benefit large and diffuse classes. For a trenchant critique of Lyons, see Fallon, OfJusticiability, Reme-
dies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1984);
[Vol. 98: 1
State Sovereign Immunity
ticipatory and active citizenry and polity better than awards of compensa-
tory damages. It may thus be seen as a more justifiable judicial demand
on state treasuries than one that will be seen in the short run (and per-
haps long run) to benefit only an individual claimant or a class of claim-
ants whose entitlement to share in the award is determined by their past
acts.3
7 1
2. Affirmation of Public Rights as Fundamental
Federal courts function not merely to resolve disputes but to articulate
and give effect to fundamental constitutional values.31 2 Monetary awards
for past wrongs may be taken to imply that the rights violated can and
should be monetized. 73 For rights relating to the ownership and distribu-
tion of property this assumption seems to be embodied in the constitu-
tional command against the "taking" of property without payment of
compensation.37 4 Setting a value on a piece of land, even if it is land with
which the owner does not wish to part, does not necessarily diminish the
right of the owner vis-a-vis the government. On the other hand, setting a
value on the loss of the right to vote, or to speak freely, or to be free from
governmentally sanctioned race discrimination, may depreciate the value
of those rights which, for purposes of defining the kind of community to
which we aspire, we may want to regard as invaluable.37 5 Particularly for
see also infra note 377.
371. It is true that we all may benefit from the perception that justice has been done when an
individual who suffers economic losses through government misconduct is compensated. The wide-
spread recognition of this interest has resulted in legislation providing monetary remedies for persons
who suffer certain injuries from government conduct. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982); see also P. SCHUCK, supra note 362 (arguing for increased reliance on
government damage liability to achieve better compensation). But when a federal court confronts a
remedial decision concerning government wrongdoing under a general jurisdictional statute, it must
act under a dual obligation to do individual justice and to provide a remedy that is consistent with the
public interest and the allocation of functions to the other branches. See infra text accompanying notes
378-86. In the absence of specific legislative direction, awarding a remedy that spreads benefits across
an uncertain portion of the citizenry may enhance public support of the order and thus strengthen the
legitimacy of the judicial choice of remedies.
372. For discussion of the role of courts in public law litigation involving such public values, see
Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Monaghan,
supra note 278; Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 663 (1977); see also Fiss, supra note 366, at 29 (taking position that "courts exist to give
meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes"); Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L.
REV. 585 (1983) (emphasizing federal courts' role in articulation of values).
373. Cf Abel, A Critique of American Tort Law, 8 BRITISH J.L. & Soc'y 199, 207 (1981)
(criticizing reliance on dollar awards as reinforcing commodification of human values and relation-
ships). But Cf. P. SCHUCK, supra note 362, at 149 (although monetary relief may devalue rights, it
should nevertheless be available for compensatory and deterrent purposes); Whitman, supra note 354,
at 52-53 (damage awards serve purpose of condemning wrongdoing and affirming importance of
rights involved). However, as Whitman later seems to argue, the affirmatory and condemnatory pur-
poses of adjudication can in many cases be better served through injunctive or declaratory relief. Id.
374. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
375. Professor Amar, in arguing that the Constitution requires "full remedies" for vindication of
constitutional violations, distinguishes constitutional rights from common law rights to be free from
tortious harm, suggesting that for the former compensatory relief is more important than for the
latter. Amar, supra note 1, at 1491 n.262. To the extent that the Constitution protects rights that are,
1988]
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rights relating to participation in a polity and to the dignitary relation-
ships between citizen and government, then, injunctive relief to stop the
wrong should be preferred." 6
Of course, this does not explain why courts are often not willing to give
a monetary remedy against the government when equitable relief is not
available. It only suggests that for certain kinds of violations of right,
there are strong reasons to prefer the injunctive remedy.3" As I shall ar-
gue, however, that preference and the unwillingness to make available a
monetary remedy against the sovereign are also supported by elements of
the constitutional allocation of power.
3. The Power to Tax And Spend
The Constitution explicitly empowers Congress to "pay the Debts" of
the United States and prohibits the expenditure of funds from the treasury
except "in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law. '378 The impor-
tance of the congressional role in controlling government resources is em-
phasized not only by those provisions, but also by the requirements that
all bills for raising revenue originate in the House and that Congress
make the rules governing disposition of government property.
37 9
in some sense, "valueless" or "priceless," however, the choice of remedies does not necessarily follow
from the importance of the rights. See also Whitman, supra note 354, at 53-56 (questioning commit-
ment to compensation as important goal of constitutional tort litigation); cf Leval, The No-Money,
No-Fault Libel Suit: Keeping Sullivan in its Proper Place, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1287, 1292 (1988)
(money award unnecessary to vindicate libel victim's reputational interests). It may be far more im-
portant for the victim of a major car accident involving, for example, a postal employee, to receive
compensatory relief than for the victim of a violation of First Amendment rights. For the latter,
redress through injunctive relief to cut short the period of violation is the primary concern, and the use
of damages may be significant for punishment and general deterrence. Relying on damages to achieve
these purposes, however, may undesirably suggest that the rights in question can be monetarily valued
and thus "balanced" against other governmental interests.
376. See White, Forgotten Points in the "Exclusionary Rule" Debate, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1273,
1278 n.21 (1983) (private law preference for damage remedy over specific relief should not apply
where one party is government and other party is individual with noneconomic constitutional rights of
liberty or property against it; here damages would be "a kind of forced exchange . . . incompatible
with the idea of a right specifically against the government."). But cf Coleman & Kraus, Rethinking
the Theory of Legal Rights, 95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1357-61 (1986) (liability rules resulting in payment
of damages may but need not imply that underlying right was simply right to compensation; in some
cases compensation intended simply to redress injury, not to legitimate conduct).
377. In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the Court applied a restrictive view of
the scope of Article III standing, id. at 105, and rigorous application of the "irreparable injury"
requirement of equity, id. at 111-13, to bar injunctive relief against police use of chokeholds. To the
extent that Lyons' conclusion that plaintiff's remedy at law was adequate turned on the availability of
damages from both police officers and the city, state immunity from monetary relief, if retained under
a federal common law approach, might support broader availability of injunctions against comparable
misconduct. Yet given the Court's hostility to actions seeking injunctive relief against law enforcement
practices, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), there is little reason to hope results would differ.
Although not involving a sovereign government, Lyons is a disturbing decision in tension with my
view of the importance of injunctive relief in public law litigation. See supra note 370.
378. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
379. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1; id. at art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The importance of democratic
accountability for those responsible for imposing taxes is emphasized by the first cited provision. See
generally Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 715, 740 (1978) (Congress is
only federal body with institutional competence to make decisions concerning raising and allocating of
1988] State Sovereign Immunity
Judicial entry of judgments that can be satisfied only by additional ap-
propriations, while not prohibited by this delegation of power to the Con-
gress,38 does put pressure on this constitutionally primary role of the leg-
islature. Although prospective relief in structural reform litigation may
have the same practical effect, compliance with many prospective decrees
can be achieved with little or no need for additional immediate appropria-
tion. And in some cases involving sweeping affirmative decrees requiring
substantial additional expenditures, the legislative body in question, at
least in theory, has the option to comply with the decree by closing the
system.3"' Moreover, such forward-looking decrees may offer the govern-
public funds).
In this respect, state sovereign immunity may stand on a somewhat different footing than federal
sovereign immunity. Since Congress alone has power to make appropriations, the Court has held it
improper to issue a mandamus against a federal official to draw money from the Treasury absent an
appropriation. Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 271, 288-91 (1850) (no mandamus against
Secretary of Treasury to pay alleged debt where Congress has not appropriated funds); see also
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 321 (1976) (denying request for transcript; expenditure of
public funds only proper if authorized by Congress); compare Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 524 (1838) (allowing mandamus of Postmaster General to enter credits in payment of debt
where Congress by law had directed settlement of claim). The less explicit delegation to the President
to "take care that the laws" be faithfully executed has not been similarly interpreted as constraining
the jurisdiction of the Court. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); cf Nixon v. Fitzger-
ald, 457 U.S. 731, 754 (1982) (although President immune from private damages, at least where not
authorized by Congress, courts may exercise jurisdiction over President). Appropriations require ac-
tion by the entire Congress, moreover, while presidential action or inaction may be redressed through
orders to subordinate officers. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
But ef. Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867) (refusing to enjoin President and mili-
tary commander from executing allegedly unconstitutional law).
That a court may not compel the appropriation does not necessarily mean that the court lacks
power to issue a judgment. See supra notes 278-79; infra note 380. It does, however, suggest that
some constitutional basis exists for distinguishing between the court's adjudication of claims for mone-
tary relief against the federal government, at least when the judgment requires additional appropria-
tions, and claims for relief that can be satisfied without an additional appropriation. Whether these
constitutional provisions in fact justify a distinction between relief against the Treasury and relief
against executive branch action, that question with respect to the federal government can be more
reasonably regarded as one of constitutional law, or federal common law strongly influenced by the
Constitution, than can the same question with respect to states.
380. The history of the Court of Claims suggests that judicial entry of judgments for amounts not
yet appropriated is not unconstitutional, even though the Court may not be able to enforce its mone-
tary judgments. Until 1956, judgments of that court were presented to Congress annually, with appro-
priations made after judgments were entered. M. BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
CLAIMS, A 50-YEAR PERSPECTIVE, reprinted in 216 Ct. Cl. 85, 161 (1978). From 1956 to 1977,
Congress made a standing appropriation to satisfy judgments of the Court of Claims that were less
than $100,000; all other judgments had to be presented to Congress for further specific appropriations.
Id. Only in 1977 did Congress authorize a standing appropriation to be used to satisfy any judgment
of the Court of Claims. See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-26, 91 Stat.
96-97. As was noted in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 570-71 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality
opinion):
"A 1933 study found) only 15 instances in 70 years when Congress had refused to pay a judgment
[of the Court of Claims] . . . . This historical record . . . make[s] us doubt whether the capacity to
enforce a judgment is always indispensable to the exercise of judicial power."
Harlan thus concluded that the Court of Claims could "rely on the good faith of the United States,"
to "respond to its judgments," and could exercise the "judicial power" of the United States over claims
against the federal government. Id.
381. See Rhem v. Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir.
1974) (New York City ordered either to make improvements by specific date or to close notorious
"Tombs" jail; Rhem v. Malcolm, 432 F. Supp. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (noting that city closed jail in
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ment more flexibility in timing and in the ability to develop and allocate
resources than a decree for a money judgment, satisfiable only through a
monetary payment.
3 82
While the constitutional allocation to Congress of control over appro-
priations may support a remedial hierarchy disfavoring some forms of
monetary relief in cases involving the federal government, 83 no similarly
explicit constitutional allocation of functions operates with respect to state
governments and legislatures. Entirely different remedial rules might thus
be adopted. But while the Constitution does not allocate responsibility for
raising and spending the public funds of states to state legislatures, it does
assign them certain functions, thus contemplating their performance of an
late 1974; rejecting plan to reopen); cf. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (district court orders facility closed), rev'd in relevant part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d
Cir. 1979) (en banc); Rodriguez v. Jimenez, 409 F. Supp. 582 (D.P.R. 1976) (ordering "La
Princesa" jail closed but on schedule coinciding with planned opening of new facility), affd, 551 F.2d
877 (1st Cir. 1977); see also Twelve John Does v. District of Columbia, 668 F. Supp. 20 (D.D.C.
1987) (describing series of court-ordered population limits resulting in regular releases of prisoners to
comply with court orders); Fletcher, supra note 349, at 650-51 nn.48, 50 (collecting cases where
prisons were ordered shut or release of prisoners threatened or ordered by courts). But see Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (court may order that public schools be reopened); Frug,
supra note 379, at 716 n.5, 743-57 (impossible to close down prisons, school systems, or mental
hospitals; district court's injunctive decrees thus equivalent to direct orders against state budget).
382. See Nowak, supra note 1, at 1445-46. There are important differences between structural
and nonstructural injunctions in both cost and intrusiveness. See P. SCHUCK, supra note 362, at
14-20; Dwyer, supra note 212, at 161-67. In comparing damages to the nonstructural injunction, the
threat to the legislative power to appropriate is more strongly posed by the former than the latter. In
comparing damages to structural injunctions, the relative intrusiveness on state finances is less clear
and would depend on such factors as the number of damage claimants, the amount of the claims, the
size of the institution being reformed, and the relative detail of the decree. Structural decrees also may
substantially limit both legislative and executive discretion to choose among alternatives for protecting
legal rights. See Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN.
L. REv. 661, 707-12 (1978); see also Fletcher, supra note 349, at 652 (court may use spectrum of
remedies for range of permissible ends). Nonetheless, in framing structural relief, courts have the
power to mitigate intrusion by permitting state participation in framing the terms of the order and in
postponing entry of relief to allow the state time to bring itself into compliance. In many of the cases
where extensive and costly decrees have been entered, this has occurred relatively late in litigation in
which the underlying question of constitutional violation had long since been adjudicated; in contrast,
a money judgment, once entered, becomes due. See e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D.
Ala. 1971), hearing on standards ordered, 334 F. Supp. 1341, enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 390,
affd, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (after finding constitutional violation, court gave defendants
three months to file and six months to implement curative plan; after nine months, court scheduled
hearing on failure to comply and, thirteen months after original judgment, entered detailed remedial
order). See generally P. SCHUCK, supra note 362, at 184-86, 189-96 (favoring use of affirmative
decrees only where other means plainly ineffective under "least restrictive remedy" principle).
383. See generally Abernathy, Sovereign Immunity in a Constitutional Government: The Federal
Employment Discrimination Cases, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 322, 354-57, 362-63 (1975); see
also Wolcher, supra note 66, at 247. Professor Abernathy argues persuasively that Article III does
not embody a rule of immunity for the federal government but requires that federal courts decide
federal questions within the jurisdiction conferred. Separation of powers concerns for the province of
other branches of the federal government could account for the courts declining to award relief in
some cases within their jurisdiction. The availability of monetary relief against the federal govern-
ment, he suggests, should turn on whether Congress has clearly appropriated and committed the
monies sought. It is not clear whether Abernathy would conclude that injunctive relief that would
require expenditure of unappropriated funds is barred. See also Frug, supra note 379, at 788-89
(arguing for judicial restraint in development of prospective remedies for unconstitutional conditions to
permit state executives and legislators time to develop plans-including funding element).
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integral role in the federal structure.'" Nonconstitutional principles of
comity 85 therefore may support a judicial presumption that remedial
preferences flowing, at the federal level, from the separation of powers
should be applied to the other constitutionally sovereign governments-the
states. 386
4. The Power to Enforce Judgments
Because of Congress' control over appropriations,387 some members of
the Supreme Court may have once believed that courts could not exercise
judicial power to enter judgments against the government because those
judgments could not be enforced.388 However, the availability of compul-
sive process to enforce judgments against the government has not been
found to be essential for the exercise of judicial power.389 Nonetheless,
judgments that can be complied with solely by executive officials may pose
384. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (time, place and manner of holding federal election for
senators and representatives "shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof. . ."); id. at
art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (state legislatures must consent to purchase by federal government of land for
erection of forts, etc.); id. at art. II, § 1 (each state to appoint, "in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct," presidential electors); id. at art. IV, § 3 (consent of state legislatures required to
form new state from part of existing one).
385. Comity involves the voluntary recognition of or deferral to the laws or processes of another
jurisdiction. It has been invoked not only to justify federal courts' abstention from deciding cases
within their jurisdiction concerning state misconduct, but also to explain judicial recognition of the
immunity of foreign sovereign governments from the jurisdiction of United States courts. See supra
text accompanying notes 313-14; see generally Wells, The Role of Comity in the Law of Federal
Courts, 60 N.C.L. REv. 59 (1981).
386. See Abernathy, supra note 383, at 361 n.212; see also Shapiro, supra note 346, at 551-52
(abstention may appropriately serve interest of federalism and comity in actions for damages, as well
as in actions for equitable relief). Younger tied the doctrine of comity to interests in federalism, defin-
ing comity to mean:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made
up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways.
401 U.S. at 44. Although the Constitution does not allocate to state legislatures the same powers over
public resources that Congress is given, it nonetheless assumes some parallels between the two levels
of legislatures. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (electors of House to have same qualifications as electors
for most numerous branch of state legislature); id. at amend. XVII (same as to electors for Senate).
To the extent that the constitutional allocation of powers at the national level supports some elements
of the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, then, there is a basis for the courts' voluntary extension
of the doctrine to the states. Whether, under a federal common law approach, states should have more
protection from monetary awards than the federal government does, cf. supra note 357, might turn, in
part, on the availability and adequacy of state remedies.
387. For discussion of early congressional views, see W. CowE,, P. NICHOLS & M. BENNETT,
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMs: A HISTORY 5 (1978).
388. See draft opinion by Chief Judge Taney in Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561
(1864), published as an appendix in 117 U.S. 697, 702-03 (1886) (judicial power cannot be exercised
where executive certification and legislative appropriation needed to give effect to judgment); see also
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) (because judgment sought could not be executed,
case outside judicial power).
389. See supra notes 278-79, 380; see also Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102 148-51 (1974) (remedy available in Court of Claims for alleged "taking"); id. at 179-80 (Doug-
las, J., dissenting) (noting that requisite compensation might exceed $100,000 limit for judgments
payable by General Accounting Office without further appropriation from Congress).
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less risk of being unenforceable than judgments for fixed monetary relief,
which can only be effectuated if the executive and legislative branches act
together in meeting the court's decree.390
These concerns-as to the power of the court, standing alone, to enforce
its judgments against a government entity-are of significantly less weight
in litigation against a state than in litigation against the federal govern-
ment, because it is more likely that in the event of resistance the executive
arm of the federal government will support relief ordered against state
officials than against federal officials.""1 However, an order requiring
compliance by executive branch officials of the state government may
prove easier to enforce than one requiring a tax levy and expenditure by
the state's legislative body. 92
5. Remedial Hierarchy and Forum Allocation Revisited
Neither legislative control of appropriations, nor the relative ease of en-
forcing judgments directed solely against executive branch officials, nor the
values of rights affirmance and public benefit from remedial orders is suf-
ficient, standing alone, to justify all of the remedial distinctions drawn in
recent Eleventh Amendment cases. 93 Taken together, though, they plausi-
bly account for a preference against awarding accrued monetary liability
in litigation against a constitutional sovereign, and the consequent prefer-
390. Where state official defendants are directly ordered to provide funding for specific remedial
measures, see, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), concerns for the ease of enforcing
judgment may appropriately underlie judicial reluctance to grant relief either in the form of a mone-
tary judgment or in the form of a prospective decree requiring massive expenditures from state
treasuries.
391. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793) (Jay, C.J., concurring).
392. In major institutional cases, the necessary relief will often require legislative appropriations.
Enforcing obligations through contempt proceedings directed at a small group of executive officials,
however, may be more manageable than holding an entire legislative body in contempt. See Mobile
Co. Jail Inmates v. Purvis, 551 F. Supp. 92 (S.D. Ala. 1982) (civil contempt of $5,000 per day
entered against county officials who had authority and resources to allocate funds for short-term re-
dress of jail overcrowding but failed to do so), affd by order, 703 F.2d 580 (11th Cir. 1983); cf
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 (3rd Cir. 1982) (en banc) (state agency
and official held in civil contempt, with $10,000 per day fine, for failing to comply with order requir-
ing payment of costs of special master where official instigated state legislature to cut appropriations),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1984). But see Frug, supra note 379, at 792 (asserting that detailed
orders in structural reform cases are unenforceable because courts cannot "imprison" state executive
officials for failing to comply with decree or legislature for failing to appropriate funds). The con-
frontational potential of enforcement proceedings, then, only partially distinguishes damage awards
from massive structural relief that requires combined efforts of state executive and legislative officials.
393. For example, in actions disputing the right to specific property, whether there is a separation
of powers concern at all can be seen to rest on whether the property is the government's, thus render-
ing the question of immunity virtually identical to the question on the merits. See, e.g., Florida Dep't
of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 694-97 (1982) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see
also Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947). Adjudication of specific rights to property may not create a
perception of broad public benefit, but neither does it imply that the property rights involved are
merely compensation rules involving no a priori restraint on government action. See also supra note
364 (questioning application of preference against monetary relief in Edelman itself; infra text ac-
companying notes 447-48 (sketching alternative statutory analyses).
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ence, albeit an ambivalent one, in favor of prospective relief in the federal
common law of state sovereign immunity in federal courts.
Moreover, in evaluating these preferences, the remedial hierarchy's in-
teraction with the forum allocation principle must be considered. States
are not necessarily immune in every forum from damage actions or from
actions to recover wrongly withheld welfare benefits arising under federal
law. Those actions certainly may, and perhaps must, be entertained in the
first instance in state tribunals.3 94 Federal questions presented therein can
be reviewed by the Supreme Court. By funneling some federal claims for
relief to state tribunals, the forum allocation principle gives state courts
the initial opportunity to engage in factfinding concerning state actions
394. Where state courts are authorized to provide relief against the state under state law, they
cannot discriminate against a similar claim under federal law. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 283-84 n.7 (1980); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Wolcher, supra note 66, at 240-41.
Some go further, arguing that states have a constitutional obligation to provide remedies in state court
for constitutional violations that federal courts are constitutionally prohibited from providing, see id.
at 198-200; Taylor, supra note 290, and even where similar rights under state law are nonjusticiable,
see Gordon & Gross, supra note 158, at 1151. Under the analytical framework proposed in this
article, the question their argument presents is whether there are any remedies for violations of fed-
eral rights that a federal court should not give under the common law of state sovereign immunity, but
that a state court must provide.
Where the state court lacks jurisdiction to award monetary relief against the state in comparable
cases arising under state law, it is difficult to argue it must do so for federal claims except on the
ground that federal law itself requires that the monetary remedy against the state be provided. If
monetary relief is necessary to vindicate federal rights, however, the Supreme Court has several
choices: It could require that state courts provide the remedy in the exercise of its appellate power
over the state court systems and/or it could make that remedy available in federal district courts
(assuming no statutory bar). Choosing between these alternatives is not easy. Compare Sandalow,
supra note 130, at 206-07 (favoring presumption against requiring state courts to entertain federal
claims) with Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action in State Courts, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 311, 357 (1976) (arguing for contrary presumption). To note just one aspect of the inquiry:
Despite the advantages of the forum allocation rule discussed in text, forcing state courts to adjudicate
such claims poses federalism problems in its own right. Cf FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775
(1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (antithetical to federalism to require state administrative agency to
consider adopting federal regulation). Requiring state, rather than federal, judges to take the political
heat for ordering substantial state expenditures might be thought, in the long run, to undermine the
vitality of state courts as an independent judicial system capable of acting as a check on abuse of
government power. But in either event, it would be an exercise of the federal judicial power to make
the remedy available in federal district court or to require that state courts make available the remedy.
That the availability vel non of state remedies and procedures may interact dynamically with what
relief is available in federal district court is an accepted feature of federal jurisprudence in areas
ranging from habeas corpus, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), to taxes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982); infra note 480; see also Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100,
116-17 (1981) (noting availability of state court section 1983 action in dismissing federal damages suit
on grounds of comity); Althouse, supra note 212, at 1531-34 (states can "earn" autonomy from
federal jurisdiction by offering state fora in which federal claims can be presented, for example, in
ongoing enforcement proceedings under Younger doctrine). Under a similarly interactive approach,
whether monetary relief is available in federal district court against states may come to depend, in
part, on the adequacy of the remedies available in the state courts. Federal statutes may bear signifi-
cantly on both aspects of the question of which forum should provide the remedy. Cf. 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1988; 28 U.S.C. § 1341; Spencer v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 471 U.S. 82 (1985) (af-
firming, by evenly divided Court, state court's refusal to apply sections 1983 and 1988 in tax adjudi-
cation); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982) (federal relief under section 1983 not
dependent on exhaustion of state administrative remedies); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979)
(section 1983 did not overcome states' immunity from monetary relief in federal courts). See also infra
note 434.
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attacked as violating federal law; to adjudicate both substantive and reme-
dial claims of federal law; and to rectify violations of federal law with
appropriate regard for peculiar state and local interests, perhaps vindicat-
ing state law at the same time. Operating within the constraints of federal
appellate review of both merits and jurisdictional decisions," 5 the alloca-
tion of these federal claims to state courts affords an opportunity for state
judges to contribute to the development of substantive federal law, 96
thereby enhancing their awareness of the requirements and evolving needs
of federal law.39 7 Moreover, the forum allocation principle gives the state
courts an opportunity to pass on questions of state law that may relate to
the federal claim and to employ state procedures in doing so."' The allo-
cation thus may enhance the strength of state institutions of justice by
remitting citizens to those fora for some federal claims. At the same time,
it relieves federal courts of the burden of adjudicating the merits of such
claims, preserving their time for other forms of federal litigation.3 99
These justifications, however, would support abstention in favor of ini-
tial state court jurisdiction over every federal claim for relief, including
those for injunctions that are routinely granted in federal district courts,
and are plainly insufficient to describe or prescribe the federal common
395. See supra Part II().
396. Bator, supra note 229, at 1037 (allocating certain constitutional claims concerning state
power to state courts provides politically healthy opportunity for state courts to enforce federal consti-
tutional restrictions). It may be politically healthy to hear the voices of state court judges on issues of
affirmative federal right in order to enhance their involvement in the elaboration of federal rights; yet,
if those voices are systematically less sympathetic to the federal claim, implicit political purposes are
also served by the doctrine. The legitimacy of using jurisdictional techniques to achieve substantive
results is much debated. Compare id. at 1037 (legitimate for Congress to express concern about sub-
stantive constitutional matters through techniques of jurisdictional regulation) with Sager, supra note
229, at 74-77 (jurisdictional withdrawals motivated by desire to restrain enforcement of rights
impermissible).
397. See Redish, Supreme Court Review of State Court "Federal" Decision: A Study In Interac-
tive Federalism, 19 GA. L. REv. 861, 865, 902 (1985) (noting educational value for state courts of
Supreme Court review).
398. Thus, in Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945), the Court, in
concluding that the statute in which the state consented to suit did not contemplate suit in federal
court, noted that:
[Tihe advantage of having state courts pass initially upon questions which involve the state's
liability for tax refunds is illustrated by the instant case where petitioner sued in a federal
court for a refund only to urge on certiorari that the federal court erred in its interpretation of
the state law.
Id. at 470. See supra note 226 (discussing value of having state judiciaries elaborate content of state
law). If the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment were to require state court adjudication of any state
law issue that might be germane to a case against a state, then construing the amendment to permit
the exercise of federal jurisdiction in such cases, whether for equitable or legal relief, only on appeal
and not in any original federal action, might follow. But cf supra notes 141-143. In view of the
importance of the federal question jurisdiction, and of its availability in its original as well as appel-
late form in the constitutional scheme, see Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,
821 (1824), the inference of any such constraint is not warranted by an amendment directed at a
diversity-based head of jurisdiction.
399. See Shapiro, supra note 346, at 587-88 (discretion whether to exercise subject matter juris-
diction is undeniable feature of federal jurisdiction and is necessary, inter alia, to avoid overburdening
federal courts).
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law doctrine.4 " But the particular allocation of monetary claims against
states to state courts may be supportable for reasons beyond those set forth
above. First, the relative competence of federal and state trial benches
might support the present allocation of remedies in two different respects.
On the one hand, federal judges may be regarded as generally more com-
petent and more expert in adjudicating federal law, and thus more likely
to write clear and well-reasoned opinions that provide guidance for the
future.40 1 This skill is of considerable import where ongoing injunctive
relief is at stake. On the other hand, state trial court judges may be closer
to the competence of federal district court judges in the assessment and
review of damage determinations, since state court civil dockets are typi-
cally dominated by tort and commercial contract cases,40 2 in which dam-
ages would be the ordinary form of relief. Second, to the extent that a
monetary award against the public fisc entails a potential confrontation
with the politically accountable processes of tax appropriations, entry of
the judgment by a state court judge, carrying with it the support of at
least one branch of the state government itself, may decrease the potential
for noncompliance or hostility to federal authority. 03 Finally, this alloca-
400. Whether federal courts can properly abstain from hearing damage claims against states on a
principled basis that would not justify abstention in every other federal case challenging state action is
not easily answered. If the forum allocation effect of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence is recognized
and retained as a form of federal common law, it will have to be justified on terms distinct from
existing categories of abstention. Unlike Younger abstention, it cannot be justified by the desirability
of avoiding interference with pending or imminent state proceedings since the burden of initiation
would be on plaintiff. Unlike Pullman abstention, return to an original federal forum is not available,
nor has the allocation to state courts been limited to cases in which state law is uncertain and a
difficult constitutional question might be avoided. Moreover, the allocation of damage claims against
states to state courts has not been limited to settings where there are complex and established state
procedures for adjudication of the claims, as in abstention under Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315
(1943), though the tax and welfare rights cases might be so justified. And damage claims obviously
differ from the complex injunctive relief that the Rizzo and Lyons Court may have thought justified
equitable abstention in favor of state court adjudication. Finally, abstention has been traditionally
invoked only where there is an adequate state remedy. While I suggest that such a requirement might
well emerge from our revised understanding of state sovereign immunity, see supra note 394, it has
not been a clear part of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence to date.
401. Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARP. L. REV. 1105, 1121-23 (1977); see also R. Pos-
NER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 144 (1985) (noting widespread belief that federal
judges are better than state court judges); M. REDISH, supra note 174, at 2-3 (federal courts superior
to state courts for adjudication of federal rights because of greater expertise, independence, and
competence).
402. See D. TRUBEK, W. FELSTINER, J. GROSSMAN, H. KRrrzER & A. SARAT, CIVIL LITIGA-
TION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT 1-69--71 (1983) (civil dockets in five sampled state courts
were dominated either by tort or commercial contract cases, while public law and business regulation
cases, virtually nonexistent in state courts sampled, occupied significant portion of five sampled federal
court dockets); cf. R. POSNER, supra note 401, at 188 (state, rather than federal, courts should enforce
federal due process rights of fired employees because issues involved are comparable to contract cases
with which state courts are familiar); Whitman, supra note 354, at 37-38 (state court judges are
competent to determine damage claims against state officials under good faith immunity rules limiting
liability to violations of clearly established right). Even in the determination of damages, however,
some expertise in peculiarly federal damages rules may be required. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 253-67 (1978) (only nominal damages may be awarded to vindicate procedural due process
violations absent proof of actual injury).
403. Cf. Brown, supra note 1, at 391 (state court may be better able to balance competing inter-
ests). On the other hand, because state court judges function without federal constitutional guarantees
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tion maintains the ability of federal courts to stop ongoing violations of
federal law.
Countervailing arguments, of course, exist. Abstention serves to delay, if
not deny, ultimate federal judicial review of federal questions" 4 and to
defeat plaintiffs' choice of forum. It may also pose significant risks to the
ultimate vindication of federal rights and to the uniformity with which
they are enforced.405 Considerations of competence and expertise aside,
the ability and willingness of state court judges to protect nonmajoritarian
rights is likely, over time, to compare unfavorably with that of the tenure-
and salary-protected federal bench. 08 If sovereign immunity is not consti-
tutionally required, moreover, adherence to its remedial traditions in de-
nying an original federal forum for some damage claims might be thought
inconsistent with congressional provision of federal fora for the initial con-
sideration of affirmative federal question claims.4 7
A more basic question is: Why justify any theory of sovereign immu-
nity-a doctrine by which courts decline to grant certain remedies for gov-
ernmental wrongdoing that would be available against a private wrong-
of independence in either tenure or salary, see Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State
Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 1351-52 (1982), they may be particularly reluctant
to enter awards against the state fise that are either politically unpopular or so large as to have an
adverse impact on the states' ability to fund court operations and judicial salaries.
404. See generally Edwards, The Changing Notion of "Our Federalism", 26 WAYNE L. REV.
1015 (1987) (criticizing Pennzoil as unduly impairing ability to obtain federal ruling on federal is-
sues); cf. England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964) (appellate review inade-
quate substitute for initial federal adjudication, especially on issues of fact). Allocation of such claims
to state courts will mean that in most cases merits review of the federal issue by a federal court will
not occur, given the practical limitations on the Supreme Court's ability to review.
405. See supra note 403; infra note 406. For differing views on whether and when federal courts
should abstain from deciding cases within their jurisdiction, compare Shapiro, supra note 346 (neces-
sary for federal courts to exercise discretion on whether to decide cases on merits) with Redish, Ab-
stention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984)
(violates separation of powers for court to abstain from deciding case over which Congress conferred
jurisdiction). For other useful discussions, see Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1071 (1974); Field, The Abstention Doctrine To-
day, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 590 (1977); Wells, supra note 349.
406. Allocating state damage claims to state courts provides an opportunity for the avoidance of
the demands of federal law, a phenomenon likely to continue despite increased attention to and respect
for state judiciaries. State court judges' dependence on elections is a structural constraint on their
ability and willingness to protect nonmajoritarian rights of the sort that will frequently be at issue in
litigation for monetary relief against the state. See Neuborne, supra note 401; see also Solimine &
Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial
Parity, 10 HASTINGS L.Q. 213, 252 (1983) (lower federal courts more likely to uphold civil claims of
federal rights than state courts). But cf. Bator, supra note 346, at 632-33 (that federal courts are
more sympathetic to plaintiffs on constitutional claims does not mean that they are more correct on
constitutional principles).
407. See Redish, supra note 405. But cf. Wells, supra note 349 (court expanded scope of section
1983 beyond Congress' intent and thus does not interfere with congressional judgment when it re-
stricts jurisdiction over such claims). As Professor Shapiro has argued, however, exercise of a reasoned
discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction is an accepted and necessary feature of judicial power. See
Shapiro, supra note 346, at 577-88. Given background understandings of state sovereign immunity,
moreover, ascribing any specific intention to Congress in the enactment of federal question and civil
rights jurisdiction statutes is no easy matter. Cf Welch v. State Dep't of Highways, 107 S. Ct. 2941,
2957-58 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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doer? Why retain, in any degree, a doctrine that denies or defers full
public justice to victims of government malfeasance?
Sovereign immunity doctrines in actions against the United States have
the potential to serve as retaining walls to support the constitutional allo-
cation of control over taxes and expenditures to Congress, and to reconcile
that power with the role of the federal courts in enforcing constitutional
and federal statutory rights of individuals from wrongful government ac-
tion. To argue that courts should order full remedies under general juris-
dictional provisions for victims of governmental wrongdoing is to create
tension within the constitutional allocation where the particular remedy
requires appropriations. 0 8 In the absence of the countervailing and wide-
spread public good that may be achieved through many forms of prospec-
tive injunctive relief, judicial hesitancy to require payment of accrued
damages without clear support from the constitutionally accountable
branch may reflect sensitivity to the entire constitutional structure. As
noted above, comity or respect for state governments lends mild support to
a federal common law extension of those doctrines to claims against state
governments.4 °"
An additional reason to attempt to rationalize some elements of sover-
eign immunity doctrine is more pragmatic. Without some further indicia
that the judgments will be enforced, judicial reluctance to grant monetary
relief against constitutionally recognized sovereigns (domestic and foreign)
is deeply ingrained. Efforts to abolish a doctrinal basis for sovereign im-
munity, therefore, seem likely to result in the contraction of the substan-
tive definition of rights against government that are judicially protectable,
or the expansion of other discretionary doctrines of abstention, or both,
408. Professor Amar argues that, while the Constitution may originally have been understood by
some to require only partial remedies, this understanding was based on the belief that those remedies
would be adequate to vindicate an essentially prohibitory Constitution of negative rights; as our un-
derstanding of the Constitution has come to encompass more affirmative rights against the govern-
ment, the principle of partial relief must yield to provide the "full relief" requisite to the substantive
promise of the Constitution. Amar, supra note 1, at 1486-89. Neither argument, however, appears to
take account of the possible limitations on judicially designed remedies that may be implied from or
prudentially justified by constitutional allocations of specific powers to control government resources to
other branches of government. To put it another way, full judicial power to confine other branches to
action within the limits of the Constitution does not necessarily imply that all remedies for breach are
available or should be utilized.
409. Professor Fletcher has argued that the critical inquiry in resolving whether a state can be
sued in federal court should focus on the substantive scope of national power, rather than any limita-
tion of federal court's jurisdiction: If Congress has power under the particular constitutional clause
invoked to establish private causes of action against the state, then Congress also has power to provide
for federal jurisdiction to enforce those remedies. Fletcher, supra note 1, at 1107-27. Writing after
National League of Cities and before Garcia, Fletcher assumes that Congress' powers to impose such
financial liabilities on states may be limited by constitutional principles of state sovereignty. For the
present, however, the Court has largely eschewed efforts to develop substantive limitations on national
regulation of state affairs. Moreover, the Fletcher approach focuses primarily on congressional power.
Accepting that Congress' power to subject states to liabilities enforceable in federal courts is deter-
mined solely by the scope of the national legislative power, there will likely remain areas for judicial
interpretation and discretion in implementing such congressional schemes in which appropriate resort
may be had to the federal common law doctrines described above.
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again with adverse consequences on the courts' willingness to stand up to
other branches or levels of government when necessary to vindicate claims
of individual right. 1 ' These results seem less desirable than a frank rec-
ognition that some forms of relief on some federal claims, absent legisla-
tive direction, will not be available in the lower federal courts.
Thus, a rational common law development might retain some of the
functional aspects of the doctrine of state sovereign immunity, if it is un-
derstood, first, as a doctrine that limits only certain remedies, not all rem-
edies against the government; second, as a doctrine whose shape is deter-
mined in part by what remedies have been provided through the acts of
other levels or branches of government; and third, as a doctrine that can
yield where federal law, statutory or constitutional, clearly requires a par-
ticular remedy.'
V. TOWARDS THE FUTURE: CONGRESSIONAL ABROGATION,
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS AND STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
Understanding the immunity of the states as a federal common law
rather than a constitutional doctrine has important implications for two
open areas of this jurisprudence: Congress' power under Article I to sub-
ject states to private suits for monetary relief in federal court and the
power of federal courts, exercising general jurisdiction over federal ques-
tions, to award monetary relief against states on claims alleged to arise
directly from the Constitution. Under a federal common law approach,
both of these issues are resolved in favor of the constitutional power of the
courts and Congress.
Difficult interpretive issues remain. Revising our understanding of the
basis for state immunity to reflect its common law derivation would
change the focus of analysis in cases involving federal statutory rights,
such as Green v. Mansour, from abstract conjectures about state sover-
eignty to concrete examination of the remedial structure of the particular
statutory scheme and of the purposes served by allocating damage claims
410. See Nagel, supra note 382, at 714 & n.265 (court masks concern over remedies by uncon-
vincing and limited characterization of underlying violation); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 529-30 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (majority's rejection of "absolute immunity" for fed-
eral officers will either impair public officials' job performance or result in "a necessarily unprinci-
pled and erratic judicial 'screening' of claims ... an adherence to the form of law while departing
from its substance"); cf. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 557 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality
opinion) (Court of Claims given jurisdiction only to award damages; "far from serving as a restriction,
this limitation has allowed the court of claims a greater freedom than is enjoyed by other federal
courts to inquire into the legality of governmental action"); Fletcher, supra note 349, at 664 (in areas
where Court has reduced remedial discretion, it has been more willing to recognize constitutional
rights than it might have otherwise).
411. See infra note 466; cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implicitly rejecting "necessity" approach to implication of remedies
against federal officers).
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to state trial fora. The revised understanding will, however, have far less
impact on the basic structure of judicial federalism created by the Court's
prior decisions than adherents to the Hans view apparently believe.
A. Congress' Power to Render States Subject to Suit for Monetary Re-
lief in Federal District Courts
The issue that is likely to propel the next hard look at state sovereign
immunity is congressional abrogation: the scope of Congress' power to
create causes of action against states for monetary relief enforceable in
federal courts.412 In Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 1 3 the Court held that Congress,
acting under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, can subject states to
suits in federal court for monetary relief. The Fourteenth Amendment
could be taken to overcome or "limit" existing parts of the Constitution to
the extent necessary to achieve its purpose.414 The broad delegation of
power to Congress in section 5 sufficiently authorized that body to imple-
ment the Fourteenth Amendment through mechanisms "constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts," particularly since the Fourteenth
Amendment "by . . [its] terms embod[ies] limitations on state
authority.'
15
If the Eleventh Amendment and Article III are seen as constitutional
limitations on judicial power to entertain federal claims against states, the
412. Certiorari has been granted to review United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d
Cir. 1987), cert. granted sub nom., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988) (under
commerce clause Congress constitutionally abrogated states' immunity from damages on claims con-
cerning hazardous waste disposal). The question of Congress' power is significant in several other
areas of federal law in which Congress legislates under Article I powers. See, e.g., In re McVey
Trucking, 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 227 (1987) (Congress abrogated
state immunity on claims in federal bankruptcy proceedings); County of Monroe v. Florida, 678 F.2d
1124 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1104 (1982) (Congress may create cause of action against state
under its extradition power); Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1979) (immu-
nity abrogated on cause of action created under war powers clauses); Mills Music, Inc. v. Arizona,
591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (Congress abrogated state immunity by legislation pursuant to copy-
right clause).
413. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
414. "[T]he Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies...
are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." Id.
at 456. The Court relied on the rationale of Fitzpatrick in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978)
(upholding award of attorneys' fees against state under 42 U.S.C. § 1988), and in Maher v. Gagne,
448 U.S. 122 (1980) (allowing award of fees under section 1988 for statutory violations joined with
substantial constitutional claim under Fourteenth Amendment).
415. 427 U.S. at 456. That the Amendment limits state authority would seemingly support judi-
cial power to abrogate state immunity pursuant to section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, although
the emphasis placed on Congress' section 5 power prevents one from so concluding based on Fitzpat-
rick alone. That case may also be read impliedly to limit Congress' power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity to only those later-enacted portions of the Constitution specifically limiting
state authority. But even as so limited, to the extent that Congress is viewed as having any power to
"abrogate" a constitutional constraint on federal court jurisdiction, the decision would raise troubling
issues in defining limits on Congress' power to abrogate other constraints on the structure of national
government, for example, the rule allocating only two senators to each state. This difficulty contrib-
utes to the conclusion that state sovereign immunity should not be seen as embedded in the Eleventh
Amendment or Article III of the Constitution.
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decision in Fitzpatrick raises difficult questions about the power of Con-
gress, pursuant to its Article I powers, to abrogate state immunity from
suit in federal court.416 In several cases the Court has implied or assumed
that Congress does have such power. In Parden v. Terminal Railway,1 7
the Court held that states could be sued in district court under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (FELA) for injuries suffered by an employee of
a state-owned railroad. The opinion, however, could be read as resting
either upon the theory that the state waived its immunity by engaging in
the activity, 418 or alternatively upon the theory that states did not possess
constitutional immunity from suit imposed by Congress' exercise of its
enumerated powers under Article .49 Employees v. Department of Public
Health,420 decided nine years later, declined to find either constructive
consent or abrogation in a portion of the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) whose language applied to states at least as clearly as the statu-
tory language in Parden.421 The majority distinguished the "for profit"
state activity in Parden (running a railroad) from the "nonproprietary"
activity at issue in Employees (running a state hospital), without specify-
ing whether that difference went to Congress' power, the degree of clarity
with which Congress must speak, or the inference of state consent. 22 The
dispositive grounds for decision remained unclear, leaving uncertain on
what, if any, basis rested Congress' power to create causes of action en-
forceable in federal courts against states.' 23
The decision in Welch v. State Department of Highways424 did not re-
solve this confusion. The Court there held that the state of Texas could
416. It likewise raises questions concerning the power of courts to abrogate state immunity pursu-
ant to section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, absent expressed congressional abrogation. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 694 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court did not
rule on question).
417. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
418. Id. at 192, 194 n.11 (though state cannot be sued without consent, by choosing to operate
interstate railroad after enactment of FELA state had "necessarily consented" to suit).
419. Id. at 191-92 (states surrendered immunity when they granted Congress power to regulate
commerce).
420. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
421. Id. at 282-83, 285 (FLSA definitions specifically included employees of state hospital, and
remedial section authorized suit against any employer; FELA provision in Parden covered "[elvery
common carrier"). The Court's discussion of the extent to which generally worded statutory provi-
sions would be regarded as embracing states was thus contrary to its treatment of the same issue in
Parden.
422. Id. at 284-87. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985) (impossibility of distinguishing traditionally governmental activities from others). The majority
in Employees also noted that Alabama's regulated activity in Parden was "isolated," but that the
instant regulations more generally applied to state employees. 411 U.S. at 285. A concurring opinion,
arguing that the Eleventh Amendment permitted federal district court adjudication only with the con-
sent of the state, distinguished Parden because in Employees, the federal law was passed after the
state began the regulated activity; the state could not be said voluntarily to have waived its immunity
by its continued operation of the hospitals. Id. at 287-98 (Marshall, J., concurring).
423. 411 U.S. at 282 ("The Parden case in final analysis turned on the question of waiver;"
question of waiver one of federal law because consent arose out of activity subject to federal
regulation).
424. 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987).
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not be sued in federal district court for injuries suffered by a state-
employed ferry boat worker, notwithstanding that the Jones Act author-
ized suit by "any seaman" against his employer for maritime injuries
under the remedial scheme established by the FELA. Justice Powell,
writing for a plurality of four, sought to reaffirm the correctness of Hans.
The Eleventh Amendment and "the fundamental principle of sovereign
immunity [which] limits the grant" of Article III power protect states
from suits in federal courts, whether the suits are brought by in-staters
and whether the suits sound in law, equity, or admiralty.425 Powell did
not fully articulate the application of those principles to congressional
power, however, for he assumed arguendo that Congress had the power to
abrogate that "fundamental principle" in the exercise of its Article I pow-
ers. 26 Under that important assumption, Powell concluded that, in the
general language of the Jones Act, Congress had not abrogated the immu-
nity in the requisite "unmistakably clear . . . language.421 7 Parden, to
the extent inconsistent with this rigorous "clear statement" requirement,
was overruled.428
With Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Stevens and Black-
mun, dissenting on the ground that the Eleventh Amendment was in-
425. Id. at 2945 (quoting from Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98
(1984)).
426. Id. at 2946-47. As the parties briefed the case, congressional power to abrogate was assumed
to exist and the case turned on what rules of construction should be used. Briefs for Petitioner and
Respondent, Welch v. State Dep't of Highways, 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (No. 85-1716).
427. Id. at 2944-45. Interestingly, Welch treats abrogation and consent as independent grounds
on which to ignore the supposedly constitutional bar of the Eleventh Amendment, just as the Court
did in Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), implying that congressional power to abrogate does not
also require a finding of state consent (apart from that given in the Constitution). For a helpful
analysis of these issues in earlier cases, see Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1212-26.
428. 107 S. Ct. at 2946-48. Powell's opinion purported to reserve the question whether the Jones
Act remedy applied to state-employed seamen. Id. at 2947 n.6. If it did, the state may be liable on
that federal cause of action in suit initiated in state court. Justice White's brief concurring opinion,
however, argued that the issue of substantive coverage was decided in Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri
Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959). 107 S. Ct. at 2957 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's
position, together with the views expressed by the four dissenters, id. at 2961 n.7 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting), indicate that five members of the Court believe that the Jones Act's "substantive" provisions
apply to states. See also Employees, 411 U.S. at 283 (though FLSA wage and hour provisions applied
to state employees, its authorization of suits in district courts did not).
Difficult practical problems emerge from Justice White's apparent position that language sufficient
to impose substantive liabilities on states is not sufficient to subject them to federal court jurisdiction,
if applied to situations in which concurrent state fora are prohibited by federal law. Compare Mills
Music, Inc. v. Arizona, 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding abrogation on copyright claims) with
BV Eng'g v. UCLA, 657 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (copyright act not sufficiently clear
abrogation under Atascadero standards) and Richard Anderson Photography v. Radford Univ., 633
F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. Va. 1986) (Congress lacks power to abrogate immunity without state consent
pursuant to copyright clause, although language of copyright act broad enough to include states).
Under a federal common law approach, the creation of state liability under a federal law over which
federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction would overcome any mild presumption in favor of
state fora adjudicating money claims against the state. See BV Eng'g, 657 F. Supp. at 1250 (given
exclusive federal jurisdiction, it would be more reasonable to imply abrogation from copyright act,
though clear statement rule not met); see also infra note 441 (discussing competing approaches to
question of what inferences to draw from creation of monetary liability against states for availability
of that relief in federal district court).
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tended only to limit the state-citizen head of jurisdiction and affected
neither federal question nor admiralty jurisdiction," Justice Scalia pro-
vided the key vote.480 While he joined Justice Powell in overruling
Parden, he did so on a rather different rationale. Noting that an attack on
Hans had been raised only in amici briefs, he was "unwilling" to address
"both the correctness of Hans as an original matter, and the feasibility, if
it was wrong, of correcting it without distorting what we have done in
tacit reliance upon it," without full briefing by the parties.4 1 However,
he stated that these were both "complex . . .questions," plainly implying
that the vitality of the Hans doctrine is open to question.48 Hans figured
importantly in his opinion, not as a matter of constitutional law but as a
guide to legislative intent. Because Hans had been "assumed to be the
law" during the time of Congress' enactment of both the Jones Act and
the FELA, he concluded it would be unreasonable to "interpret the stat-
utes as though the assumption never existed."
433
The suggestion in Justice Scalia's brief opinion that many issues of
Eleventh Amendment law can be resolved on statutory grounds is indica-
tive of a broader point: Overruling Hans and its progeny and moving
towards a federal common law view of state sovereign immunity in federal
question cases may have little effect on the district courts' jurisdiction. A
transition period governed by questions of statutory interpretation will be
resolved largely in favor of the states. Indeed, with the important excep-
tion of section 1983 and related provisions,434 most significant federal reg-
429. Brennan also argued that the amendment did not bar suits by a citizen against his own state,
and that, in any event, Congress had clearly abrogated any constitutional immunity that the states
might enjoy. 107 S. Ct. at 2958-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
430. justice (then Professor) Scalia, writing critically of the sovereign immunity of the federal
government, has noted that sovereign immunity can result in a "blatant affront to the basic precepts of
justice. ... Scalia, supra note 354, at 869 (1970). But see id. at 886 (sovereign immunity concept
more important in cases against "foreign" states in federal court).
431. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2958 (Scalia, J., concurring).
432. Id.
433. Id. The Jones Act preceded Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921), in which the Court
first clearly held that the Eleventh Amendment barred admiralty suits against states even though its
text refers only to suits "in law or equity." While this chronology raises some questions about Scalia's
methodology, see Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2961 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting), once Hans was decided the
Court's willingness to extend constitutional sovereign immunity principles to areas of federal jurisdic-
tion not covered by the amendment's terms was evident. Cf. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976)
(relevant inquiry not whether Congress correctly perceived then-state of law but what its perception
of state of law was); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982)
(same).
434. Section 1983 is an important exception to the potential application of the constitutionally
erroneous but statutorily relevant view of Hans on which Scalia's opinion depends. Section 1983,
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, was enacted at a low point in the Court's willingness to
bar relief on grounds of sovereign immunity and a corresponding high point in the use of the nominal
party rule. See Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203, 220 (1872) (if state cannot be sued, that is
sufficient reason to permit case to proceed against named officer). Under a consistent application of
the view that legislation is to be interpreted against the background of prevailing constitutional inter-
pretations, section 1983 might be applied broadly to permit many forms of relief, at least if the nomi-
nal defendant is a state official. In view of Fitzpatrick, moreover, the question whether section 1983
authorizes suits for damages directly against the state is not one of congressional power but ultimately
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ulatory statutes that might impose monetary liabilities on states enforcea-
ble in federal district courts were enacted after the 1880's, when the
groundwork for Hans was completed.4 35 Some, in fact, were enacted after
1973 when the decision in Employees began to construct a "clear state-
ment" rule for interpreting federal statutes. Scalia has articulated a ra-
tional basis for interpreting many earlier enacted federal statutes that do
not specifically indicate that states as states may be sued in federal court
for damages. 36
Many of the Court's recent Eleventh Amendment decisions involved
claims against states based on federal statutory rights.437 If Hans' reason-
ing were disavowed, the question whether states should be subject to a
judicial cause of action for monetary relief in federal court will turn on
interpretation of the statute in light of legislative purpose or intent.48' The
only one of legislative intent (at least with respect to claims alleging violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment or legislation enacted thereunder). Abandoning Hans, however, has no necessarily dis-
positive impact on whether section 1983 should be read as abrogating states' immunity or applying
substantively to states themselves. Even against a constitutional background that is neutral as to state
sovereignty, one must ask whether the statutory language "person [acting] under color of state law"
encompasses states. See Will v. Michigan, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W. 2d 749 (1988), cert. granted,
108 S. Ct. 1466 (question presented whether states, or their officers when sued in official capacity, are
"persons" for purposes of state court section 1983 damage suit); cf Monell v. Department of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (cities are "persons"). But see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. at 338-45
(section 1983 does not overcome Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court, possibly
implying that "states" are not "persons" under section 1983 as matter of substantive coverage). For
discussion of whether section 1983 was intended to make states liable for actions at law, see Note,
Amenability of States to Section 1983 Suits: Reexamining Quern v. Jordan, 62 B.U.L. REv. 731
(1982); see also Note, Quern v. Jordan: A Misdirected Bar to Section 1983 Suits, 67 CALIF. L. REV.
407 (1979); Comment, Concurrent Jurisdiction and Attorney's Fees: The Obligation of State Courts
to Hear Section 1983 Claims, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1207, 1231 (1986); cf. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448
U.S. 1 (1980) (where state court entertained section 1983 action against state to recover welfare bene-
fits, attorneys fee provisions of section 1988 must be applied). Even if section 1983 were reinterpreted
to authorize a cause of action for monetary relief directly against states, it is not clear, given the
different understanding of state sovereign immunity from the 1880's until recent years, that federal
courts should entertain such suits with respect to federal statutory violations under statutes that do not
themselves authorize remedies against the state. But cf. id. at 7 (section 1983's reference to "laws" not
limited to civil rights statutes).
435. See also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 11 (Powell, J., dissenting) (summary of federal
laws imposing obligations on state and local governments upon which section 1983 might permit suit);
cf. supra note 434.
436. Whether Scalia would distinguish substantive coverage from remedies in the interpretation of
statutes affecting states is unclear, as is his view whether remedial provisions might apply in state but
not federal district courts. See Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2958 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also supra note
120 (noting confusion in older cases between Eleventh Amendment and general sovereign immunity
doctrines in state court litigation).
437. In addition to Welch, see Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985) (federal welfare claim);
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985) (federal Rehabilitation Act); Quern v. Jor-
dan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979) (welfare); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (same); Employees v.
Department of Pub. Health, 411 U.S. 239 (1973) (Fair Labor Standards Act). Most of these cases,
moreover, involved claims by citizens against their own states. The major Eleventh Amendment cases
in the federal courts of appeals likewise involve questions of state liability in federal courts under
federal statutory schemes. See cases cited supra note 412.
438. "Sovereign immunity" as a catchphrase may obscure several related but distinguishable
questions: (1) whether the substantive requirements of the statute apply to states; (2) whether the
statute should be construed generally to authorize a private cause of action; (3) whether the cause of
action is available against states; and (4) if so, whether it may (or in some cases, must) be brought in
a federal or a state court. See also Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2957 (White, J., concurring) (Jones Act does
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Eleventh Amendment would have no bearing on the question of jurisdic-
tion to award monetary relief under these statutes, since it would be un-
derstood not to apply to claims arising under federal law.
One might conclude that, if states' immunity from suit has no constitu-
tional basis, then at least in the future there should be no special clear
statement or clear evidence rule,439 whatever special rules apply to the
interpretation of statutes enacted against prevailing but erroneous consti-
tutional decisions. But understanding sovereign immunity as a form of
federal common law, serving federal interests in providing appropriate
remedies and in allocating some federal question claims to state courts,
may support, on broader grounds than those Scalia suggested, some form
of clear evidence approach to questions of statutory abrogation of immu-
nity for both prior and newly crafted legislation.4, 0 A clear evidence rule
provide remedy against state, though not in federal court); Employees v. Department of Pub. Health,
411 U.S. at 287-98 (Marshall, J., concurring) (same as to FLSA). There is much disagreement
generally over the proper role of courts in implying monetary causes of action from federal statutes, a
debate reiterating disputes over whether interpretation should be governed by a strictly construed
legislative intent or by more broadly discerned understandings of legislative purpose. See generally
HART & WECHSLER 3D ED., supra note 156, at 943-50; HART & SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1410-11, 1414-15 (tent. ed. 1958);
Note, Intent, Clear Statements and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme
Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892 (1982). If one generally presumes that courts should play an active role
in developing remedies for statutory violations, one may be more likely to conclude that a cause of
action is available against all regulated entities, including states, than if one believes that courts should
not supply remedies not expressly provided for. See Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1276 (principles
generally limiting courts' implying monetary causes of action also support clear evidence rule for
finding abrogation of immunity). Yet even if one generally believes it appropriate for courts to develop
remedies not specified in a statute, federalism interests-both in assuring that states can use political
mechanisms in Congress to forestall undesired regulation and in providing an important role for state
courts in the development of federal constraints upon state action-might lead one to support some
form of clear evidence approach.
439. The clear statement rule of Atascadero seems to require the use of unambiguous language in
the statute itself to abrogate immunity. 473 U.S. at 240. Such a clear statement rule can plainly
obstruct Congress' actual intent. If, as I argue, state sovereign immunity is not a constitutionally
required principle, judicial insistence on such a stringent rule seems inconsistent with Congress' pre-
sumed primary role in law-making. Cf Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double
Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 264 (1973) (discussing clear statement
rules as legitimate form of judicial resistance to legislative purpose to depart from established
principles).
A clear evidence rule, such as Professor Field proposes, would protect states only where the statute
and legislative history are ambiguous, but would find abrogation where, on all evidence, abrogation
was Congress' intent. Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1250-52. A "clear evidence" rule, while not
necessarily obstructing legislative intent, represents a policy preference of the courts, that may be
legitimate but which requires a reasoned basis. If clear evidence rules are applied prospectively, they
appear to be a relatively mild form of judicial discretion, visible and amenable to congressional correc-
tion, without challenge to the authority of the courts as principled expositors of federal law.
440. That sovereign immunity is a federal common law doctrine may not, by itself, be sufficient to
justify narrowly construing statutes that arguably modify the common law rule, compare Shaw v.
Railroad Co., 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 557, 565 (1879) (statutes in derogation of common law to be nar-
rowly construed) with Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952) (remedial statutes to be
liberally construed), particularly in light of the Court's willingness to abandon federal common law
remedies in the face of possible statutory preemption. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319
(1981) (no clear evidence requirement for federal statutory displacement of federal common law of
environmental nuisance). But see Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1276 (suggesting that common law
character of sovereign immunity justified clear evidence requirement for federal statutory abrogation);
see also W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 657 (1988). The
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for liabilities, remedies, and fora may increase the likelihood that Con-
gress will actually focus on these questions and that the states have suffi-
cient notice to permit them to advocate their interests in Congress. In light
of Congress' heightened responsibility under Garcia as the primary pro-
tector of states' interests in their own sovereignty, such a rule may be
particularly appropriate.4
Court's refusal to find statutory displacement of common law immunities in section 1983 litigation,
see Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951); supra note 339, however, suggests that common
law governmental immunities are hardier than at least some common law remedies.
Professor Field has suggested that constitutional doubts about the substantive regulation support a
clear statement approach, in a case such as Employees v. Department of Pub. Health, 411 U.S. 279
(1973), Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1251-52, 1274, and that federalism interests justify a clear
evidence approach under which ambiguous statutes would be presumed not to abrogate immunity. See
also Brown, supra note 1, at 383. The Court itself, however, has not limited the clear statement rule
to constitutionally questionable substantive law. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). It justifies the
clear statement approach on the dual grounds that sovereign immunity is part of a constitutional
balance of powers and that courts expand their own jurisdiction when they find that states can be
sued. Id. at 242-243. Since jurisdiction is effectively exercised over states in injunctive actions, these
justifications seem unpersuasive. Furthermore, since sovereign immunity is not a constitutional princi-
ple in federal question cases, the assertion that courts are "expanding" their jurisdiction is mislead-
ing-courts have constitutional power to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims against states, but
have in effect abstained from doing so. See supra Part IV(C)(5); see also Shapiro, supra note 346, at
574-75 (discretion essential to proper exercise of jurisdiction).
441. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-56 (1985). The premise of
Garcia could, considered abstractly, be fulfilled either by a rule providing that states will be subject to
regulation, liability, and suit in the lower federal courts under generally worded federal statutes or
that, without further specification, they will not. The important point for assuring informed congres-
sional action arguably is the prospective application of whichever interpretive rule will be followed.
But see Lane, Legislative Process and its Judicial Renderings: A Study in Contrast, 48 U. Prrr. L.
REv. 639, 656-57 (1987) (state legislators unaware of rules of construction). Changes in the structure
and political organization of Congress may cast doubt on the assumption that its processes can be
relied on fully to account for state interests, see Kaden, supra note 178, at 860-68; Lee, supra note
178, at 338, and thus might justify the judicial assertion of clear evidence rules to protect states from
the consequences of Garcia.
Whether separate clear evidence requirements should apply to issues of substantive coverage, liabil-
ity to a damages remedy, and forum, is unclear. Where a federal statute plainly regulates the primary
behavior of states, the federal common law factors discussed in Part IV above may nonetheless justify
a clear evidence rule to defeat implication of a monetary remedy against a state. Where a federal
statute both clearly applies to states and provides generally for a private cause of action, as for exam-
ple in the FLSA provisions in Employees, imposition of a separate clear evidence rule on the sovereign
immunity questions of forum and liability poses a somewhat greater risk of interfering with Congress'
actual intent. It nonetheless may be justified on the assumption that inertia or inattention may prevent
Congress from specifying its intent as to state damage liabilities and in view of the federal common
law that disfavors monetary relief against states in federal court and supports state court adjudication
of claims for monetary relief against states. In this setting, a finding that the statute did not provide
for a monetary remedy in federal district court would permit state court involvement, subject to Su-
preme Court review, in the interpretation of ambiguous federal remedial provisions. But cf Employ-
ees, 411 U.S. at 286 (implying that Congress did not intend to subject states to damages under section
16(b)); id. at 287 (reserving question whether such suits may be brought in state court against state).
Were a federal statute clearly to authorize private suits against states for monetary relief, applying a
separate clear evidence rule with respect to the availability of a federal forum may be more difficult to
justify: It might be argued that Congress' intent to overcome the federal common law rule is clearly
enough evinced in its authorization of suit. On the other hand, a separate clear evidence rule as to
forum might be thought justified by those federal interests favoring state court adjudication of such
claims-at least where other factors, such as Congress' attempt to affirmatively involve states and
their agencies in the administration of the scheme, suggest that allocating the claims to state court is
consistent with overall statutory purpose. In any event the Court would not be limited to the language
of the statute in determining Congress' intent, and Congress' intention to provide a federal forum
would control. See infra note 444.
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There is a difference between legitimate interpretation and unwar-
ranted obstruction, a difference obscured by the increasing rigor of the
Court's clear statement approach. 4 " In Atascadero State Hospital v.
Scanlon, the Court, construing legislation enacted under the Fourteenth
Amendment and clearly imposing substantive anti-discrimination rules on
state recipients of federal funds, concluded that Congress could only sub-
ject states to suit in federal court by clear language in the statute itself;
inferences from legislative history would not suffice."4 3 Congress promptly
corrected the Court's apparently mistaken conclusion as to its intent.444 In
general, the Court's interpretive approach to statutes enacted under the
Fourteenth Amendment, expressly designed to enforce rights against state
action, should differ from approaches toward statutes enacted under other,
more general congressional powers.445 Where Congress enacts remedial
legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment that substantively applies to
states and generally provides for a private cause of action for damages, it
is doubtful whether any rigorous clear evidence rule arising from the pre-
sumptions of common law sovereign immunity is an appropriate interpre-
tive tool.
446
Where state liabilities are established under other congressional powers,
a more complex inquiry based on a range of indicia of Congress' intent
and statutory purpose must be invoked. Critical to an intelligent resolu-
tion of these problems is an appreciation of the degree to which applica-
tion of any presumption in favor of state court adjudication of monetary
liabilities would frustrate or advance the purposes of the statutory scheme.
442. The Court's application of clear statement rules that may obstruct Congress' statutory pur-
pose has not been limited to protection of sovereign immunity. See Note, supra note 438.
443. 473 U.S. at 242-43. In so holding, the Court marked a change from its past approach. See
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978) (relying on legislative history to support fee award
against state). See generally Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 304
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). But cf Brown, supra note 1, at 383, 387-88 (Atascadero might have
come out same way under less rigorous standard; original statute created damages liability only by
reference to different statute's implied right of action).
444. Atascadero had held that plaintiff could not maintain his statutory damages claim in federal
court. Congress quickly amended the statute to make explicit that it intended to overcome Eleventh
Amendment immunity and create the same remedies against states enforceable in federal court as are
available against other covered entities for discrimination by recipients of federal financial assistance.
Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d-7 (West
Supp. 1987)).
445. In Atascadero, the Court assumed the statute was enacted under both the spending clause
and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 473 U.S. at 244-45 n.4. But cf. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460
U.S. 226, 259-60 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Fourteenth Amendment not "blank check" for
Congress to override Tenth Amendment absent judicial declaration of right or obvious violation of
section 1 of Fourteenth Amendment). Where Congress legislates on a subject affecting primarily pri-
vate actors (though possibly including government entities), as in Parden or Welch, it might not
carefully consider any special effects of its legislation on states; where Congress enacts legislation
applicable to programs receiving federal financial assistance, as in Atascadero, the impact on states is
obvious, and it is less plausible that Congress failed to consider state and local interests.
446. But see Brown, supra note 1, at 384-85 (noting with apparent approval that Atascadero
establishes single clear statement rule for abrogations of state immunity under Fourteenth Amendment
as well as under other congressional powers).
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Thus, in Green v. Mansour, an inquiry freed of the misapprehension
that a constitutional rule of state sovereign immunity barred monetary re-
lief in federal court might have begun its statutory analysis with the fol-
lowing propositions: First, Congress intended to require states that had
wrongfully withheld welfare benefits to pay the wrongly-withheld bene-
fits. Second, one mechanism mandated by Congress to carry out the wel-
fare scheme, that could provide such retroactive adjustments, was that
states have administrative decisionmakers. 447 Although the retroactive lia-
bility was established, there remained the question of whether Congress
intended to overcome the federal common law presumption against afford-
ing monetary relief on accrued liabilities against states in federal district
courts. Given the required establishment of state fora for the provision of
such relief, one might reasonably conclude that the common law presump-
tion was not overcome.
448
The question precisely at issue in Green, whether a declaratory judg-
ment should have been given, is more difficult. The relevance of the state
administrative mechanism mandated by Congress is unclear. On the one
hand, it could be said that Congress wanted to retain some important
levels of state decisionmaking in the state systems; if declaratory relief
were granted on purely retroactive claims, it would deprive those state
decisionmakers of an opportunity to resolve the interpretive questions. On
the other hand, by mandating administrative decisionmaking under a
scheme of federal regulation, one could argue, Congress contemplated that
the tasks reserved to the state would be relatively ministerial in character,
involving application of clearly established standards. Thus, a federal de-
claratory judgment would not be inconsistent with the state scheme. Since
the district court was familiar with the relevant facts and issues, consider-
ations of judicial economy would have also favored proceeding to a final
declaratory judgment. The issue is difficult to resolve, but the more im-
portant point is that there is an alternative framework for determining
what relief is available in district courts against states that accounts for
state interests in a way more consistent with Congress' power to overcome
states' federal common law immunity.
447. See supra notes 284-90; see also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 692-96 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (provision for federal funding of retroactive hearing awards showed intent to create federal
right enforceable in federal court section 1983 action).
448. The relationship between these statutory issues and interpretive questions under section 1983
is complex, wholly apart from the issue of whether section 1983 covers states or abrogates their immu-
nity from suit in federal court. See supra notes 434, 447; see also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,
420-23 (1970) (HEW's power to cut off AFDC funds to noncomplying state does not preclude claim-
ants from declaratory and injunctive relief); compare Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (section
1983 action in state court proceeding to review administrative decision concerning past due federal
welfare benefits) with Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1 (1981) (Congress did not intend section 1983 actions to be available to enforce provisions of environ-
mental statutes containing their own enforcement clause, notwithstanding clause saving other reme-
dies). Full consideration of these questions is beyond the scope of this article.
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B. The Construction ofJurisdictional Provisions: Constitutional Neces-
sity and the Judicial Power to Give Relief
If the doctrine of sovereign immunity is one of federal common law, it
operates, of necessity, within the constraints of Congress' power to control
the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts and the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. The significance of this obvious point is that, at
some level, every sovereign immunity question (except perhaps for those
arising in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction) involves an issue of
statutory interpretation, one statute in question being the general jurisdic-
tional provision.","
If a state's claim of immunity from relief on federal grounds in federal
court is raised, the court may ask: Does a general jurisdictional provision
authorize this court to grant this remedy? The breadth and generality of
the federal question statutes would seem to support an affirmative answer
to this question.45 Yet since Congress has legislated against a background
understanding of sovereign immunity-not necessarily an erroneous con-
stitutional doctrine but a common law remedial preference-one might
also conclude that in enacting general jurisdictional statutes Congress con-
templated that a remedy disfavored under sovereign immunity doctrine
would not be chosen unless that remedy were provided for by other stat-
utes or was the only constitutional way in which to exercise the jurisdic-
tion conferred.4"1
449. See H. FINK & M. Tusnngr, supra note 306, at 413-14; see generally Tushnet, Constitu-
tional and Statutory Analyses in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1301 (1979).
Professor Field has argued that, to give the Eleventh Amendment its intended effect, general jurisdic-
tional statutes enacted in the language of Article III conferring jurisdiction over suits between "a state
and citizens of another" should not be construed to abrogate states' common law immunity. Field,
Part II, supra note 1, at 1275 n.31 1. It is unclear whether Field would extend this proposition to the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the general federal question statute, see id. at 1264 n.272, or whether
her point applies only to jurisdictional statutes framed in the language of that part of Article III that I
argue the Eleventh Amendment was intended to repeal. It is also unclear under her proposed rules of
construction the degree to which courts acting under such a general jurisdictional statute would be
precluded from varying the common law rules of sovereign immunity. See id. at 1262-65, 1278. Her
position suggests that the grant of jurisdiction would leave the court free to develop, though not abro-
gate, common law immunity except where abrogation is required by some other law that controls a
controversy within the court's jurisdiction. This conclusion appears to be at odds with her otherwise
nonconstitutional theory of state sovereign immunity.
Although it may be sensible to say that a general jurisdictional statute does not by itself abrogate
states' common law immunity, I disagree with any suggestion that the Constitution requires this mode
of construction in federal question or admiralty jurisdiction cases. If federal courts are given jurisdic-
tion over questions arising under a federal law that refers generally to states, then I would construe
the jurisdictional grant to give the courts the power to award whatever relief is necessary to vindicate
the general right in question. On the other hand, my interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
would stand as an obstacle to efforts to confer jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction in state law
cases.
450. See supra notes 343-346. See also H. FINK & M. TUSHNFT, supra note 306, at 55 (arguing
that principle of Bell v. Hood is that general grants of federal jurisdiction should be construed to
authorize effective remedies for invasion of legal rights).
451. While Congress may have expected that, in exercising federal question jurisdiction, courts
would employ traditionally available remedies, Congress cannot be presumed to have given the courts
jurisdiction to effect an unconstitutional result or jurisdiction under which they may not interpret
1988] State Sovereign Immunity
The remedial preference described above, regarded as a form of federal
common law, clearly must yield where the supremacy of constitutional
law requires a remedy normally disfavored in the doctrine.452 The Fifth
Amendment is just such a provision and illustrates the point. The Court
has recently held that the just compensation requirement of that clause is
a "self-executing" command to provide for the payment of compensation
for any governmental taking.45 Does the state's sovereign immunity from
suit in federal court foreclose those courts from requiring states to provide
compensation if the state fails to provide an adequate opportunity for the
adjudication of those claims?"5"
For a court otherwise having jurisdiction of the claim to answer that
question affirmatively would be inconsistent with the basic command of
Marbury that the court must apply the Constitution as law where it is
controlling in cases properly before the court.455 Where the Constitution
some part of the Constitution. See Bator, supra note 229, at 1035; Hart, supra note 229, at 1402.
Where state remedies are inadequate or unavailable to vindicate the alleged federal right, application
of the federal common law rules of state sovereign immunity in choosing remedies under a general
federal jurisdictional statute could place the Court in that uncomfortable, and perhaps unconstitu-
tional, position. Cf. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933) (notwithstanding absence of provision
for award of interest, where taking has occurred, Court having jurisdiction of claim against govern-
ment is required by Constitution to award interest).
452. Professor Tribe agrees that, at least in those cases involving constitutional restraints opera-
tive on both federal and state governments, courts can abrogate what he sees as a constitutional rule of
state sovereign immunity. Tribe, supra note 1, at 696 n.73. He argues that, where a constitutional
rule constrains both levels of government, federal courts will exercise restraint because of the effect on
other branches of the federal government; likewise, if the court oversteps the proper line, Congress is
more likely to take action to correct the court's ruling. While Professor Tribe's analysis is intriguing,
it is also more contorted than the common law approach. The distinction Tribe draws between
prohibitions on both levels of government and prohibitions only upon states seems far removed from
any understanding of the original intent of the Eleventh Amendment. If the amendment constrains the
courts' exercise of federal question jurisdiction in actions against states, it is difficult to justify excep-
tions for both congressional and judicial abrogation, except perhaps on a chronological theory that the
Civil War and subsequent amendments limit the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, the premise that
the Court may abrogate states' immunity only where it would also abrogate the federal government's
immunity is in tension with the view that there is a more substantial constitutional basis for restraints
on judicial entry of monetary relief against the federal than the state governments. See supra note 379.
Finally, that Congress may "veto" judicial abrogation of the immunity of the United States, e.g., by
providing alternative remedies, does not necessarily imply that it will be alert to do so with respect to
the states.
453. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378,
2383-85 (1987). The Fifth Amendment is a good illustration, because there is no ambiguity on the
substantive question of whether the Constitution itself requires the payment of money by the govern-
ment that takes property. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
454. First English strongly suggests not. The Court considered and rejected the Solicitor Gen-
eral's argument as amicus curiae "that the prohibitory nature of the Fifth Amendment combined with
principles of sovereign immunity, establishes that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the
power of the government to act, not a remedial provision." Id. at 2386 n.9 (citation omitted). The
Court quite firmly rejected this position: "[our past] cases make clear that it is the Constitution that
dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a taking." Id.
455. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); cf. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.
228, 242 (1979) (where there is no other effective means to enforce constitutional rights, litigant
"must be able to invoke the existing jurisdiction of the courts for the protection of their justiciable
constitutional rights"); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983) (federal courts' statutory jurisdiction
to decide federal questions confers adequate power to award damages to victim of constitutional viola-
tion, although whether to do so requires common law remedial analysis of other factors).
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provides a self-executing command to a state to make payment, and where
no other effective forum exists where the claim can be presented," 6 it is
fundamentally inconsistent with the predicate of a constitutional system to
invoke a nonconstitutional tradition of sovereign immunity to defeat the
claim. Indeed, the very clarity of this textual provision for a monetary
remedy is inconsistent with a premise of sovereign immunity as a constitu-
tional doctrine, at least as a doctrine separate and apart from whatever
constraints on jurisdiction Congress may impose on the federal courts.""'
456. The Fifth Amendment, the only constitutional provision with a clearly self-executing re-
quirement of a monetary remedy, has been interpreted consistently with the forum allocation principle
discussed above. The Court has held that, with respect to takings under color of state law, no constitu-
tional deprivation occurs by the mere fact of a taking so long as the state has provided a mechanism to
award the constitutionally-requisite just compensation. No violation occurs until after unsuccessful
attempts to obtain compensation. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172, 194-97 (1985). Under Hamilton Bank claims against a state for compensation for
takings are generally adjudicated initially in state courts, with federal review perhaps available only in
the Supreme Court. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1980). But
if a state did not provide an adequate mechanism for resolution of those claims, there is, in my view,
no constitutional or jurisdictional barrier to a federal district court entertaining such a claim for relief.
A difficult question, though, is how to determine whether a state remedy is inadequate. Some might
argue that if there is a state court that could hear the claim of remedial inadequacy, the general state
court remedy is not inadequate. Cf HART & WECHSI.ER 3D ED., supra note 157, at 1342 (discussing
Tax Injunction Act); compare (if state court has procedure for hearing federal claim, remedy is ade-
quate) with id. at 530 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (substance of state court remedy must also be ade-
quate). On the other hand, where state law is clearly settled against the availability of a mechanism to
vindicate the claim of federal right, requiring resort to state courts, with the slim chance of obtaining
Supreme Court review, see Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988) (eliminating Court's
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over state court cases), may be an effective denial of the federal right.
Where plaintiff demonstrates that the state remedial mechanism is inadequate, the federal common
law doctrine ought not bar access to the only federal forum reasonably certain to be available. Cf
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519, 1528 (1987) (requiring presumption that state reme-
dies are adequate where plaintiff fails to present federal claim in pending state court proceedings).
457. See supra note 195. Whether an individual is entitled to a monetary award against a state
turns, not on a general constitutional rule of immunity, but on whether such a remedy is necessary to
vindicate the particular constitutional right in question. In this respect, I differ somewhat from Profes-
sor Field, who believes that the relevant inquiry must be whether the particular constitutional provi-
sion in question abrogates states' common law immunity and that this abrogation question turns on
the specific intent of the framers. The result in Hans would survive her common law approach to
states' immunity because the only debate over state suability during the ratification of the Constitution
concerned Article III, and "[n]o one intimated . . . that the contract clause of its own force might...
remov[e] states' immunity." Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1267. Indeed, Field suggests, given the
limited debate on state suability, no other portion of the 1789 Constitution could be so construed. Id.
If, however, in determining what remedies are required against a state for violation of an affirma-
tive command of the Constitution, the courts are limited to those remedies specifically contemplated by
the framers, then it is difficult to see the task of the courts as "interpretation and development of the
common law immunity doctrine." Id. at 1265. While Field elaborates an argument that the courts'
power to vary common law immunities was "frozen" as of 1789, she then properly rejects that view as
inconsistent with our present understanding of the nature of judicial power. Yet her "unfrozen" view
seems surprisingly rigid or, alternatively, not based on principle: "[lit is unnecessary to impose a
freeze on federal judicial interpretation of sovereign immunity . . . [because] [flederal judicial abroga-
tion is not a realistic possibility . . . . Absent a freeze . . . judicial interpretation and development of
the common law immunity doctrine is to be expected, but judicial abrogation is not." Id. at 1264-65.
Regardless of what is to be expected, I argue that federal courts have the power and, in some circum-
stances, the obligation to provide a monetary remedy against a state-where the court has been given
jurisdiction over the question and where the Constitution itself requires such a remedy or where the
constitutional right can be vindicated only by affording such a remedy.
Field's failure to take this position may derive from her apparent view that the Eleventh Amend-
ment implies a constraint on the entire judicial power. Her notion that Article III is "neutral" on
State Sovereign Immunity
The proposition that the federal common law of state sovereign immu-
nity must yield to constitutional, as well as statutory, imperatives, is sug-
gested by reasoning in Malone v. Bowdoin,458 in which an action in eject-
ment was brought against a forest service officer of the federal government
to try his title as occupant of the land. An identical proceeding against two
army officers, brought in United States v. Lee,45 had been decided in
favor of the private plaintiff, with the Court rejecting the argument that
the suit was really against the United States and barred by sovereign im-
munity. In Malone, however, the Court, noting its own earlier refer-
ence480 to the Lee decision as the application of the "'constitutional excep-
tion to the doctrine of sovereign immunity,' ,,461 limited the holding in Lee
to those instances "'where there is a claim that the holding [of the prop-
erty] constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without just com-
pensation.' ,,46- Since the Court of Claims had been given jurisdiction,
since Lee, to entertain claims against the government founded on a taking
of property and to provide monetary remedies, in Malone there was no
constitutional necessity to construe the action in ejectment as anything but
a suit against the United States that was barred by the immunity of the
United States.
What the Court can be understood to have done, in its movement from
Lee to Malone, was to have insisted, first, that a remedy for unlawful
government conduct be provided if there was a jurisdictional basis for do-
ing so; second, in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary,
permitted the remedy that did not directly invade the public fisc; and
third, where Congress provided a monetary remedy, favored that remedy
over injunctive relief.4 3 The recognition in this context that constitutional
state sovereign immunity is ambiguous. Neutrality in this sense may mean that the enactment of
Article III did not abrogate state immunity or that the enactment of Article III neither abrogated
immunity nor authorized the federal courts to do so. I have argued that the Eleventh Amendment
limits only a portion of the Article III judicial power, the head of jurisdiction over diverse citizen-state
claims, and that Article III authorizes the federal courts to exercise the ordinary judicial power, in-
cluding the power to develop or change federal common law, in entertaining actions for relief against
states under federal question jurisdiction.
458. 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
459. 106 U.S. 196 (1882); see Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 222 (1897) (relying on Lee in suit
against state official).
460. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696 (1949) (refusing to
enjoin War Surplus Administrator from disposing of government coal plaintiff allegedly had contrac-
tual right to receive and holding that action within officer's "statutory authority," even if wrongful,
could not be enjoined unless it were alleged to be unconstitutional).
461. 369 U.S. at 647-48 (quoting Larson, 337 U.S. at 696). If sovereign immunity were constitu-
tionally required, it would be bizarre to speak of a constitutional exception to the doctrine. The
language of Lee and Malone thus suggests that, even as to the federal government, sovereign immu-
nity may be largely a form of federal common law.
462. Malone, 369 U.S. at 648 (quoting Larson, 337 U.S. at 697). See Malone, 369 U.S. at 647
n.8 (noting that unlike in Lee, Court of Claims could give just compensation for taking of plaintiff's
land).
463. The Larson Court, in explaining why monetary relief against the government (when author-
ized by Congress) was preferred, sought to justify the inversion of the remedial hierarchy for public
wrongs:
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requirements justify providing relief otherwise barred by immunity doc-
trines should have no less application with respect to claims against states.
This is not to say that, in Malone, the availability of a Court of Claims
remedy should have been dispositive of the question whether the action
against the officer should have been entertained. Rather, the Court should
have asked whether any important federal interests warranted specific re-
lief against the allegedly wrongful possession, 8 4 and whether, in light of
those interests, Congress intended the Court of Claims remedy to be ex-
clusive where disputes as to title to property in the government's posses-
sion were raised.4 16  The question for the continued development of the
federal common law of government immunities must ultimately be, as to
cases within the courts' subject matter jurisdiction, what kinds of remedies
are necessary or appropriate to vindicate the federal right. That inquiry
can never be fully answered by an independent and co-equal judiciary
blindly deferring to legislative remedies.4 6
[Ilt is one thing to provide a method by which a citizen may be compensated for a wrong done
to him by the Government. It is a far different matter to permit a court to exercise its compul-
sive powers to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it to act. There are the
strongest reasons of public policy for the rule that such relief cannot be had against the sover-
eign. The Government, as representative of the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its
tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed question of property or contract right.
337 U.S. at 703-4. See also id. at 691 n.11 (dictum that even if officer acts unconstitutionally, relief
requiring "affirmative action" or disposition of "sovereign property" barred). If, however, Congress
had not seen fit to provide the monetary remedy, the tenor of the opinion suggests that "strong[]
reasons of public policy" would require that the action for specific relief against the officer be permit-
ted. The opinion thus illuminates the view of federal sovereign immunity as having a content influ-
enced by the presence of statutorily prescribed remedies. The nominal question posed by the opinion
is: When is a suit against an officer also one against the United States? The question it in fact
answered was: What remedy, in addition to a monetary remedy provided explicitly by Congress,
should courts make available in actions brought under general jurisdictional provisions for alleged
governmental wrongdoing? This question is closely related to whether, from statutes providing no
monetary remedy but specifically contemplating other forms of enforcement, a monetary remedy
should nonetheless be implied. See supra notes 438, 441. Interestingly, Congress provided a substitute
for the ejectment action barred by Malone when, in 1972, it authorized suits against the United States
to quiet title. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1982).
464. The federal common law of sovereign immunity should address not only the question of
whether any remedy is available for the alleged violation of law, but also the adequacy of that remedy.
See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 247 (1931) (remedy provided by
state law for discriminatory taxation inadequate). If the Fifth Amendment confers a right to be free
from governmental takings absent a legislative decision that the particular property, or type of prop-
erty, is needed for a public purpose, the availability of a monetary remedy would not necessarily be
sufficient to vindicate the federal constitutional interest in retaining one's property. See also Malone,
369 U.S. at 648 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (damage award insufficient for claimant seeking possession
of property). Compare Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680-90 (1981) (where President
had authority to enter accord, Court of Claims remedy sufficient to redress taking) with Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (Court of Claims remedy uncertain and does not
preclude injunction against President's unauthorized taking).
465. Malone, 369 U.S. at 650-51 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Larson, 337 U.S. at 722-23 (Frank-
furter, J., dissenting) (both arguing that existence of Court of Claims remedy should not be dispositive
on existence of remedy against officer). Apart from the question of individual right is the question of
whether Congress itself would prefer not to proceed with a taking for which compensation would be
required when the taking results from a misunderstanding of ownership interests. See Cramton, Non-
statutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need for Statutory Reform of Sovereign
Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant, 68 MICH. L. REv. 387, 414 (1970).
466. Cf Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 236-44 (1979) (distinguishing implied rights of action
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C. Stare Decisis and The Problem of Transition
In Welch v. State Department of Highways, Justice Powell stated that
to abandon the view that the Eleventh Amendment principle of sovereign
immunity limits the judicial power over claims arising under federal law,
even when brought by a citizen against his own state, would result in
overruling "at least 17 cases, ' ' 7 an unsettling development that might
require major doctrinal changes in other areas of public law litigation." 8
Close scrutiny of Justice Powell's list of cases that would be overruled,
however, suggests that his claim is overblown. Overruling Hans' errone-
ous view of federal question jurisdiction need not drastically affect district
court jurisdiction, but may offer substantial advantages to simplifying and
making more coherent a body of law that has for many years been rightly
condemned as anomalous and inconsistent, both internally and with re-
spect to the basic constitutional norms by which we like to believe we are
governed.
1. Effect on Prior Caselaw
The seventeen cases cited by Justice Powell can be divided into five
groups: federal question claims involving rights under federal statutes;
federal question claims relating to state taxation; claims arising under
state law or diversity jurisdiction; admiralty claims; and claims within the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.
a. Federal Statutory Claims
At least five of the cases on Justice Powell's list involved actions by
citizens against their own states based upon a claim of federal statutory
under statutes from those under Constitution; for former, Congress' intent controlling, but courts pri-
mary enforcers for latter). But cf. Schweiker v. Chilicky, 108 S. Ct. 2460 (1988) (asserting congres-
sional superiority in formulating remedies for constitutional violations related to statutory rights);
Field, supra note 266, at 934-37 (questioning divergence in Court's approach to constitutional and
statutory implied rights). A "necessity" test is the standard that may be appropriate for inferring
remedies against states which a strong federal common law tradition, supported by contemporary
experience and functional concerns, does not provide. Without a stringent standard, it is unlikely that
limitations on relief against states based on institutional concerns of federalism would long survive
individual claims of right. But cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1971) (implicitly rejecting "essentiality" test in favor of "appropri-
ateness" standard in inferring from constitutional provisions monetary causes of action against indi-
vidual officers). In evaluating the necessity for, e.g., monetary relief against a state, the effectiveness of
other federal judicial remedies would be of primary concern in view of the courts' special role in
enhancing governmental accountability. See supra note 342; see also Engdahl, supra note 17 (contrac-
tion of common law damage actions against officers as effective remedy for government wrongs re-
quires abandonment of sovereign immunity in damage suits against government treasuries); cf. Ken-
tucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 161-62 n.2, 169 n.17 (1985) (apparently reserving question whether
Fourteenth Amendment authorizes "official-capacity" damage suits against state officials).
467. 107 S. Ct. at 2956 n.27.
468. Justice Scalia also expressed concern over the effects of overruling precedent in settled areas
of the law. Id. at 2958 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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right."6 9 Since Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon involved legislation
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
would permit suit thereunder, without changing the basic Eleventh
Amendment analysis, so long as sufficiently express words were used by
Congress.470  Indeed, Congress rapidly overruled the effect of Atas-
cadero.47' Four of these cases involved federal conditions to spending pro-
grams in which issues of statutory interpretation rather than congressional
power were dispositive. 47 '2 The Court's recent rejection of state challenges
to conditions on spending makes it likely that, under existing caselaw,
Congress could subject states to suit in federal court as a condition of their
participation in these programs, if Congress acts sufficiently clearly.""3 Al-
though Employees involved pure regulation, under present Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence, the question is at least open as to whether
Congress has power to subject states to such suit under its Article I pow-
ers, if it acts with sufficient clarity, with even conservative members of the
Court unwilling to deny the existence of such power.
474
Thus, to contend that a change in the framework would "overrule"
these cases in a way radically inconsistent with the existing framework of
judicial federalism is simply inaccurate. Under the approach outlined
above, inquiry would focus on Congress' intent; the result would at least
sometimes be identical.,"'
b. Challenges to State Taxation or Pending State Court Proceedings
Three other cases on Justice Powell's list4 76 were tax refund actions
against state taxing authorities that today would not differ in result were
469. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234
(1985); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees
v. Department of Pub. Health, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
470. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 243; cf Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 130-33 (1980) (uphold-
ing fee award on statutory non-civil rights claim pendent to constitutional claim). But cf. Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 9 n.7 (1980) (noting argument that even under section 5, Congress may not set
aside immunity on statutory claims).
471. See supra note 444.
472. Green, 474 U.S. at 64; Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242-46 (Rehabilitation Act); Quern, 440
U.S. at 342-46 (section 1983); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 674 (Social Security Act and section 1983).
473. See e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 107 S. Ct. 2793 (1987); see also Field, Part II, supra note 1,
at 1240 n.174. But compare Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (sustaining waiver as
regulatory condition to activities in interstate commerce) with Welch v. State Dep't of Highways, 107
S. Ct. 2941, 2948 n.8 (1987) (reversing Parden's statutory construction and purporting to reserve
decision on Congress' power, in regulating states, to require waiver of immunity). But even granting
that the question is open, abandoning Hans' view of the Eleventh Amendment will still not overrule
the commerce clause, spending power, or Fourteenth Amendment cases discussed above, given the
possible statutory grounds for those decisions.
474. See Brown, supra note 1, at 393 (Court will eventually adopt position that Congress can
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under Article I powers); L. TRIBE, supra note 247, at
185-86 (same). In Welch, all members of the Court were willing either to hold or to assume arguendo
that Congress had regulatory power under Article I to subject states to suit in federal court on mone-
tary claims. See supra text accompanying note 426.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 447-48.
476. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v.
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there no constitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity from suit. Nu-
merous federal statutory policies and judicial doctrines strongly favor state
court determination of challenges to state tax matters in the first instance.
Congress has prohibited federal courts from issuing injunctions against the
collection of state taxes where adequate state remedies are available.47
Both as a matter of statutory construction and of comity or equitable re-
straint, declaratory relief is likewise prohibited.478 Even damage actions
against state tax assessors in their individual capacity under section 1983
have been judicially declared unavailable.47 9
The policy of both Congress and the federal courts has been to avoid
even indirect interference with the state-established procedures for the col-
lection of taxes and for the adjudication of disputes concerning the legality
of those taxes. Only when the state provides no effective mechanism to
challenge the validity of a tax, either before or after its imposition, will
the Court articulate federal remedial constraints.4 " Given the strength of
the Court's policy to keep federal courts out of the initial process of adju-
dicating state tax disputes, there are ample statutory and doctrinal ba-
ses, 48 1 wholly apart from the Eleventh Amendment, on which the Court
could refuse to permit refund cases to be filed in federal courts where state
law provides an adequate refund procedure. Similarly, for some of the
problems presented in two cases on Powell's list seeking equitable relief to
Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
477. Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
478. California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982); Great Lakes Dock & Dredge
Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
479. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
480. See also Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981) (state no-interest rule does not
render refund action inadequate). Compare Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Musgrove, 335 U.S. 900
(1949) (state court's denial of jurisdiction over action to enjoin collection of taxes as barred by sover-
eign immunity treated as adequate state ground precluding review) with Georgia R.R. & Banking Co.
v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299 (1952) (upholding federal district court jurisdiction over action to enjoin
collection of same tax). After the federal action was initiated, the state asserted that other state court
remedies were available. The federal action was then stayed, but the state court found that appeals
were not available. The Supreme Court thereafter concluded that other available state court remedies
were not "plain, speedy and efficient" so as to bar jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act and went
on to reject the claim that the action to enjoin collection of the tax was a suit against the state for
Eleventh Amendment purposes. Id. at 306. This litigation not only shows the Court's substantial
deference to state proceedings for tax collection, but also reveals an exercise of federal judicial power
to assure that some adequate remedy be afforded for vindication of the claimed federal constitutional
right. See also Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (disagreeing with state court that refund
action unavailable due to alleged "voluntariness" of payment; state court finding of voluntariness
denied federal right in substance; implying that refund remedy is constitutionally required when ini-
tial payment of illegal tax is coerced).
481. As Justice Rehnquist observed in Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454
U.S. 100, 109 (1981), there is no inconsistency between the principle of comity and the granting of
relief where a federal court determines that available "state remedies did not adequately protect the
federal rights asserted." Accordingly, only where state remedies did not "adequately" protect the as-
serted federal rights would the Court issue relief against state taxation, even absent the supposed bar
of the Eleventh Amendment.
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 1
restrain state court prosecutions,"" other grounds are available, apart
from sovereign immunity, that might preclude such relief.4s8
c. State Law Claims
At least two of the cases Justice Powell cites, County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation4 s4 and Pennhurst State School & Hospital v.
Halderman,8 5 involved state law claims against a state or state officers.
Oneida involved a claim, based in part on state law, for a money judg-
ment against the state by name, albeit not within the party configuration
expressly prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. In both cases, while the
Eleventh Amendment need not be regarded as a bar to relief, as my previ-
ous discussion of Pennhurst indicated, there are substantial arguments
that jurisdiction over such state law claims should not be exercised on a
theory of either pendent or ancillary jurisdiction.486 Moreover, federal dis-
trict courts have discretion, reviewable by the Supreme Court, over
whether to exercise jurisdiction over appropriate pendent or ancillary
claims.4 ' The results in both cases could be sustained without reliance on
any broad constitutional theory of the Eleventh Amendment.
482. See Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933) (state, which intervened in federal diversity
action to request federal court to hold in its registry certain stocks, did not waive Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity to equitable relief restraining it from prosecuting claim for inheritance taxes in pend-
ing state probate proceeding; federal question concerning res judicata effect of prior federal judgment
could be raised in state court); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516 (1899) (Eleventh Amendment barred
injunction against state officials proceeding against bridge company for charging rates in excess of
those permitted by allegedly unconstitutional state law; after federal case filed and some preliminary
relief issued, indictments issued against company employees).
483. Under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975),
notions of "equitable restraint" and "Our Federalism" might preclude the lower federal courts from
granting relief against the prosecution of criminal indictments in a case like McGhee (at least if indict-
ments were properly filed prior to proceedings of substance on the merits), and, more speculatively, in
a case like Fiske. Cf Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 1519 (1987) (Younger abstention
applied in private civil litigation to force litigant to raise federal claim in pending state appeal). In any
event, injunctions against allegedly unconstitutional state conduct as in McGhee would not be barred
by the Court's present view of the amendment. See supra text accompanying notes 216-17.
484. 470 U.S. 226, 250 (1985).
485. 465 U.S. 89 (1984). A third, Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909), was a
diversity jurisdiction suit by contract creditors of the state liquor commission. After substantial initial
proceedings on the state law contract claim, an allegation under the contracts clause was added. To
the extent that the suit was properly regarded as one against the state, dismissal was consistent with a
view of the Eleventh Amendment as repealing only the party-based head of jurisdiction, notwithstand-
ing the presence of a federal question which had not given the court jurisdiction.
486. The argument against jurisdiction may be stronger in Oneida than in Pennhurst, for two
reasons. First, the claim by the county is clearly one against the state, rather than against a state
officer, and thus, assuming the indemnity claim to arise under state law, implicates the concern under-
lying the Eleventh Amendment more clearly than where the relief is sought against state officials and
could be satisfied without crossing common law barriers of sovereign immunity. Second, because this
claim in Oneida was a cross-claim by the county defendant against the state defendant, it bears little
relation to the need to make fully effective the exercise of federal question jurisdiction over a plaintiff's
underlying federal claim. See supra text accompanying notes 210-45 (discussing Pennhurst). If the
county's indemnity claim were found to arise under federal law, however, the Eleventh Amendment
should not bar its adjudication under federal question jurisdiction.
487. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (pendent jurisdiction); C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 45, § 3523, at 105-06 (ancillary jurisdiction).
State Sovereign Immunity
d. Admiralty and Original Jurisdiction Cases
Of the cases remaining on Justice Powell's list, two are related cases in
which the Court decided that the Eleventh Amendment required state
consent before the state could be sued in admiralty."" Exceptions to the
rigor of this rule have developed over time, at least in the lower federal
courts.4 9 Judicial recognition that states are not constitutionally immune
to admiralty jurisdiction need not change their liability to suit in federal
court in any significant way. Federal courts could continue to protect
states from judgments that would be inconsistent with the common law of
state sovereign immunity.490
Finally, we come to Duhne v. New Jersey,491 an attempt by a citizen of
New Jersey to invoke the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction over a
constitutional challenge to the Eighteenth Amendment. Although the citi-
zen's suit raised a federal question, the Court's original jurisdiction was
invoked because of the state's status as a party, as was the case in
Chisholm. But while the Court had entertained original actions between
the United States and a state,492 the Court had also suggested by the time
of this decision that only the party configurations specified in the first
clause of section 2 of Article III could be brought under the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction; and the Court soon thereafter held that the
mere presence of a state as a party and of a federal question was not
sufficient to confer such jurisdiction.493 Thus, dismissal would have been
required in any event, even if the Eleventh Amendment had never been
enacted, and accordingly, the revised understanding of the amendment
embraced by this analysis need not change the result in Duhne.
e. The Contracts Clause Cases
The contracts clause cases, like Hans itself, should also be reconsidered.
The contracts clause would seem to provide a constitutional command of
sufficient clarity to override the presumptions of the federal common law
of sovereign immunity. It expressly limits the states, and it was early on
488. Ex parte New York, No. 1, 256 U.S. 490 (1921); Ex parte New York, No. 2, 256 U.S. 503
(1921).
489. J. ORrH, supra note 1, at 140; Comment, The Eleventh Amendment Immunity and State-
Owned Vessels, 57 TuLANE L. REv. 1523, 1535 n.57 (1983); see supra note 200.
490. However, consistent with developments in the immunities of vessels of foreign governments,
states might not retain immunity in admiralty jurisdiction from claims arising from their "commer-
cial" conduct. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b).
491. 251 U.S. 311 (1920).
492. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
493. See Texas v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 258 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1922); see also Louisi-
ana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 16 (1900); California v. Southern Pac. Co., 157 U.S. 229, 258-59 (1895);
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 393-94 (1821); HART & WECHSLER 2D ED., supra note
141, at 249; Amar, supra note 6, at 254 n.160. But see C. WRI;H'r, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 45, §§ 4043, 4049 (arguing that "better view" would be that Court can exercise original jurisdic-
tion over any claim against state within judicial power on any basis). Moreover, prospective relief like
that sought in Duhne might be available against state officers despite the Eleventh Amendment.
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treated as a judicially enforceable constraint on a state's own contracts.494
Yet as the contracts clause doctrine has developed, states have been given
substantial latitude to eliminate or modify remedies provided in the con-
tract to enforce its provisions.
495
At least two important proponents of a more limited understanding of
the Eleventh Amendment believe that the Hans result can survive aban-
donment of its articulated view of the Eleventh Amendment for reasons
peculiar to the contracts clause. 498 Although a difficult question, it is per-
haps of less import today than in the nineteenth century, as the relative
importance of the contracts clause in the constitutional scheme has dimin-
ished. Moreover, Hans rested independently (albeit alternatively) on the
ground that the particular jurisdictional statute sued under did not extend
to any form of action that could not be brought in the state court. The
language of the modern federal question jurisdiction statute differs signifi-
cantly from the one in Hans, and thus Hans can be reconciled to a quite
different result should a state once again default on its debt obligations
and fail to provide an adequate state court remedy so as to justify abroga-
tion of the federal common law of state sovereign immunity.
494. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 132-36 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.); Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 247, at 613 (noting
that contracts clause not directed at state's own contracts, but approving its application to them).
Professor Field and Justice Brennan, however, have both argued that the contracts clause was not
intended to permit the assertion of affirmative claims against states. See Amar, supra note 1, at 1470
n.188 (suggesting that Fletcher v. Peck was wrongly decided insofar as it held prohibition on impair-
ments of contracts to apply to contracts of state).
495. See, e.g., Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (obligation of
contract is not impaired by law modifying the remedy for its enforcement). But cf. United States
Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) (when "state's self-interest" in own contracts at
stake, contracts clause requires scrutiny of legislative changes). Moreover, to the extent that the con-
tracts clause does not prohibit mere breach, as in failure timely to repay a debt, cf. Tidal Oil Co. v.
Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444, 451 (1924) (clause applies only to legislative acts), states would have sub-
stantial protection from debt actions in federal courts on substantive grounds, even if the claim were
regarded as one arising under federal law for jurisdictional purposes. See Fletcher, supra note 1, at
1123 n.337 (Chisholm facts would present no constitutional claim).
496. Justice Brennan has argued that the contracts clause was a "self-imposed" limitation on the
states, carrying with it no affirmative congressional power to enforce it. Employees v. Department of
Pub. Health, 411 U.S. at 319-20 n.7. The difficulty with this position is that it hardly accounts for
the clause being placed in the Constitution. If not even Congress was empowered to enforce the clause
affirmatively, then why should courts be able to enforce its requirements defensively? See id. at
292-93 n.8 (Marshall, J., concurring). See also Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S.
299 (1952) (entertaining action against state officer for violation of contracts clause). Field, by con-
trast, apparently would permit Congress to enforce the contracts clause by providing for actions for
monetary relief against states, but she does not read the constitutional provision itself as abrogating
state immunity. She concludes that, absent a congressionally created cause of action, the contracts
clause is not enforceable by the courts in a manner inconsistent with the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity. Field, Part II, supra note 1, at 1265-68. This view, while somewhat more plau-
sible than Brennan's, is troubling because of the degree to which it depends on a rigid adherence to a
presumed but unarticulated intent of the framers of the Constitution. See supra note 457. Yet the
argument that the contracts clause was not implicitly understood to authorize a federal cause of action
might better account for evidence that state debts and contracts were intended to be enforced through
the diversity, rather than the federal question, head of jurisdiction. The apparent tension between the
early view of the sweep of federal question jurisdiction and the understanding that claims for money
relief on a contract with a state could be heard only under the state-citizen clause is difficult to
resolve. See supra notes 101, 333.
State Sovereign Immunity
2. Doctrinal Coherence as a Virtue in Federal Litigation
Although some of the results of prior Eleventh Amendment decisions
admittedly would be left unchanged by the revised understanding urged
here, strong reasons nevertheless support the change.
First, articulated as a constitutional doctrine grounded in Article III
and the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine of state sovereign immunity to
relief on federal claims is so inconsistent with the establishment of judicial
power over all federal questions cases arising under a Constitution explic-
itly limiting state power that it lacks credibility as a reasoned exegesis.
Something else is in fact going on, and a failure to recognize and give
voice to that something has detracted from the Court's ability to serve as a
principled expositor of the Constitution.
Second, it is difficult to reconcile a constitutional doctrine of state sover-
eign immunity with Congress' power to abrogate that immunity. The con-
cept of a constitutional limitation on subject matter jurisdiction that Con-
gress can expand is fundamentally in tension with Marbury. Yet the
alternative, to conclude that Congress lacks power to subject states to fed-
eral judicial enforcement of obligations properly imposed by federal
law-suggesting that the judicial power is not coextensive with the legisla-
tive-is even more fundamentally inconsistent with the structure and pre-
mise of the Constitution.
Viewing the doctrine of state sovereign immunity as one of federal com-
mon law better accommodates both the concepts of congressional abroga-
tion and state waiver, clarifying the constitutional basis on which Con-
gress can make states liable for monetary relief in federal court and by
which states may consent to suit without threatening the stability of more
general Article III jurisprudence. This approach would also resolve the
tension that would otherwise exist between a constitutional rule of state
sovereign immunity and a constitutional rule that states provide relief in-
compatible with the common law doctrine. Although the federal common
law of sovereign immunity may recognize similar remedial distinctions, it
does so not simply because one or another form of relief is really against
the state, but because such forms of relief as the injunction (or even a
mandate to return specific property) have features which render them
more acceptable modes of providing judicial redress against governmental
wrongdoing.
Finally, tumultuous change in the scope of the district courts' jurisdic-
tion or of states' immunity from suit in federal district courts is unlikely to
result from overruling the erroneous interpretation of Hans. First, numer-
ous issues of congressional intent need to be resolved to find a state subject
to district court suit on federal statutory claims. Second, the state court
systems will likely provide remedies sufficiently adequate to forestall many
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claims for monetary relief based on remedial inadequacy from being suc-
cessful in the federal courts.
CONCLUSION
Marbury v. Madison proclaimed that the essence of civil liberty, of a
government of laws and not of men, was the availability of a judicial rem-
edy for governmental wrongdoing that invaded private legal rights.
Against the force of this principle stood a common law tradition of sover-
eign immunity, a tradition of English law misunderstood in its transposi-
tion to the United States, but reinforced by early political battles of the
young republic. Although federal separation of powers principles loosely
support some of the remedial distinctions drawn under the rubric of sover-
eign immunity, the articulation of sovereign immunity as a constitutional
principle has never been justified by logic as powerful as that of Marbury.
It cannot be so justified today, especially as applied to the states in their
relations to the demands of federal law. Recognizing the federal common
law background for this set of doctrines is consistent with our basic consti-
tutional structure and the role of the federal courts therein. And it will
permit the gradual evolution of a more focused and candid development of
the law of remedies for governmental wrongdoing in the continued strug-
gle to maintain a form of government that can both "control the governed
.. .and . . .control itself."1
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